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The europeanisation of grassroots greens: mobilisation in France, Italy and the UK

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

ANAS	<i>Azienda Nazionale Autonoma delle Strade Statali</i> (Autonomous National State Roads Agency)
ARLP	<i>Alternative Régionale Langon Pau</i> (Langon Pau Regional Alternative)
ATTAC	<i>l'Association pour la Taxation des Transactions pour l'Aide aux Citoyens</i>
BSE	Bovine spongiform encephalopathy
CGB	<i>Commission du Génie Biomoléculaire</i> (Biomolecular Engineering Commission)
CIACT	<i>Comité Interministériel d'Aménagement et de Compétitivité du Territoire</i>
CP	<i>Confédération Paysanne</i>
DOC	<i>Denominazione di origine controllata</i> (Controlled Designation of Origin)
EEB	European Environmental Bureau
EEC	European Economic Community
EMO	Environmental Movement Organisation
EU	European Union
FNE	<i>France Nature Environnement</i>
FNSEA	Fédération nationale des syndicats d'exploitants d'agricole
GEN	Genetic Engineering Network
GM	Genetically modified
GMO	Genetically modified organism
IGG	<i>Itinéraire Grand Gabarit</i> (heavy load relief road)
NAAG	No Alignment Action Group
NGO	Non-governmental organisation

OGM	<i>Organisme génétiquement modifié / organismo geneticamente modificato</i>
PdCI	<i>Partito dei Comunisti Italiani</i> (Italian Communist Part)
PRC	<i>Partito Rifondazione Comunista</i> (Communist Refoundation Party)
RSPB	Royal Society for the Protection of Birds
SAM	<i>Soccorso Ambientale Marremmano</i>
SANEF	<i>Société des Autoroutes du Nord et de l'Est de la France</i> (North and Eastern French Motorway Society)
SAT	<i>Società Autostradale Tirrenica</i> (Tyhrrenian Motorway Association)
SEPANSO	<i>Fédération des Sociétés pour l'Etude, la Protection et l'Aménagement de la nature dans le Sud-Ouest</i> (Federation of Societies for the Management and Protection of Nature in the South West)
TAV	<i>Treno Alta Velocità</i> (High Speed Train)
TEN-T	Trans-European Transport Network
TEN-T EA	Trans-European Transport Network Executive Agency
TOGG	Totnes Genetix Group
UK	United Kingdom
WWF	World Wildlife Fund for Nature

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Any scholar of social movements will attest to the importance of community and shared support for a common goal. This thesis is no different because although it bears my name it has been far from a solitary endeavour.

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Abstract

This thesis asks ‘what does europeanisation mean for the strategies and practices of grassroots green groups in Europe?’ and aims to identify the conditions under which these groups become ‘europeanised’. I identify three process of europeanisation: *direct europeanisation* – when an actor connects directly to the EU, *indirect europeanisation* – when an actor connects to a europeanised member state and *passive europeanisation* – when actors europeanise outside of state mechanisms. The grassroots green movement has largely evaded studies of europeanisation and so it is through examining europeanisation at this ‘base’ level, closest to the citizens, that this research makes an original contribution to our understanding of the variables that mediate the process of europeanisation and to our understanding of grassroots green activism in Europe.

This thesis takes its analytical framework from social movement theory and uses political opportunity structures and frames as domains in which it looks for evidence of europeanisation. Within these domains I distinguish between European and europeanised activity, teasing out the role of the nation state in mediating europeanisation at a grassroots level. Two cases are examined: anti-road protest and anti-GM protest in Britain, France and Italy between the period 2007-2010.

This thesis demonstrates that there is some evidence of europeanisation within grassroots green groups. It encourages a more nuanced understanding of europeanisation as a process that can occur outside the state and amongst actors who do not seek to impact the EU. It finds that both strategic and ideological considerations shape the political opportunity structures to which movements direct themselves. It also finds that the fit between the frames used in protest and the national masterframes is a powerful variable in explaining the extent of social movement europeanisation.

Declaration

I hereby declare that, except where otherwise indicated, this thesis is entirely my own work and that no part of it has been submitted for any other degree or qualification.

1 Introduction

'If European integration has long been an élitist project, its evolution involves growing pressures 'from below' – from social movement organisations and NGOs'

(della Porta & Caini, 2009: 168)

1.1 Overview

Across Europe, grassroots environmental activism now routinely takes place; every day, in every country. But what does it mean to mobilise in a political environment that includes an 'additional' and powerful level of government: the European Union? What political opportunities are available when the national – and sub-national – are supplemented by a European level? How do activists 'frame' – that is, how do they construct and diffuse the meanings of environmental problems? Is this frame becoming a more common one across Europe? These are the questions that this thesis seeks to answer. It offers insights into what europeanisation means for the mobilisation strategies and practices of the grassroots green movement in Europe and contributes to the nascent literature on the europeanisation of social movements.

In this thesis europeanisation is taken to mean *the process of constructing and diffusing formal and informal rules, beliefs and norms that originate in the EU and*

are interpreted by Member States. For environmental activism this process is important: it shapes the domestic and supranational political structures in which environmental policies are made, in which institutions and their actors operate, and in which new norms and practices become diffused between policy-makers and publics. In short, europeanisation means that the context in which green movements operate has changed. This thesis offers two core areas of potential change: political opportunity structures (POS) (*the structural features of a political system that shape the conditions for social movement action*) and frames (*action oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate the activities of a social movement group*). These two areas of analysis, drawn from the literature on social movements, are examined here as ‘domains’² where one might expect to find evidence of europeanisation amongst social movement actors. These two concepts are explored further in section 1.3 of this chapter.

The overall argument of this thesis is that the process of europeanisation occurs in ways that the existing europeanisation framework is unable to capture. Specifically, I identify three types of europeanisation:

- *Direct europeanisation*, caused by interaction between a national or sub-national actor³ and the European Union. Examples would include a social movement lobbying the European Commission, a Regional Government implementing European Union legislation or a political party sending

² Featherstone and Radaelli also use the concept of ‘domains’ of europeanisation which they define as: ‘the domains where the effects of europeanisation are supposed to materialize’ (2003: 35) .

³ ‘Actor’ here refers to social movements, interest groups, political parties, institutions or states.

representatives to the European Parliament. This concept maps on to my definition of *European* POS and frames outlined later in the chapter.

- *Indirect europeanisation*, caused by interaction between an actor and europeanised agents (policies, parties, institutions) at a national level. This could be a social movement lobbying their national or local government about their implementation of an EU policy, local chapters of a political party discussing their position with the party's European representatives, or small businesses getting advice from their city's European Officer. This idea is represented in the *europeanised* political opportunity structures and frames that are presented in this thesis.
- *Passive europeanisation*, caused by the emergence of pan-European relationships without the premeditated aim of addressing the European Union's national or supranational institutional impact. Examples of this process include social movement groups forming a pan-European network to share beliefs and strategies on an EU policy or the diffusion of pan-European understandings through European social media. Passive europeanisation is reflected in aspects of the *europeanised* frames and political opportunity structures presented later in this thesis.

Direct and indirect europeanisation are premeditated – actors seek to take advantage of 'European' opportunities such as additional points of institutional access, funding or European networks. Passive europeanisation is implicit and does not involve any

explicit attempt to connect to European opportunities. Rather, the construction and diffusion of europeanised rules and norms is implicit and occurs as a by-product of other channels of interaction such as networking.

Although other scholars have used the terms direct, indirect and (rarely) passive europeanisation, my thesis clarifies their meaning and adapts them to non-state actors. Existing definitions are inconsistent, contradictory and, as explained below, unsuitable for application to social movements. Bache and Marshall emphasise the issue of intention in their definitions. Direct europeanisation is ‘the *intended* impact of an EU initiative’ and indirect europeanisation ‘the *inadvertent* impact of an EU initiative’(2004: 5-6 - emphasis my own). Schimmelfennig similarly identifies intentionality as a distinguishing factor:

[d]irect mechanisms are those in which the EU takes a pro-active stance and intentionally seeks to disseminate its model and rules of governance beyond its borders. By contrast, indirect ones are those in which either non-EU actors have the active part or the mere presence of the EU generates unintended external effects (2010: 8).

However, Sciarini et al. use the same terminology to stress the distinction between *formal* and *informal* negotiations with the EU – direct europeanisation is ‘international negotiation between [a country] and the EU’ and indirect ‘when a non-EU member state adapts unilaterally to existing EU rules’ (2004: 354-355). These writings on direct and indirect europeanisation therefore offer two points of interest: notions of intention (to become europeanised), and formality (of interaction with the EU). Furthermore, the concepts of direct and indirect are most commonly deployed

in explaining the europeanisation of non-EU states such as Switzerland, where direct europeanisation refers to the negotiation of bilateral or international agreements with the EU and results in domestic change. Meanwhile, indirect europeanisation is the unilateral adoption of EU rules into domestic norms (Fontana, 2009; Schimmelfennig, 2010; Sciarini, Fischer, & Nicolet, 2004).

Defining direct and indirect europeanisation in this way raises two problems. First, these understandings overlap with other similar concepts. For example, Auel uses the term ‘passive europeanisation’ to refer to ‘national parliaments...as the mere objects or victims of europeanisation processes’ (Auel, 2006: 249) – which straddles the distinctions offered by Bache et al. between the concepts of ‘direct and indirect europeanisation’ and ‘voluntary and coercive europeanisation’. Do national parliaments knowingly have europeanisation forced upon them (coercively) or is it an inadvertent consequence of EU initiatives (indirect)? This tangle of concepts makes it difficult to identify the logic at work and harder still to study empirically.

A second problem is that these authors do not address the level of governance at which europeanisation occurs. It is assumed that direct or indirect europeanisation is something that happens to states (or national parliaments) as a result of their interaction with the EU. But what of sub-state actors? What of non-state actors? There is no way to capture the kinds of europeanisation process that occur at a more local level. By distinguishing between the europeanisation processes that occur as a result of direct and indirect connections to the EU, we are able to differentiate

opportunities that exist at *national or European levels of governance*. And by unravelling ‘passive europeanisation’ from these opportunities, we are able to capture the processes of europeanisation that are *not mediated by the state*.

Within the political opportunity structures and frames examined in this thesis I distinguish between *European* and *europeanised* domains. The key point of difference is the degree of direct connection to the European Union; in this way these domains map onto the three kinds of europeanisation outlined above. In the case of European POS and frames the connection to the European Union is a direct one – actors intentionally seek political access at the European level, or frame an issue explicitly as European. They are evidencing *direct europeanisation*. In the case of europeanised POS and frames actors knowingly seek European-inspired opportunities or frames at a national level, or they may tap into europeanised opportunities through engaging with new allies or sharing frames across European borders. Their connection to the European Union may be, but does not have to be, a premeditated one. In this europeanised domain they evidence *indirect* and, or *passive europeanisation*.

I argue that a grassroots or local green group will be europeanised to the extent that it is able to connect to either a European or europeanised domain. The extent to which these actors are europeanised varies across protest area, across countries and varies between the two domains of POS and frames. Finally, I also argue that opportunities for grassroots groups to europeanise are not contingent on their professionalisation or

institutionalisation – even the most informal and grassroots-based actors can show evidence of europeanisation.

My approach in investigating what this changed context means for the strategies and frames of the movement is explicitly comparative. I explore environmental protests on two issues: genetically modified (GM) crops and road-building. I present findings on protests on both issues across three EU Member States: France, Italy and the UK. In comparing these six individual campaigns, I identify two core ‘domains’, drawn from social movement studies, where one might expect to find evidence of europeanisation in grassroots groups: political opportunity structures (POS) and frames. Within these two domains, I identify the opportunities for social movements to experience direct, indirect or passive europeanisation.

The original contribution to social science of this thesis is threefold. First of all, it makes a theoretical contribution to the study of europeanisation by *accounting for europeanisation that occurs outside of the state*. Scholars of europeanisation have focussed their attention on policies (S. J. Bulmer & Radaelli, 2004; Schmidt & Radaelli, 2002), policy processes (Bomberg, 2007; Daviter, 2007) and political parties (Bomberg, 2002; Hines, 2003; Ladrech, 2001). It is only very recently that attention has been turned to the non-institutionalised field of social movements (Císař & Vráblíková, 2010; della Porta & Caini, 2009; McCauley, 2008a, 2008c). The most important consequence of earlier, institution/policy-centred body of work is the privileged role it affords to state. For example, Knill and Lehmkuhl (1999)

identify three mechanisms of europeanisation: domestic adaptation to a European institutional model, altered domestic opportunity structures, and altered beliefs and expectations. In all cases the state is the actor that adapts and alters. In a similar vein Green Cowles et al. (2001) have isolated the idea of 'goodness of fit' as a mechanism of europeanisation where the degree of europeanisation experienced by a state is determined by how well their domestic policies and institutions fit with those of the EU. All of these mechanisms hinge on the role of the state. It is the state that mediates the effects of europeanisation for the actors within it. While this is undoubtedly true, it does not give adequate consideration to those actors who do not work with the machinery of the state by, for instance, participating in policy-making or receiving state funding. How might a grassroots social movement experience europeanisation if not through the state? The first significant contribution of this thesis therefore is to develop an understanding of the processes of europeanisation that account for both state and non-state actors.

The second contribution made here is to the social movement literature. First, scholars of social movements have largely neglected to examine europeanisation. Although there is a growing body of work on the transnationalisation of movements (Doherty, 2006; Doherty & Doyle, 2006; Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Rootes, 2005; Tarrow, 1998, 2006), this focus is at the expense of investigating the specific processes associated with the impact of European integration. Where work on europeanised social movements has begun to take place, it has very rarely considered the grassroots level of the social movement spectrum (Rootes, 2002a); rather it concentrates on the activities of professionalised social movement groups or NGOs

in Brussels (della Porta & Caimi, 2009; Imig & Tarrow, 2001). It is through examining europeanisation at this 'base' level, closest to the citizens, that we are able to expand our understanding of the empirical effects of European integration on average European citizens (even if it is arguable whether 'activists' are 'average Europeans'). We gain a better sense of how europeanisation is refracted at different levels of governance and at different levels of political mobilisation.

Secondly, I problematise the idea of social movements as 'non-institutionalised' actors. Although this feature is cited as one that defines social movements, in reality social movement actors sit on a long spectrum where the divide between NGO and grassroots group is more blurred than the literature suggests. For example, while Friends of the Earth Europe may be easily identified as an NGO, the local chapter of the organisation in Edinburgh may share many more characteristics with neighbouring grassroots groups than with its alma mater. In the context of europeanisation this overlap between non-institutionalised grassroots group and institutionalised NGO is important. For instance if, as the literature suggests, the EU is most accessible to institutionalised groups (Börzel & Buzogány, 2010; della Porta & Caimi, 2007; Rootes, 2002a), these NGO groups are the actors most likely to experience europeanisation. But the relationship between europeanisation and social movement groups is more subtle than this – NGOs and their national and local chapters mediate the degree of europeanisation at a grassroots level. This thesis highlights the importance of a more nuanced definition of social movement, especially if it is to be studied in the context of europeanisation.

The third contribution of this thesis is a deeper empirical understanding of environmentalism in Europe. As studies of EU integration are concerned with the emergence of a new political order or a new way of ruling, environmental issues and protest are especially interesting areas of study. As Dryzek et al. (2003: 2) argue, 'environmentalism is tied up with some contemporary developments that may, in the end, produce a new kind of state whose emergence is of comparable historical significance to the earlier emergence of the liberal capitalist state and then the welfare state'. Certainly, the European Union, through its internal market and its related competencies, has had an impact upon green actors (Bomberg, 1998, 2002; Bomberg & Carter, 2006; Jordan, 2000; Landman, 1999). Furthermore, green movements are especially fertile ground for studying new social movements (NSMs) in Europe because, in many ways, they are typical of these NSMs (Doherty, 2002: 21). By studying EU environmentalism through the lens of the green movement, we are able to examine the interplay of a dynamic and often contentious policy area that is simultaneously trans-boundary and highly localised. The unique, emerging layers of governance that European integration delivers create a political environment for environmental activism that is both distinctive and deserves exploration.

1.2 Research Questions

This thesis draws on literatures in political science and sociology to address the question:

How has europeanisation altered the mobilisation strategies and practices of grassroots green groups in Europe?

In particular, I am interested in the way that europeanisation shapes the political opportunity structures within which a movement operates, and the way europeanisation shapes and/or diffuses the frames that they construct. While focusing on these specific questions, I engage with wider questions that arise from the existing literature on europeanisation and social movement studies:

- Where does the europeanisation of social movement predominantly occur – at the domestic or European level?
- To what extent does the degree of movement institutionalisation impact the degree of movement europeanisation?

The first of these sub-questions is posed in response to scholarship on multi-level governance, political opportunities, and supranational environmentalism. In their research on organised social movements in Europe, della Porta and Caimi (2009: 14) identify what they call ‘crossed influence’; that is, pressure at the national level to change decisions at the European level, or pressure at the European level used to change decisions at the national level. Meanwhile, Marks and McAdam (1996: 275) concur that europeanisation brings new arenas of action for social movements:

[W]e expect - in fact, can already discern - significant changes in the locus and form of social movements as a result of European integration.... So instead of the rise of a single new social movement form, we are more apt to see the development and proliferation of multiple movement forms keyed to inherited structures and the demands of mobilisation in particular policy areas.

Finally, Poloni-Staudinger (2008: 535) draws attention not only to the supranational nature of europeanised arenas, but also to the supranational nature of environmentalism in particular:

The European Union (EU) presents us with a unique case of supranational governance, particularly concerning its relation to environmental policy-making. Growing environmental awareness among European citizens in the 1960s and 1970s gave rise to demands for more attention to environmental issues at the supranational level.

Where do these ideas intersect? We are led to understand that European integration has brought additional levels of influence to be exploited by social movement actors. They are using these new arenas to apply European pressure at national level and national pressure at a European level. And these multiple dimensions are especially acute in the case of environmental issues. But, of course, other questions inevitably arise. How then do these opportunities shape the process of europeanisation? Is europeanisation greatest when grassroots groups are pursuing their agenda domestically or at the level of the EU? Are local and grassroots groups still within the reaches of the process of europeanisation?

The second of the sub-questions I have highlighted – ‘to what extent does the degree of movement institutionalisation impact the degree of movement europeanisation?’ –

stems from strands of literature linked to those outlined above. If social movements are to take advantage of new levels of governance and new political opportunities that have emerged as a result of European integration, will they then need to become institutionalised⁴ (della Porta & Caiani, 2007; della Porta, Kriesi, & Rucht, 1999; Rootes, 2002a, 2005)? Indeed, for some, the processes of europeanisation and institutionalisation are synonymous: '[e]uropeanisation...refers to process of institutionalisation that are specifically related to the EU and European integration' (Waterhout, 2008: 25). For others, institutionalisation is a conscious social movement strategy. For example, Rootes (2002a: 398) argues:

Whether or not environmentalists respond to the opportunities the EU presents will depend not merely upon the experience of national politics but also upon their preferred styles of political action. Action at the European level is most attractive to those whose styles of action are participatory only at elite level and for whom consultation, negotiation and lobbying are congenial.

For his part, Van der Heijden (1997: 33) posits that the development of this institutionalised style of action is largely dependent on the political opportunity structures within which a movement operates:

[T]he degree of institutionalisation to a large extent is determined by the specific political opportunity structure within which a social movement has to perform. In other words: in one country there will be more institutionalisation than in another depending on the political opportunity structure.

In short, these authors would lead us to believe that a social movement will be europeanised to the extent that they are able to adapt their action repertoire to these new European-level opportunities, and their ability to adapt will depend, in part, on their degree of institutionalisation. However, I argue that the reality of

⁴ I define institutionalisation as 'a movement away from extreme ideologies and/or the adoption of more conventional and less disruptive forms of contention' (Tarrow, 1998: 207).

europeanisation is more nuanced than the institutionalised/grassroots dichotomy suggests. The interconnectedness of grassroots and more professionalised groups blurs the boundaries of institutionalisation.

As for the behaviour of activists at the grassroots level of the movement, many authors suggest that the more local and grassroots-based groups within a social movement are, the less likely they are to ‘institutionalise’ (della Porta & Diani, 2006; Rootes, 2002b, 2003b; Tarrow, 1998). Yet, others argue that the protest cycle of radicalisation and institutionalisation can be broken. Of the non-violent direct action and social justice movements, Doherty (2002: 25) writes:

...it seems possible that they will be able to continue without significant institutionalisation. Both types of groups are strongly opposed to institutionalisation and may be able to sustain activity that complements that of better-resourced EMOs⁵ and green parties. This is because they are rooted in communities whose culture is opposed to institutionalisation, but which have the commitment and resources to sustain grassroots activism.

These ideas pose a quandary. If europeanisation is felt most keenly by the most institutionalised actors, because they are best able to connect to the new European-level opportunities⁶, then where does that leave grassroots groups? Are they forced to adopt institutionalised strategies or might they be able to europeanise without institutionalising? I investigate this question further when I distinguish between European and europeanised in chapters three and five.

⁵ Environmental Movement Organisations (EMOs)

⁶ The social movement literature holds that ‘the structure of EU institutions has tended to encourage lobbying rather than public protest’ (Rootes, 2003b: 250) which favours those social movement groups with more professionalised and institutionalised action repertoires See also (Ruzza, 2011).

1.3 Defining the Terms

Defining Europeanisation

The 1990s were characterised by a ‘europeanisation turn’ in political science scholarship. It represented a development beyond the traditional studies of European integration that sought to theorise the process of integration itself and provide data to show what new EU actors and policies looked like. Europeanisation, in contrast to these traditional integration studies, was interested in *the impact of this integration* on Member States.

The origins of this development have been portrayed in different ways. Jordan et. al (2007: 3) trace the convergence of three different streams of research: the impact of European integration on the national level, the examination of individual EU policies and focus on the European sources of domestic change. Alternatively, Featherstone and Radaelli (2003: 6-12) identify four different ways in which europeanisation has been applied: as an historic phenomenon, transnational cultural diffusion, institutional adaptation, and finally as policy adaptation. The exact origins of europeanisation research may be debatable, but agreement is widespread that it has emerged as a valued currency among scholars of the EU.

The fashionable, or even ‘faddish’ (K. Featherstone & C. M. Radaelli, 2003: 3) application of europeanisation has proven, however, to be a double-edged sword.

The breadth of its application is confused by the breadth of its definition. Within the body of literature on europeanisation, four key debates over definitions bubble to the surface:

1. *Europeanisation as a top-down process*

Works based on this idea see europeanisation simply as the effect of European integration on member states. This understanding of europeanisation insists that:

what matters for domestic actors and institutions is how the delegation to the European level affects policy outcomes in the domestic arena. Put another way, who are the winners and losers from the EU? (Hix & Goetz, 2000: 3-4)

The ‘mechanisms of europeanisation’: institutional compliance, political opportunity structures and the framing of expectations – as outlined by Knill and Lehmkuhl (1999) – are central to this genre of literature .

2. *Europeanisation as a reflexive process*

A reflexive view of europeanisation focuses on a kind of ‘feedback loop’ whereby EU policy impacts upon domestic actors, and those actors in turn shape EU policy (Börzel, 2002; Börzel & Risse, 2000; S. J. Bulmer & Radaelli, 2004). Bomberg and Peterson (2000: 7) define europeanisation along these lines as:

a complex process whereby national and sub-national institutions, political actors, and citizens adapt to, and seek to shape, the trajectory of European integration in general, and EU policies in particular

3. *Europeanisation as 'goodness of fit'*

In this instance europeanisation is:

the extent to which domestic institutions have to change in order to comply with European rules and policies (Green Cowles, Caporaso, & Risse, 2001: 7).

Where EU policy fits well with national policy, there will be limited need for adaptation and thus limited europeanisation. Where national and EU policies do not sit well together at all, it becomes very difficult to adapt to Europe and again there is limited scope for europeanisation. Europeanisation is best evidenced, then, by cases of moderate adaptation. This conceptualisation is commonly aligned with ideas of top-down europeanisation.

4. *Europeanisation as convergence.*

This definition sees europeanisation as a process of homogenisation amongst Member States. Representative of these scholars are Mény et al. (1996: 8-9), whose work focuses on the:

progressive emergence of a bundle of common norms of action, the evolution of which escapes the control of any particular member state and yet decisively influences the behaviour of public policy actors

The first of these definitions - 'europeanisation as a top-down process' – takes a managerial approach to the process that reduces it to one of policy generation in the EU and policy implementation in the Member State. It is, I argue, flawed for two

reasons. The first is that, in intertwined political systems, it is very difficult to isolate the causation of x EU policy on y Member State – the ‘net change’ between the time before and time after a European policy is introduced (Vink & Graziano, 2007b: 9). Secondly, this understanding of europeanisation does not encompass other processes at work: the cognitive, normative or transnational dimensions of europeanisation are all missed. The definition offered by Radaelli (2000: 4) is a good antidote to this approach because it captures both the informal and formal processes at work. For him europeanisation is:

Processes of (a) construction (b) diffusion and (c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU decisions and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies.

The second definition – ‘europeanisation as a reflexive process’ – recognises the ability of national actors to be shaped by and to shape the policies and politics of European integration. The strength of this approach, as Börzel and Risse (2000: 1) explain, is that ‘as far as the EU is concerned, we will get a more comprehensive picture if we study the feedback processes among and between the various levels of European, national, and subnational governance’. This definition is a persuasive one because it is able to accommodate the policies, practices and norms that are developed by Member States and then ‘uploaded’ back to the supranational level in order to inform the future direction of EU integration. This idea is central to the working definition of europeanisation presented in this thesis.

The third approach to europeanisation – as ‘goodness of fit’ – depicts different mechanisms or policies as the variables that account for the degree of institutional change at a national level. But this interpretation cannot account for other mechanisms of change such as institutionalisation or transnationalism⁷ between states. Furthermore, the idea of ‘goodness of fit’ only works when there is an explicit EU model or policy with which domestic structures must ‘fit’. Where europeanisation occurs through softer mechanisms such as socialisation or regulatory competition then this interpretation becomes problematic (K. Featherstone & C. M. Radaelli, 2003: 14-16).

Finally, I do not subscribe to the idea that europeanisation is synonymous with convergence because as Featherstone and Radaelli (2003: 33) note ‘there is a difference between a process and its consequences’. This approach would not be able to account for the effects on interest representation (Eising, 2007) or administrative adaptation (Laffan, 2007), for example.

In this thesis, I refine these varying conceptions of europeanisation to create my own. Europeanisation is: *the process of constructing and diffusing formal and informal rules, beliefs and norms that originate in the EU and are interpreted by Member States*. Key to this definition are three ideas:

⁷ I define transnationalism here as ‘multiple ties and interactions linking people or institutions across the borders of nation-states’ (Vertovec, 2009: 1)

- (1) europeanisation does *not* rely on the *straightforward implementation of policy* but may be manifest in informal processes and ways of doing things;
- (2) europeanisation is a *two-way process* where the EU and Member States have an impact on one another;
- (3) europeanisation may be observed to occur *between member states* as policies and practices are diffused and reinterpreted.

Europeanisation then works *vertically* with impact flowing between the EU and the Member States. But it also works *laterally*, with impact ‘taking on a life of its own’ and being diffused between states.

Defining the Green Movement

The second definition central to this thesis is that of the ‘green movement’. This study presents findings on the activities of a variety of actors involved in each of the case study campaigns: from political parties to environmental movement organisations (EMOs) to grassroots activists living in a protest camp. Thus, it is important to be especially precise in defining the parameters of this term. First of all, what do we mean by a social movement? Doherty (2002: 7) draws on the work of della Porta and Diani (2006: 14-16) to provide us with a very helpful point of departure. He claims that social movements share four defining features:

(1) They must have a consciously shared collective identity

There must be a shared sense of ‘them’ and ‘us’. This identity is forged through shared frames and ways of interpreting the world around them, but also shared cultures and practices. McAdam et al. (2001: 21) underscore the importance of this element of ‘otherness’ in their definition of social movements:

A social movement is a sustained interaction between mighty people and others lacking might; a continuing challenge to existing power-holders in the name of a population whose interlocutors declare it to be unjustly suffering harm or threatened with such harm.

(2) They must act at least partly outside political institutions

The act of protest is a key dimension to this criterion. The movement will perceive established, democratic political institutions as an inappropriate arena for their arguments and will take their claims, at least in part, into the public domain. In practice, however, this protest does not need to be directed at those in power – it might take the form of challenging the legitimacy of certain social practices. Doherty offers the example of green activists in Manchester who dressed up as aliens visiting Earth for the first time; milling about amongst Christmas shoppers they asked to know more about the curious pursuit of consuming ever more material things. This was not an act of protest in the conventional sense, but in their parody was a political message and confrontation (Doherty, 2002: 11).

(3) Social movements are characterised by non-institutionalised networks of interaction

Although there may be a variety of different movement groups within a movement, the ties that bind them are loose and do not have to be formalised in membership of a particular umbrella organisation. There are two important institutionalised actors that may still be considered part of the movement (in the case of the green movement at least): green parties and environmental movement organisations. Doherty (2002: 12) notes that:

since green parties are formally organised political parties working within political institutions they might appear to be outside the green movement. Yet most theorists choose to include them as part of the movement because of the strong bonds between most green parties and other parts of the green movement.

He also observes that ‘those EMOs that do not challenge the existing political or social system are not part of the green movement’. Within the networks then must be actors who challenge the established socio-political arrangements – whether they are professionalised or not matters only to the extent that they offer this challenge. In principle then an institutionalised actor such as an environmental movement organisation may be part of the green movement if they challenge political and economic norms and are closely networked with non-institutionalised movement groups.

(4) They must reject, or challenge dominant forms of power

Ideas about what is wrong and who may be held responsible occur in the construction of social movement frames – in the discourses, activities and interactions of social movement groups. However, this attribute of a movement does make it easier to assess what is not a movement. A collection of groups that engage in protest against a given issue is not a movement if their agenda does not challenge the underlying ideologies and power structures (such as capitalism); protests against fox hunting or vivisection are not social movements, for example.

Using the framework outlined above, do the actors in the case study campaigns (outlined in chapter two) qualify as a social movement? Certainly the local grassroots groups are easily identified as falling within the social movement typology. More difficult are professionalised actors. Doherty asserts that EMOs who do not challenge the existing socio-political system cannot be classed as part of the social movement. Whilst this might be true of the European offices of these organisations, it is important to note that they are not representative of the full spectrum of actors within their group. Marks and McAdam (1999) and Tarrow (2006: 175) observe:

[T]here is a disjunction between European environmental umbrella groups, like those that are connected through the EEB⁸, and their national chapters. First, while the former engage heavily in the politics of expertise favoured by the European Commission, the latter use a combination of routine and contentious politics at home.

⁸ European Environmental Bureau (EEB)

In fact, the relationship may even stretch beyond disjunction if ‘Brussels-level umbrella groups do not always enjoy the support of their member organisations who are more engaged in national politics and protests’ (Tarrow, 2006: 173). This point serves to highlight how very *local* the local chapters of an EMO or an NGO can be. The local chapter of an organisation such as Friends of the Earth will have far more in common with grassroots groups in the same area than with Friends of the Earth UK or Friends of the Earth Europe. Of course, the extent to which the local chapters of EMOs are removed from national and supranational administrations will vary between organisations. As we will see, the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) is far more centralised than Friends of the Earth, for example. Nonetheless, the fact that local chapters tend to be situated much more in the grassroots level of work than the label ‘EMO’ means that, where appropriate, I include them as actors in the case study movements. A similar situation also applies to Green political parties. In many countries, the parties were formed from the environmental movement itself and, despite professionalization, retain strong ties to the more radical politics of the national green movement groups – especially true in the case of the UK.

For this reason, in cases where local grassroots groups work with local chapters of EMOs or political parties, I include them in my analysis of the movement. Where appropriate I make the distinction between these different kinds of actors. But when they act at in small numbers, at a local level and form part of a formal or informal network (i.e. when they meet the other criteria stated above), then I group them together under the banner of grassroots groups. Grassroots here refers to informally-co-ordinated, small-scale, localised protest.

The above four dimensions provide a guide for how we may identify the ‘movement’ part of green movements – but what of the ‘green’? One of the key divisions between actors concerned about the environment is between those who are *ecologists* and those who are *environmentalists*. The difference is essentially one of ideology. Dobson (2000: 2) explains:

environmentalism argues for a managerial approach to environmental problems, secure in the belief that they can be solved without fundamental changes in present values or patterns of production and consumption and *ecologism* holds that a sustainable and fulfilling existence presupposes radical changes in our relationship with the non-human natural world and in our mode of social and political life.

Whilst it is important to understand the ideological nuances that separate environmental actors, this division is not a central concern of the work presented in this thesis. I use the term ‘green’ as an overarching label within which actors sit on an ideological spectrum of ‘shades of green’. Here, the green movement may be composed of deep ecologists or ‘dark greens’, as well as modernising environmentalists or ‘light greens’. But they may (and often do) still work side-by-side on specific campaigns. I therefore use the term ‘green’ to apply to the full spectrum of actors with environmental concerns.

Having outlined the contours of what it is to be a social movement and what it is to be green, I arrive at a definition of green movement. Rootes’ definition addresses the four dimensions of a social movement presented above, but is also able to accommodate the spectrum of actors that work on local-level campaigns. The green movement therefore is:

a loose non-institutionalized network that includes, as well as individuals and groups who have no organizational affiliation, organizations of varying degrees of formality, that is engaged in collective action, and that is motivated by shared identity or, at least, shared environmental concern' (Rootes, 2002b: 415)⁹

Defining Political Opportunity Structures

The concept of POS, part of a 'political process' approach to social movement study, has been developed over the past 20 years as a means of explaining social movement emergence and success. The essential message is that activists do not choose their *modus operandi* in a vacuum – their goals and their tactics are contingent on the political context in which they are operating. The strength of political opportunity structures therefore lies in its capacity to explain the differential mobilisation of similar movements between countries and at different points in time.

Political opportunity structures as a concept has evolved over the course of the past 40 years, starting with Eisinger's (1973) analysis of protest in different American cities in which he identified the openness or closure of the local public administration as a key variable in explaining the protests. These two variables of 'open' or 'closed' political systems have been added to (by considerations of electoral systems, access to allies and the alignment of elite interests) and refined by other scholars.

⁹ Rootes applies this definition to the *environmental* movement whereas I apply it to the *green* movement. My definition of green movement however accommodates a full spectrum of environmental concerns and means that Rootes' definition is equally applicable to the term 'green'.

Two main streams of thought have emerged: those who favour the static aspect of the variables (Kitschelt, 1986; Kriesi, 1993; Kriesi, Koopmans, Duyvendak, & Guigni, 1992) and those who emphasise a more dynamic interpretation (Imig & Tarrow, 2000; Tarrow, 1998). Their variables and a broader discussion of the political opportunity structures approach are presented in chapters three and four. At this stage, it serves us to present only the variables that are operationalised in this thesis. McAdam (1996: 26-27) provides a useful synthesis of the commonly agreed variables:

- 1) *the openness or closure of the state*
- 2) *the stability of elite alignments*
- 3) *the availability of elite allies*
- 4) *the state's capacity for repression*

In this thesis, I concentrate my attention on the first three of these variables. I do not concern myself with the state's capacity for repression because I consider this to be an overarching theme of the political opportunity structures rather than a discrete variable on its own. This interpretation leads me to develop my own definition of political opportunity structures as *the structural features of a political system that shape the conditions for social movement action*.¹⁰ The core structural features explored here are: *the strength of the state to implement its policies, the openness of the state to third party interests, and access to elite allies*.

¹⁰ A full and more extended discussion of political opportunity structures appears in chapters three and four.

Defining Frames

Frames became the subject of increased academic attention during the 1980s, when sociologists began to develop further the ideas of beliefs within social movements. They sought to understand how meanings were constructed, diffused and used strategically. From this perspective, Benford and Snow write (2000: 613):

social movements are not viewed as carriers of extant ideas and meanings that grow out of structural arrangements, unanticipated events or existing ideologies. Rather, movement actors are viewed as signifying agents actively engaged in the production and maintenance for constituents, antagonists and bystanders or observers.

Furthermore, because frames are a product of collective negotiation, they are the embodiment of the diffusion of social movement ideas. In this way, they are particularly well suited to capturing transnationalism and, in this case, europeanisation within social movements.

In chapter five, I provide a more comprehensive discussion of framing and the current literature. Here I present the three functions of social movement frames, and offer a working definition. Snow and Benford (1988: 199) identify the three properties of a frame as:

- 1) a diagnosis of some event or aspect of social life as problematic and in need of alteration;
- 2) a proposed solution to the diagnosed problem that specifies what needs to be done;

- 3) a call to arms or rationale for engaging in ameliorative or corrective action.

In my own analysis of frames, I synthesise these diagnostic, prognostic and mobilising functions into two areas of analysis: mobilising frames (what is the issue? Who is affected?) and problematising frames (who is responsible?) The above three functions and two areas of analysis sit within my definition of frames as *action oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate the activities of a social movement group*.

1.4 Research Design

My research questions have been shaped by two established approaches from social movement theory: political opportunity structures and framing. The overarching question to be investigated is ‘how has europeanisation altered the mobilisation strategies and practices of grassroots green groups in Europe?’ Within this remit two nested questions emerge:

- Where does the europeanisation of social movement predominantly occur – at the domestic or European level?
- To what extent does the degree of movement institutionalisation impact the degree of movement europeanisation?

The theoretical background to this approach lies in the competing perspectives of political science and social movement research into europeanisation. While political science accounts have privileged the study of green policies (Buller, Lowe, & Flynn, 1993; Jordan, 2000; Liefferink & Jordan, 2002) and parties (Bomberg, 2002; Bomberg & Carter, 2006; Hines, 2003), and therefore privileged the role of the national or supranational state, social movement scholarship has focussed on the trans-nationalisation of these movements rather than the specific processes associated with the impact of European integration (Doherty, 2006; Doherty & Doyle, 2006; Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Rootes, 2005). The research questions detailed above are informed by both of these pools of literature, using europeanisation ideas about ‘goodness of fit’ (Green Cowles, Caporaso, & Risse, 2001) which suggest the importance of the role of the state, alongside social movement theory about the role of political opportunity structures and frames (McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996). In this section I explain the overall design for the project in light of the research questions: the variables examined and case selection. Information about the data collection methods chosen and the ethical issues and implications for the participants is included in the appendices.

Variables

A good deal of academic attention over the past ten years has been devoted to the appropriate research design for studying europeanisation (Exadaktylos & Radaelli, 2009a, 2009b; Falkner, 2003; Howell, 2002; Liebert, 2002; Saurugger, 2005). One of the fulcrums of this debate is the direction in which europeanisation flows. For

those who take a top-down approach (Börzel & Risse, 2000; Green Cowles, Caporaso, & Risse, 2001; Saurugger, 2005), europeanisation is the independent variable. They seek to explain the impact that europeanisation has on policies or politics using approaches such as ‘goodness of fit’. For those who take a bottom-up approach and therefore consider it an independent variable, (McCauley, 2011; C. Radaelli, 2004, 2006; C. M. Radaelli, 2008) ‘europeanisation should not be considered as “something that explains”, but rather “*something to be explained*” by mainstream social science’ (McCauley, 2011: 1).

In this research project we ask ‘how europeanised is the green movement and how do we measure it?’. So, in this instance, europeanisation is *something to explain* the behaviour of the green movement. Europeanisation thus must be treated as an independent variable.

However, it is important to note that this choice does not mean that europeanisation must only ever be considered an independent variable. Indeed, I concur with those who argue that europeanisation is a *reflexive process*. Therefore, whilst it is a process capable of shaping the green movement, so in turn may the movement shape the process of europeanisation. In this thesis, however, I choose to examine primarily one direction of the flow of influence, whilst acknowledging that this direction forms part of a broader picture. Figure 1.1 below illustrates how this sits within the broader cycle of europeanisation.

Also illustrated in this figure are what I have called ‘domains of europeanisation’, and which may be considered intervening variables – the channels through which europeanisation flows, mediating the impact of europeanisation upon the movement. These variables are drawn from two areas of social movement theory: political opportunity structures and frames. This thesis examines to what extent these domains, which are also variables, are conduits for europeanisation and to what extent they shape the strategies and practices of the movement.




Figure 1.1: The variables in the europeanisation of social movements

Case study selection

Case studies have developed a strong pedigree within qualitative research design. In contrast to other approaches such as experimental or historical methods, which

usually concentrate on a very limited number of variables, '[o]ne of the strengths of case studies is that they attempt to understand the significance of particular factors within the whole case rather than screening out this context' (de Vaus, 2001: 247). Given the aim of this research project, to investigate the various factors at play in the complex and highly contextualised process of europeanisation, a case study design was deemed the most appropriate approach.

The cases I selected for my research were chosen according to a number of theory-based and practical considerations. The countries and policy areas were also chosen for their capacity to produce 'contrasting results for predictable reasons' or 'theoretical replication' (Yin, 1994: 18). Given these choices, it was important to hold some factors constant and to make the cases truly *comparable*. From the literature on political opportunity studies, it is clear that a cross-national comparison will be helpful in establishing how the process of europeanisation manifests itself. Reising (1998: 10) writes:

the Europeanization of protest occurs displaying systematic cross-national differences. These differences are, as the results suggest, related to the differential between the constraints of the actors' domestic environments and the common-to-all evolving opportunities on the level of European politics.

One of the least contested claims in the literature on POS is that the concept is most useful when applied to cross-country analyses. Furthermore, the strong pedigree of the multiple case study method means that in order to answer these research

questions, I needed a multiple country study. In selecting the countries there were three main criteria:

1. *All countries should be Member States of the European Union* in order to isolate the effect of the European Union as opposed to other transnational processes such as globalisation.

Previous studies of europeanisation have found a strong relationship between the degree of europeanisation and the policy area within member state administrations (Jordan, 2000; Jordan & Liefferink, 2007; Knill & Lehmkuhl, 2002). Based on this evidence, it was decided that all of the case studies countries should have been member states of the European Union since 2004 (EU 15) and therefore subject to the same legislative history within the EU, the same policy making regulations and influences. In this way the ‘national impact of the EU’ variable may be held as constant as possible.

2. *All countries needed to have an active green movement* in order to compare systematically the opportunities and frames used at a local level

A second consideration was the nature of environmentalism within each of the case study countries. Although I was comparing specific grassroots and localised protests, some of these groups were affiliated to larger EMOs or to small but vibrant grassroots groups. If there were not similar levels of activity across the spectrum of environmental groups in each country, then these relationships and the frames that they constructed would not be easily comparable.

3. *I need to speak the languages of the countries chosen* in order to communicate with local-level actors for whom English may not be a second language.

The final consideration was based on the grassroots nature of the research. Because I would be interviewing members of the general public in my case study countries, I needed to be able to speak to them in their own language. This choice broadened the number of actors that I was able to speak to beyond only English-speakers, and also allowed the participants to express themselves more openly.

Beyond comparing the europeanisation of grassroots green groups across EU member states, I decided to introduce a second comparative dimension to the project. By studying protest in two policy areas, I was able to generate richer insights into how europeanisation diffuses to a grassroots level. To this end, two areas were selected: genetically-modified crop protest and road-building protest. Both of these areas are subject to European Union legislation, although they differ in two interesting ways: the degree of EU regulation, and the way that these policies are implemented at a national level.

Let us first consider the degree of EU regulation. Genetically modified crops are subject to much more binding and comprehensive regulation than road-building projects. The EU has approved the cultivation of two kinds of genetically modified maize in Europe (MON 863 and MON 810) and legislation on the cultivation of

those crops is binding in each Member State. Despite the ‘safeguard clause’ that permits individual member states to effectively impose a national moratorium, the ability to impose this control in practice is limited. For example, in September 2011 the European Court of Justice ruled that France’s de facto moratorium on the cultivation of GM crops was illegal (Reuters, 2011a). In the field of genetically modified organisms (GMOs), Member States are tightly bound by EU regulation. McCauley (2011: 8) notes ‘The anti-GMO movement...is indeed a particularly interesting case for studying Europeanization processes due to the marked involvement of EU policy and legislation on GMOs’. This close involvement contrasts with road-building policy, where decision-making is largely devolved to the level of the Member State. While the EU’s Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) provides guidance and funding for road-building proposals, these proposals are generated by the Member States themselves. Koopmans (2007: 187) underscores the important explanatory power that different ‘issue areas’ or policies have in the process of europeanisation:

‘These analyses reveal that the share of Europeanised claims diverges strongly across issue fields. In issue fields where European competencies are strong (e.g. monetary and agricultural politics), public debates are strongly Europeanised...In the other four issue fields that we studied (immigration, troop deployment, pensions and retirement, and education) Europeanisation tendencies were much less strong. This is less a result of a lack of media interest in European issues than of the fact that most decision-making competencies in these fields have thus far remained on the national level.’

In exploring two policy areas with differential degrees of regulation, I am able to generate insights into the relationship between the degree of europeanisation within a movement and the degree of EU legislation at a national level.

Furthermore, the two policy areas are contrasted in the way they manifest themselves on the ground. The cultivation of GM crops results in trial sites in the case study countries around which a particular incidence of protest may evolve; indeed many of the anti-GMO groups studied in the case of France and the UK had their roots in such protest. In recent years, however, the commercial or trial cultivation of GM crops has declined as environmental protesters across Europe have expressed concern. The current campaign of the anti-GMO movement in each of the case studies is therefore one of awareness-raising. There is no specific 'incident' (for example a local trial site) around which they mobilise, but they fight to keep public opinion turned against GM crops and to change national and EU decisions on the cultivation, import and labelling of GMOs.

Road-building projects are different. They result in a specific tangible site (or proposal) around which social movement groups may mobilise. This local emphasis changes the focus of social movement groups from a long-term awareness raising strategy to one of immediate action. It changes the way in which the issue is framed, the kind of mobilisation strategies pursued, and the kind of actors likely to get involved.

In summary, I have chosen to compare two areas of environmental protest: GM crops and road-building. I have studied both of these areas within three European countries: France, Italy and the UK. Within each of these cases, I look at the role that political opportunity structures and frames play in determining the degree of

Europeanisation of the green movement. Figure 1.2 illustrates this investigative matrix.

	France	Italy	UK
GMOs	POS	POS	POS
	Frames	Frames	Frames
Roads	POS	POS	POS
	Frames	Frames	Frames

Figure 1.2: Matrix illustrating the units of analysis

Time-frame

I chose to study the six case study campaigns over a period of time, focussing mainly on the period 2007-2010. The reasoning for this is both logistical and informed by research theory.

First of all, it was important to follow the groups over a period of time, rather than to get a snapshot of events. This time-frame enabled me to capture any adaptations to the actors' frames or networks or modifications to their action repertoire. Within this time period, I conducted two periods of fieldwork across my case studies, in the autumns of 2008 and 2009. A second reason for this time-frame is that it represented a significant period of activity for two of the road campaigns under consideration.

2007 is the year that new plans for the Italian *Corridoio Tirrenico*¹¹ were established and also the year that the A65¹² in France began construction. In the case of the UK reference, a slightly longer time-span is necessary to capture the arc of the campaigns. In the case of the A701¹³, by 2007 the proposed re-routing of the road at Bilston Glen had been suspended for two years due to funding constraints. I therefore also make reference in my analysis to part of the campaign which took place in the years from 2002, when the proposal was approved by the Scottish Executive.

In the case of the GMO campaign in Devon, it is also important to reference the years previous to 2007 when the roots of the contemporary anti-GMO movement were grown in the field trials of the late 1990s and early 2000s. Therefore, the timeframe of the study is not tightly-bound. But it does offer a framework within which to concentrate analysis and offers scope to accommodate the changing dynamics of a campaign.

¹¹ The *Corridoio Tirrenico* or ‘Tyrrhenian Corridor’ is a road expansion and diversion project planned for a section of existing road along the Tuscan coastline. This project, together with the others mentioned below, is outlined further in chapter 2.

¹² The A65 is a new motorway built between Bordeaux in France and Pau on the Spanish border. Work was completed December 2010.

¹³ The A701 road project concerns the proposed rerouting of road through the village of Bilston outside Edinburgh.

Data Collection Methods

The research design of this thesis, like much social movement analysis, adopts a qualitative approach. The research methods are therefore very much grounded in this qualitative tradition. I rely on a triangulation of methods to enhance the robustness of my findings: case studies, semi-structured interviews and documentary analysis. The process of sourcing these materials and conducting fieldwork is discussed in detail in Appendix 1.

1.5 Structure of the Thesis

This thesis is divided into eight chapters. The first two chapters outline the theoretical background to the work, the research design and the cases studied. Chapters three to six use the case studies to explore political opportunity structures and frames, analysing what europeanisation means for environmental actors in these domains. The seventh chapter draws comparative conclusions from the case studies before chapter eight highlights the conclusions of the thesis and suggest further avenues of exploration.

This chapter has outlined the theoretical background to investigating europeanisation and the green movement, introduced the research questions that guide the thesis and defined the key terms. It has also outlined the contribution that this work makes to scholarship on europeanisation and on social movements. The chapter then

presented the comparative research design used in the thesis – it outlined the variables chosen, the process of case study selection and the research methods employed.

Chapter two offers a descriptive outline to the six individual case study campaigns. It begins with an overview of GMOs and road-building in the context of European integration before focussing on the specific campaigns. I present the main issues, actors and activities in each case. This background serves to contextualise the analysis that follows in subsequent chapters.

Chapter three conceptualises political opportunity structures in more detail. It reviews the way in which POS is used to explain differential social movement behaviours and the range of variables developed by scholarship in this area. I draw on this work to create my own working definitions and then apply them to the national level. This national framework acts as a basis to develop European and europeanised political opportunity structures. I argue that a social movement will show evidence of europeanisation to the extent that it is able to connect to either of these sets of political opportunities. This chapter concludes with an outline of the national political opportunity structures in each of the case study countries that provide a baseline for the analysis in the following chapter.

Chapter four applies the theoretical framework of the previous chapter to my case study campaigns. It first presents *European* political opportunity structures, examining each campaign in turn for evidence that they were able to connect to these structures. *Europeanised* political opportunity structures are then addressed in the same manner. It illustrates that there is evidence of social movements groups connecting to both European and europeanised POS and offers explanations for why each campaign experiences these opportunities differently.

Chapter five centres on social movement frames. Here, the contours of frames are outlined – I review the way in which frames have been used to explain how social movements recruit and mobilise support. The main ‘framing tasks’ are presented and I distil this literature into my own definition of frames. The baseline of how frames work at a national level is used to illustrate the possibility of capturing both European and europeanised frames. As in chapter three, I argue that a social movement will show evidence of europeanisation to the extent that it is able to connect to either of these sets of frames. I present the three distinctly national ways in which ‘the environment’ is framed in each of our case study countries. The chapter concludes with an overview of the national environmental masterframe in each of the case study countries.

Chapter six applies the concepts of European and europeanised frames to the six case study campaigns. I begin with European frames, examining each campaign in turn for evidence that the social movement groups were able to connect to this frame.

Europeanised frames are addressed in the same way. I demonstrate that there is evidence of social movements groups connecting to both European and europeanised frames and I offer explanation to account for the differential uptake of national, European and europeanised frames.

Chapter seven draws comparative conclusions from the analysis in the thesis. The findings are reviewed along three axes: by protest issue, by country and by domain. Within each of these areas the evidence for direct, indirect and passive europeanisation is discussed. I illustrate how europeanisation is refracted differently through each of these variables and highlight the need for a more nuanced understanding of europeanisation for actors who work outside of the mechanisms of the state. The degree of variation amongst the spectrum of social movement actors is also identified.

Chapter eight situates these findings in two important debates in social and political science: the theories of European integration – particularly multi-level governance, and the prospects for a europeanised green movement. I argue that although the green movement may have access to new levels of governance as a result of European integration it does not follow that they are able to exercise influence at all of those levels. It follows therefore that a europeanised green movement seems a distant prospect, although further work on conceptualising a europeanisation framework for social movements will help to identify progress in this area as it occurs.

2 Cases, Countries and Controversies

‘Civil society actors are, at the same time, critical towards the EU, but also (potential and actual) entrepreneurs of europeanisation. They legitimize Europe while criticizing it’

(della Porta & Caini, 2009: 178).

2.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter I outlined the research question of this study: what does europeanisation mean for the strategies and practices of the green movement? We established the research design being to investigate this question, noting that case selection was important. Here, the cases have been selected along two different dimensions: country (France, Italy and the UK) and protest area (Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) and road-building). This affords us the opportunity to draw cross-national and cross-issue comparisons.

In this descriptive chapter I outline the contours of these case study issues and case study countries in order to contextualise the analysis in the following chapters. The chapter begins by explaining the way in which GMO and road-building legislation has played out at the European and national levels, and how associated protest has developed alongside it. It then moves to outline the specific protests in France, Italy and the UK against Genetically Modified (GM) crops and road-building. In France

we examine the anti-road protest against the construction of the A65 between Langon and Pau in the Aquitaine region of Southern France. Also in Aquitaine, one of France's largest maize-growing regions, I study the ongoing campaign against GM crops. In Italy, I evaluate the campaign against the *Corridoio Tirrenico* road running along the Tuscan coast and the anti-GMO campaign in that same region, the first of the Italian regions to declare themselves GMO-free. Finally, in the UK I investigate the campaign against the re-routing of the A71 at Bilston outside Edinburgh, and the ongoing campaign against GMOs in Devon, again the first region in the country to declare itself GM-free.

Within each of these case study campaigns I describe three important features: the issue at stake, the actors involved and the activities of the social movement groups involved. In order to assist the reader I also provide a brief table at the start of each case outlining the main actors involved and any necessary translations. The overall aim of this chapter is to provide a background to the case study campaigns over which I layer analysis in the following chapters.

2.2 Anti-Road and Anti-GMO Protest in Context

i) Road Policy and Protest

With regard to road-building projects in Europe and associated protest, the EU's responsibilities for legislating on transport policy are deep-rooted in the Treaty of Rome and latterly the development of the Single Market. Stevens explains how in

the early development of transport policy 'France, Germany and Italy...with large territories, and dispersed populations, were much more accustomed to extensive State intervention in the provision of both road and rail transport, and wanted a common transport policy that would allow such intervention to continue '(2003: 38-39). The preference for national autonomy over road-building projects is one that has persevered, and is well-illustrated in the EU's legislation in this area.

The EU's main instrument of influence over road transport policy is through Trans-European Transport Networks (TEN-Ts), established by The Treaty on the European Union in 1992 which 'must aim to promote the development of Trans-European Networks as a key element for the creation of the Internal Market and the reinforcement of Economic and Social Cohesion' (European Union, 2008). The main function of the Network, through its managing body the Trans-European Transport Network Executive Agency(TEN-T EA), is to ensure that integrated transport networks for rail, road, air and water are available to serve all of Europe in order to maintain economic competition and to support the single market. Making the network sustainable and meeting the environmental challenge that the network poses also fall under the TEN-T's remit. The Network is resourced by a number of EU financial instruments such as the TEN-T Programme, the Cohesion Fund, the European Regional Development Fund and European Investment Bank's loans and credit guarantees and provides organisational resources to assist with cross-border cooperation (European Union, 2011). On 19 October 2011 the European Commission adopted a proposal to renovate the existing TEN-T network, making the development of core 'corridors' more of a priority and focusing spending on a

smaller number of projects. The TEN-T is designed to support and facilitate the work of Member States rather than to dictate where roads should be built.

A consequence of responsibility for transport policy lying at the level of the member state is that environmental protest against road-building is therefore also most commonly directed at this national level. In the UK this was most obviously manifest in the 1989 'Roads to Prosperity' programme, promising £23 million investment in the country's road infrastructure over 30 years – a scheme which, coupled with new evidence about the environmental consequences of road transport, resulted in the infamous road protests of the 1990s. Occupations at Twyford Down and the Newbury Bypass attracted significant press attention and spawned the creation of numerous local groups and national organisations including Transport 2000, Road Alert! and Alarm UK (Doherty, 1998; Plows, 2006; Rootes, 2003a). The anti-road protest of this time has been called 'the first significant example of environmental protest by a New Social movement in Britain' (Doherty, 1999: 276) and created a legacy of localised anti-road activism and of non-violent direct action which, as the case below shows, continues today.

In France and Italy the context of anti-road protest is less memorable. There is a significant history of public-private partnerships in the road sector in France and Italy, making grand national road-building programmes less necessary because contracts are negotiated on an individual ad hoc basis with only partial state finance. As a consequence, anti-road protest too operates on an ad-hoc basis without – against the *Treno Alta Velocità* (High Speed Rail Network) for example (della Porta, 2006b)

or the Somport Tunnel (Hayes, 2000). In the following sections we examine the interplay between European and national legislation in specific instances of GMO or road-building protest.

ii) GMO Policy and Protest

The use of GM crops has courted scientific and political debate since advances in technology the 1970s made their widespread application possible. Also known as genetic engineering or recombinant-DNA technology, the European Union defines GMOs as ‘organisms in which the genetic material (DNA) has been altered in a way that does not occur naturally by mating or natural recombination (European Union, 2006: 3).

Unsurprisingly GM goods have a substantial legislative history within the European Union¹⁴ supplemented by a number of auxiliary regulations and recommendations adopted to support these actions. In the context of these case studies, the most significant of these was Article 23 or ‘the safeguard clause’ in Directive 2001/18/EEC which allowed Member States to restrict or refuse the use or sale of GMOs in the territory. The clause was invoked by Italy, France and the UK at points throughout the late 1990s and 2000s¹⁵. Most recently, and in response to this resistance, the EU has proposed using subsidiarity for GM legislation, allowing

¹⁴ This legislation falls into five themes: (1) the contained use of genetically modified micro-organisms, (2) the deliberate release onto the market of GMOs (3) placing onto the market GM food or animal feed (4) intentional and unintentional movement of GMOs between Member States of the European Union and third countries, (5) labelling and traceability of GM products (European Union, 2006: 4-5)

¹⁵ The Safeguard Clause is currently in operation in 6 Member States: Austria, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary and Luxembourg. Italy has said that it will refuse the cultivation of GMOs but has not done so formally (European Commission, 2010: 34).

Member States to decide whether GM crops may be cultivated on their land (European Commission, 2010: 36).

One of the most notable aspects of the legislative procedure surrounding GMOs is the difficulty with which consensus is reached. Abels notes that 'in all cases where a competent authority approved the market release of a GMO, a competent authority in another member state raised objections and in so doing initiated the comitology procedure' (Abels, 2002: 7). The consequences of a divisive technology and a complicated legislative system suggest an increased scope for anti-GMO protesters to articulate their concern publically and gain empathy while the cumbersome EU legislative process is underway. Kettmaker asserts 'it is when the EU's legislative process progresses too slowly or deviates markedly from the public preference that consumer campaigns are most likely to have an effect. That this effect seems to have been greatest on national corporations is one of the complexities of the emerging European polity' (2001: 227).

Against this legislative background Kettmaker notes that 'since the mid-1990s, there has been considerable grass-roots resistance in Europe to the cultivation of genetically modified plants and their use in food products. Before the first half of 1996, the protest was mostly confined to sporadic local campaigns against experimental fields of genetically modified crops' (Kettmaker, 2001: 205). This was followed by two 'waves of protest' throughout the EU Member States – the first from 1996-1997 developed in Central European countries like Austria, Switzerland, Germany and then Italy. A second wave gathered Britain and France on board

(Kettner, 2001: 210). Analysis of public attitudes to GM crops in the Eurobarometer surveys show a steady decline in support between 1996-2010: in France support fell from 43% to 16%, in Italy from 51% to 24% and in the UK from 52% to 44% (European Commission, 2010: 40). Since the protest of the 1990s and the decline in public encouragement for GMOs, the focus of anti-GMO campaigning has been largely awareness-raising. Groups seek to maintain pressure on governments and consumers not to endorse GM production. This earlier protest means that the field trials of GM crops are few and far between, so the case studies we consider now are united in this continued effort.

2.3 Protest in France

i) The French Anti-Road Campaign

ACTORS	TRANSLATION
ARLP (Alternative Régionale Langon Pau)	Langon Paul Regional Alternative
SEPANSO (Fédération des Sociétés pour l'Etude, la Protection et l'Aménagement de la nature dans le Sud-Ouest)	Federation of Societies for Environmental Protection and Management in the South West
Amis de la Terre	Friends of the Earth
France Nature Environnement	France, Nature, Environment
Greenpeace	
Réseau Action Climat France	Climate Action Network France
World Wildlife Fund(WWF)	
European Environmental Bureau (EEB)	

i) *The Issue*

This case centres on the proposal to build the A65 motorway which bridged the 150km from Langon in the Gironde, through Les Landes, to Pau in the Pyrénées Atlantiques. The A65 is also known as the *Autoroute de Gascogne*. It is a four-lane toll motorway (the projected completed in December 2010), and was designed to offer a quicker route between Bordeaux and Pau than the existing RN134, RD932 and RD934 roads which were thought to be congested.

The road drops down from Languedoc to intersect with the A62, and then passes down through the Gironde and the eastern parts of the Landes until it merges with the bypass around Aire-sur-l'Adour. It then continues to head south through northern Pyrénées-Atlantiques to join the A64 (Bayonne-Pau-Tarbes-Toulouse) at Poey-de-Lescar, near Pau (see Fig. 2.1). Now finished, the new road also integrates with the existing motorway network which joins up Bordeaux and Pau with Toulouse.



Figure 2.1: The route of the A65

The road is being built in Public-Private Partnership, with construction being initiated by the *Comité Interministériel d'Aménagement et de Compétitivité du Territoire* (CIACT) (Interministerial Committee for Territorial Development and Competitiveness) in early 2008. In partnership with CIACT is a purpose-built joint venture called A'LIENOR, which is composed of two companies: Eiffage Group – road construction and SANEF (Société des Autoroutes du Nord et de l'Est de la France) – finance and tollroad construction. There was a four-year construction period allowed and then a 55-year concession on the toll. A'LIENOR asked for a €500m subsidy for the concession (Aliénor).

The controversy surrounding this project is framed both in environmental/ecological and economic terms. These concerns centre around 1) the ecological implications of the path of the road, 2) the environmental impact of road-building with regard to climate change and 3) the questionable economic benefit of the road's construction (ARLP & SEPANSO, 2008b: 4).

Construction of the road will require the use of 2,000 hectares of countryside and its path will cut through part of the Landes Forest. This is Europe's largest maritime forest and a National Park. The tract of the forest which will be destroyed is also home to a number of species protected under Annexes II and V of the European Habitats Directive. Amongst these are the last population of white-footed crayfish in *Les Landes* and the very rare False Ringlet butterfly. The habitat of the white-footed crayfish will be completely destroyed by the road, suggesting their inevitable

extinction. The False Ringlet butterfly's habitat will be partially destroyed and the population may not recover from the disturbance.

Concerns are also raised about the more general changes in the forest's local climate which may be brought about by the road's path. The forest's pines are used to tap resin and provide a drainage system and root infrastructure in the sloping foothills of the Pyrenees. Campaigners argue that the microclimate the trees create is vital to the local farming industry. They note that the drainage and irrigation systems in place have taken years of development and that the A65 will disrupt their balance (ARLP & SEPANSO, 2008b: 21).

In addition to the direct ecological implications of the road, campaigners are also framing the A65 as part of a larger climate change debate. The joint dossier of ARLP and SEPANSO on the A65 draws on the science of Volatile Organic Compounds (VOC), CO₂ emissions and the goals on carbon emissions reduction (2008b: 8-9).

Finally, the third area of controversy concerns the declared economic benefits that the road will bring. The A65 was proposed on the basis of low (but increasing) traffic flows between Langon and Pau, the isolation of parts of the region and improved transport links particularly with Toulouse. Campaigners however are sceptical about the reality of these claims. They argue that the better communication links need to be concentrated on the two end of the axis, not on the link between the two (ARLP Dossier A65, p.13). The path of the road will also bypass many of the

smaller, isolated communities by several tens of miles and so the new access will be '*complètement inutile*' – completely useless (Interview, anti-road activist 30/10/08). The A65 project follows another roads project in the region, the *Itinéraire à Grand Gabarit* (IGG) (Heavy Load Relief Road) which focussed on the road link between Bordeaux and Toulouse directly – a European Parliament-decreed 'Infrastructure of national Interest' (*Itinéraire à Grand Gabarit*, 2003). The A65 therefore presents the most current piece in the road transport puzzle for the South West corner of France.

ii) *The Actors*

The main group which has mobilised against the A65 is ARLP (*Alternative Régionale Langon Pau* – Langon Pau Regional Alternative). Their campaign is supported by the environmental organisation SEPANSO (*Fédération des Sociétés pour l'Etude, la Protection et l'Aménagement de la nature dans le Sud-Ouest* – Federation of Societies for the Management and Protection of Nature in the South West) – one of the smaller and independent of such organisations, but it is not a grassroots group and does rely on a small amount of state funding. Although these are the two main groups involved in the campaign, press communications also bear the logos of *Amis de la Terre* (Friends of the Earth), *France Nature Environnement* (FNE – France, Nature, Environment), *Greenpeace*, *Réseau Action Climat France* (Climate Action Network France), and the World Wildlife Fund for Nature (WWF).

The ARLP was a grassroots group. It was established as a direct response to the A65 road project in 2006 and was composed largely of residents of the Gironde region opposed to the road, occupants of those villages most directly affected by the new

road's path (namely Bostens), and shares some dual membership with other environmental groups in the region like *Amis de la Terre*. Very few of its members had been involved in any kind of protest activity before, in fact for some of them it is 'the first time that they have taken an interest in politics at all' (Interview, anti-road activist 31/10/08). Overall, the group's membership drew on a wide cross-section of the local community; some of the group's younger members belonged to a community arts organisation, and use their various artistic abilities to further the ARLP agenda, other members were involved in protest or in environmental issues for the first time. The group was organised and innovative; it had a comprehensive website, a YouTube presence, and used the breadth of membership to create a campaign that was representative of a wide variety of local interests.

SEPANSO's involvement in the campaign is more legalistic, '*une attaque juridique*' (Interview, 06.11.2008). As an organisation it concerns itself with all aspects of protecting the natural patrimony of the Aquitaine region of France. A member of *France Nature Environnement* which is in turn a member of the European Environmental Bureau (EEB), SEPANSO is institutionalised. There are 16 salaried staff in the office, paid for by the local government, and a number of volunteers. Overall, they are involved in the management of 10 nature reserves and 30 councils and committees with various environmental objectives. At an international level they have had representation at the EEB, at Rio 92 and Rio+10. With regard to the A65 campaign, SEPANSO have been able to use their access to information and resources to keep abreast of developments and to campaign through official channels.

iii) *The Actions*

The protest repertoire of ARLP was a creative one. Actions included a wheelbarrow race in the main square of Mont-de-Marsan; the wheelbarrows contained characters playing the roles of Alain Rousset (President of the Aquitaine Regional Council and Deputé of la Gironde), Alain Juppé (former Prime Minister, Minister of Ecology and Sustainable Development and Mayor of Bordeaux), Henry Emmanuelli (Deputé for *Les Landes*) and Jean-Jacques Lasserre (President of the Pyrénées-Atlantiques Council) racing for the title of the biggest local *bétonneur* – ‘concrete-layer’. The race made the headlines of the local news on France 3 Aquitaine and considerable local media coverage. A clip of the race was also posted on YouTube. The ARLP also took a carnival float to the *Parade Climatique* in Paris in 2007 a climate change protest event organised by national environmental NGOs. The float featured ‘DJ Borloo’ a DJ-ing caricature of Jean-Louis Borloo, Minister for Ecology, Energy and Sustainable Development playing a famous club mix dubbed with a rap about the A65 (see figure 2.2). Once again, clips of the rap were posted on YouTube and on the ARLP website, together with other televised material such as local interviews on regional news.



Figure 2.2: DJ Borloo on a float at the *Parade Climatique*

In a similarly creative vein ARLP formed a spin-off group of *planteurs volontaires* (volunteer planters) a word-play on the *faucheurs volontaires* (volunteer reapers) who are well-known in France for their destruction of field of GM crops. The *planteurs* planted trees on various tracts of the proposed A65 route, posting updates on their website. Figure 2.3 shows a poster advertising their activities.



Figure 2.3: A poster advertising the first *Planteurs Volontaires* action 30/03/07

These more original acts of protest were supplemented with traditional action repertoires: unravelling banners down the side of buildings, in this case the Pey-Berlan Tower in Bordeaux, giving TV and radio interviews, and creating a petition.

However; the over-riding characteristic of the anti-A65 protests is its relative professionalisation. In spite of the ARLP group being a grassroots group with little or no previous campaign experience it has developed a striking action repertoire which has attracted considerable local and national press coverage. It developed a

website, participated in studio discussions on the local news and posted videos on YouTube to reach a wider audience. Together with the professional environmental expertise of SEPANSO it launched a sustained attack on the proposals at local, regional and national levels.

ii) The French Anti-GMO Campaign

ACTORS	TRANSLATION
Amis de la Terre	Friends of the Earth
Aquitaine Alternatives	
Collectif Aquitaine Avenir Sans OGM	The Aquitaine GMO-Free Future Collective
Collectif Aquitaine des Faucheurs Volontaires	Aquitaine Collective of Volunteer Reapers
Greenpeace France	
l'Association pour la Taxation des Transactions pour l'Aide aux Citoyens (Attac) France <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Attac Landes côtes sud - Attac Marsan - Attac Born 	Association for the Taxation of Transactions to Help Citizens
Les Verts	The Green Party
Parti des Socialistes Européens	European Socialist Party
Vigilance OGM 33	GMO Vigilance 33
Maison de la Nature et de l'Environnement	House of Nature and the Environment

i) *The Issue*

The French case chosen for this thesis is the anti-GMO movement in Aquitaine. The South West corner of France has the highest concentration of maize farming in the country, indeed, in Europe, and as a consequence has been the focus of the majority of GM maize trials (Eurostat, 2009). The Aquitaine region is therefore well-versed in the anti-GMO arguments and hosts a number of grassroots and institutionalised opposition groups.

Although French public policy was broadly supportive of GMO technology up until 1996, the French government and people have developed a history of unease with GM technologies that has peaked in recent years. Common to the European timeline of concern outlined above, Graham Hayes pinpoints the origins of concern in France to the 1st November 2006 when the newspaper *Libération* ran a front page article entitled '*Alerte au soja fou!*' (Beware the mad soya!) explicitly linking GM crops to a number of recent food security scares such as BSE (Hayes, 2006: 01), a development that was of particular concern to France because of the importance of beef exports to its economy.

The agricultural dimension of the problem is key to France's relationship with GMOs. The division of opinion between the two powerful agricultural trade unions the *Fédération nationale des syndicats d'exploitants d'agricole* (FNSEA – National Federation of Agricultural Syndicates) in favour of GMOs and the *Confédération Paysanne* (CP – Countryside Confederation) against, is characteristic of the deep divisions running through the different governments and government policies which have overarched the debate.

Several u-turns may be observed within French GMO policy from supporting the introduction of GMO products to a complete moratorium, positions usually corresponding to a change in government. In addition to this instability, there was a perceived lack of early consultation with the general public which fuelled feelings of unrest. Hayes notes that 'hitherto treated as an issue of technoscience regulation...cordoned off from public debate within dedicated institutional structures such as the *Commission du Génie Biomoléculaire* (CGB), the development of GMOs in France henceforth became a highly charged political issue under the twin issues of social protest and sustained media attention' (Hayes, 2006: 01). The prominent profile of French anti-GMO protest has been maintained and currently finds itself at an all-time high, the outline of which is presented below.

ii) *The Actors*

Within Aquitaine and its various departments, the dominant anti-GMO voices are those of the subsidiary groups of NGOs. In particular, *l'Association pour la Taxation des Transactions pour l'Aide aux Citoyens* (Attac – Association for the Taxation of Transactions to Help Citizens), and its local subsidiaries: *Attac Landes côtes sud*, *Attac Marsan*, *Attac Born*. Attac defines itself as a 'movement for popular education' (Attac France, 2009) and, although not limited to environmental issues takes a firm stand against GMOs. Other organisations include *Greenpeace France*, and its subsidiary group in Bordeaux, and *Amis de la Terre* and its subsidiary in Landes. They are closely linked to the national and international anti-GMO campaigns of their respective organisations.

The grassroots face of anti-GMO protest is represented by a local group – *Vigilance OGM 33* (33 is the number of the department of Gironde in Aquitaine) and the *faucheurs volontaires* (volunteer reapers) – Figures 2.4 and 2.5 illustrate their logos with emblems of ‘investigation’ and ‘reaping’. Their support for the *faucheurs* is an important part of their identity, and a number of *faucheurs* share membership with the group. The *faucheurs volontaires* in the region are a collection of individuals operating at a grassroots level to ‘reap’ the GM crops planted in trial sites. They are united by common membership of local environmental groups, including chapters of larger EMO, and in spite of their grassroots approach they are recognised alongside established NGOs in regional anti-GMO campaigns.¹⁶



Figure 2.4: The logo of *Vigilance OGM 33*



Figure 2.5. The logo of the *Faucheurs Volontaires*

Although they did not comprise part of the European-level networks of actors such as GMO-Free Europe, *Vigilance Aquitaine 33* does have membership of *Maison de la Nature et de l'Environnement* (House of Nature and the Environment) – an

¹⁶ It should be noted that the *faucheurs volontaires* are not specific to the region, they are a movement of civil disobedience that took root at the Larzac protests of 2003 and have gathered a regional presence across France, as well as international notoriety.

overarching networks of environmental organisation working in Aquitaine which provides them with both material resources and expertise at a local level. An example of the breadth of actors at work in Aquitaine, from political parties down to the *faucheurs* is illustrated by the regional coordination network: *Collectif Aquitaine Avenir Sans OGM* (Aquitaine GMO-Free Future Collective). Launched in 2006 to coordinate anti-GM campaigns, signatories of their charter included¹⁷: the political parties *Les Verts* and *Parti des Socialistes Européens* (the European Socialist Party), NGOs *Amis de la Terre* and Greenpeace, local organisations such as *Aquitaine Alternatives* and the grassroots activists the *Collectif Aquitaine des Faucheurs Volontaires* (Aquitaine Collective of Volunteer Reapers). In this way, the grassroots face of the anti-GMO movement is only a small part of it – and the action repertoires deployed reflect the breadth of groups involved.

iii) The Actions

The nature of the GM crop debate – a national and a highly local issue, and one with considerable public sympathy – means that the role of the anti-GM campaign is to apply pressure at the relevant points – national, local government and the general public. With France's moratorium currently in place there are no current crop trials and therefore no flashpoints around which the groups may mobilise. For this reason, there appears to be a long and well developed history of coordination amongst the various local and national organisations in the area.

¹⁷ The full list of signatories is: Accueil paysan 24 ; Aquitaine Alternatives ; Association du Causse de l'Isle : Comités Attac ; Bergerac ; Développement Durable ; Fédération Bio d'Aquitaine ; Bioservice ; Comité de vigilance OGM 47 ; Confédération Paysanne d'Aquitaine ; Collectif Aquitain des Faucheurs Volontaires ; Greenpeace ; Horizon Vert ; I.D.E.A.L ; L.C.R. ; PCF ; Les amis de la Terre des Landes et Dordogne ; Fédération Sepanso ; Parc Naturel Régional Périgord Limousin ; Périgord sans OGM ; PS ; PSE Parti des Socialistes Européens and Les verts (L'Ecologie Les Verts, 2006)

The actions of the anti-GMO campaign in Aquitaine may be divided into two main areas: direct and non-direct action. The non-direct action represents the vast majority of the work done, by both grassroots and organised interests. The most typical actions join together this spectrum of actors into coordinated awareness-raising campaigns. For example, an action of 29 March 2008 saw *Vigilance 33*, *Attac 33*, *Greenpeace*, *Amis de la Terre*, *Non aux OGM* and local organic farmers assemble in Bordeaux city centre for an anti-GMO awareness campaign. There were public speakers, music and flyer-drops. They are supplemented by a rolling tide of individual actions: stands at local environmental awareness days, film screenings and flyer-drops in public places – town squares, outside supermarkets etc and writing to local mayors to express concern. All of those interviewed belonging to these groups were able to give several examples of having participated in several of these activities.

The grassroots face of the movement – *Vigilance 33* and the *faucheurs* also have a repertoire of more direct action, designed to attract media attention. For example, at the sentencing of José Bové for his part in the destruction of a field of GM maize *Vigilance 33* held a ‘solidarity picnic’ outside the courthouse. Equally the manifesto of the *faucheurs* makes their strategy of non-violent action clear. *Faucheurs* are advised not to act alone, not to carry secateurs or scythes with them, and to carry a piece of ID so that they may be formally identified by the police. Their strategy involves destroying fields of GM crops through their physical presence, by rolling around in the plants, by picnicking in the field or playing sports. Unlike similar

sabotage activities in the UK which took place at night to avoid arrest (Doherty & Hayes, 2007), the *faucheurs* hope to attract as much attention as possible.

2.4 Protest in Italy

i) The Italian Anti-Road Campaign

ACTORS	TRANSLATION
i Verdi	The Green Party
il Partito Democratico	The Democratic Party
Legambiente	Environmental League
WWF	
Italia Nostra	Our Italy
Stop al consume di territorio	Stop Developing the Land
Comitato per la Bellezza	Committee for Beauty
Movimento Ecologista	Ecologist Movement
Soccorso Ambientale Marremmano (SAM)	Maremma Environmental Assistance
SOS Maremma	
Comitato Stop Autostrada	Stop the Road Committee
Associazione di promozione sociale (ARCI)	Association for Social Benefit
Coordinamento Toscano Produttori Biologici	Tuscan Organic Producers Network
Forum Ambientalista Toscano	Tuscany Environment Forum

Medicina Democratica	Democratic Medicine
“L’Alternativa” Bibbona	The Bibbona Alternative
La sinistra per Castagneto	The Left for Castagneto
Partito di Comunisti Italiani (PdCI)	Italian Communist Party
Partito Rifondazione Comunista (PRC)	Communist Refoundation Party
Comitato Tirrenica a Basso Impatto	Tyhrrenian Low Impact Committee
Comitato Aurelia Sicura Subito	Secure the Aurelia Immediately Committee
Comuni di Capalbio	The Municipality of Capalbio
Montalto di Castro	
Manciano e Cellere	Manciano and Cellere
Coldiretti	Farming Trade Union
Cia	Farming Trade Union
il Comitato del Priorato	The Municipality of Priorato

i) *The Issue*

The Italian case centres on a proposal with a 30 year history to build a *Corridoio Tirrenico* (Tyrrhenian Corridor) between Grosseto in Tuscany and Civit  Vecchia in Lazio. The existing S.S. 1 Aurelia road which runs close to the West coast of Tuscany and skirts around the edge of the Maremma National Park would be replaced by the *Corridoio* further inland. The most controversial tract, between Grosseto and Rosignano Marittimo, will cut through the National Park, and has created considerable local consternation.

The project is based in the long-term inadequacy of the existing S.S. 1 Aurelia, specifically a 20km tract between these two towns which is the *Variente Aurelia* (Alternative Aurelia) – see Figure 2.6 for the route of the road. This tract is particularly winding, without a central barrier and is peppered with many narrow crossings. In 1991 the *Società Autostradale Tirrenica* – SAT (Tyrrhenian Motorway Association) which was initiated in 1968 with the specific aim of designing and administering the construction of a road between Livorno and Civitavecchia, put forward a proposal with an ‘internal’ trajectory. Their proposal was immediately dismissed by the Department for the Environment with the support of assorted environmental organisations and local interests. Subsequent proposals were submitted, with the support of ANAS (the national motorway agency) in 1996 and 1999. A change of government and the approval of the First Strategic Infrastructure Programme meant that in 2001 ANAS’ proposal was approved in principal. Since then, the SAT and ANAS have continued to debate the details of the project with the Tuscan Regional government and the environmental lobby. To date, the project is in the latter stage of approval with the local authorities.




Fig. 2.6: The proposed trajectory of the *Corridoio Tirrenico*

The controversies around this road centre primarily on 1) the decision to build a new road in place of renovating the existing one, and 2) the planned trajectory of the new road. It has been framed as an environmental/ecological disaster, an economic issue and a safety problem.

The decision to build a new road rather than renovate the existing one has been countered by two main oppositional arguments. The first is that the existing tract of road is so dangerous, that not to renovate it but to supplement it with an alternative road would be irresponsible. The second is economic: that the costs of building a second road are far higher than the figures of the Tuscan regional government suggest. The toll which would be applied to the road has not yet been revealed, and the campaign suggests that it would be excessive, especially in light of the fact that some of the organic farms in the path of the road would be forced to close or to lose their organic status. Figure 2.7 indicates one of the farms that would be implicated by the proposed road.



Figure 2.7: One of the organic farms that would be affected by the *Corridoio Tirrenico*

The ecological concerns regarding the impact of the road are also framed in terms of the local history. For example, the route the road will take will pass through the hills of Tarquinia, Manciano, Magliano, Pitigliano and Scansano – famous for their ancient Etruscan heritage and dotted with archaeological museums. A campaign flyer from *Legambiente* describes the area as ‘*ricca di storia, cultura e natura*’ – rich in history, culture and nature (Legambiente, -). The campaign also draws attention to the fact that the road will cut through the vineyards of Morellino di Scansano (red DOC) and Pitigliano (white DOC) which are amongst the most rapidly expanding vineyards in Italy. The wine-producing capacity of the area is of particular importance to Tuscany and its agritourism industry, and the *Strada del Vino colli di Maremma* (Maremma Hills Wine Route) would be cut in two by the motorway. The dominant frame for the ‘no campaign’ is the agricultural patrimony of the area.

ii) *The Actors*

The campaign against the *Corridoio Tirrenico* is characterised by a great breadth of actors. Some have been political parties; *I Verdi, il Partito Democratico*; international or national NGOs; *Legambiente, WWF, Italia Nostra, Stop al consumo di territorio*, some local environmental organisations; *Comitato per la Bellezza, Movimento Ecologista, Soccorso Ambientale Maremmano* (SAM) and a dedicated community group; *SOS Maremma*. There is evidence of cooperation between the NGOs with regard to the road, through joint publications for example (Emilliani, Lenzi, Matteoli, Podestà, & Zanchini, 2004) or through the umbrella group *Comitato Stop Autostrada* (Stop the Road Committee).¹⁸ There is also the ‘*Comitato Aurelia*

¹⁸ The *Comitato Stop Autostrada* is composed of the following groups and organisations: *Arci Bassa Val di Cecina*; *Arci Val di Cornia-Elba*; *Coordinamento Toscano Produttori Biologici*; *Forum*

*Sicura Subito*¹⁹ (see the table at the beginning of this section for a full list of these actors with translations where appropriate).

The overall effort between these groups appears very disjointed. Only *Amici della Terra* and *I Verdi* make reference to the campaign on their websites. *SOS Maremma* mentions a day of information and action with ‘other environmental associations’. In practice, the campaign against the road is an organic one, with *individuals* rather than environmental *groups* taking the lead in organising action.

iii) *The Actions*

The action repertoires of the protest groups reflect these divides. While the NGOs have produced expert studies (see previous section), the grassroots mobilizations have involved a physical presence. For example *SOS Maremma* organised an information desk at the *Fest’ambiente* environmental festival and *Fiera Quattro Passi* ‘Better World’ festival in Grosseto and Treviso respectively in August and September 2009. They have also organised bike rides and other similar events to raise the profile of their campaign in the local communities, as well as reaching out to local organic farmers whose crops may be affected by development.

Due to the long history of the campaign, the legal wrangling and the expert consultations required to approve the proposals the campaign has largely been

Ambientalista Toscano; WWF; *Legambiente*; *Medicina Democratica*; “*L’Alternativa*” *Bibbona*; “*La sinistra per Castagneto*”; PdCI (Italian Communist Party) ; PRC (Communist Refoundation Party); COMITATO TIRRENICA a BASSO IMPATTO

¹⁹ The *Comitato Aurelia Sicura Subito* is composed of the following groups and organisations: *i Comuni di Capalbio, Montalto di Castro, Manciano e Cellere, le associazioni Italia Nostra, Legambiente, WWF, il Movimento Ecologista and Comitato per la Bellezza*, the agricultural trade unions *Coldiretti* and *Cia*, *il Soccorso Ambientale Maremmano* and *il Comitato del Priorato*

dominated with the large environmental NGOs and political parties, with the institutional gravitas to negotiate with the Regional Government. The grassroots actors, from with the local chapters of EMOs or *SOS Maremma* were instrumental in gathering public support to attend the public consultations.

ii) The Italian Anti-GMO Campaign

ACTORS	TRANSLATION
The Tuscan Regional Government	
Greenpeace Italy	
<i>Amici della Terra</i> (and their local composite chapters such as <i>Amici della Terra Firenze</i>)	Friends of the Earth
Legambiente	The Environmental League
WWF	
<i>Associazione Italiana Agricoltura Biologica</i>	Italian Association of Organic Farming
Slowfood Italia	Slowfood Italy
<i>Coldiretti</i>	Agricultural Trade Union

i) The Issue

The Italian case study of the anti-GMO movement is that of the work in Tuscany. Although there is a grassroots element to its campaign, it is a largely institutionalised movement which is concentrated in the region's capital – Florence. In order to understand the background to the anti-GMO sentiment in this area it is helpful to consider it in its national context.

Italy was a relative late-comer to the GM debate but quickly became one of Europe's most anti-GM countries, with polls consistently suggesting that the general public have high levels of distrust towards GMOs. In the most recent data available from 2008 of the 20 regions in Italy, 16 had declared themselves anti-GM (GMO-Free Europe, 2011). The consequence of this high level of public distrust has coupled with high levels of local government support.

The GM crop debate is of particular economic significance to Italy in comparison with the other case study countries by virtue of its prominent fruit and vegetable export market of which a significant proportion is organic (Bertolini and Guidone 2001: 143). This economic imperative has raised the stakes in the government's stance on GM issues. Alongside France and other European countries in February 1997 the Italian government invoked the safeguard clause banning the commercialization of bt-176 maize on its territory but quickly revoked decision in light of the trade implications. The stance of Agricultural Ministers has also been inconsistent: Giancarlo Galan was more sympathetic to GM research than his successor Saverio Romano who has expressed his intention to "build a wall to block the invasion of GMOs which are jeopardising our country's production...we have to prevent them for getting a foothold in our markets"²⁰ (Romano, 2011).

The anti-GM issue of particular pertinence to Tuscany because of the agro-alimentary patrimony. They are famous for the wines, cheeses and truffles and this has meant that the local public are particularly sensitive to agricultural issues. A

²⁰ Original text - *mi impegno ad alzare un muro altissimo per bloccare l'invasione dell'Ogm che sta mettendo in crisi le nostre produzioni...Impediremo che gli ogm possano avere spazio nel nostro mercato* – translation my own.

study of the rise of anti-GM sentiment across Europe notes that, in Italy ‘as the debate continued throughout the summer of 2000 many stakeholder positions were shifting, in particular those who represented food producers, retailers and consumer organisations... Consumer perceptions, with regard to the importance of Italian food quality, was a key theme in defence of maintaining traditions and high standards.’ (Marris, Wynne, Simmons, & Weldon, 2001: 43).

ii) The Actors

The Tuscan case is an especially strong example of the importance of food quality and agricultural patrimony to the campaign – it is a self-declared GM-free region. This in turn has dictated the kinds of actors involved in the protests. Unusually, one of the most important actors is The Tuscan regional government who has banned the cultivation of GMOs from its territory since 2000, as well as the procurement of any crops containing GM products. They were one of the founder signatories of the Florence Charter (signed 4 February 2005) which called for the ability for regions to act autonomously in banning the cultivation of GM crops from their borders, to call the European Commission to impose sanctions on irresponsible GM practices and to push for transparency in the cultivation of GM crops. As such, the Regional government is a high-profile anti-GMO actor with the legislative powers to act on that, and they have dominated the protest activities.

In light of the institutionalised nature of much of the anti-GM sentiment in Tuscany, unsurprisingly the social movement actors are also institutionalised. The main social movement actors in this area are Greenpeace Italy, *Amici della Terra* (and their local

composite chapters such as *Amici della Terra Firenze*), Legambiente, WWF and aided by agro-alimentary interest groups such as *Associazione Italiana Agricoltura Biologica* and *Slowfood Italia*, as well as the farmer's association *Coldiretti*.

There have not been any recorded field trials of GM crops in Italy, due in no small part to the Regional Government's ability to veto any proposals. As such, the field actions taken in the UK and France have not occurred, and the grassroots groups that one might expect to evolve as a result have been 'squeezed out'. In the subsequent chapters, the grassroots face of the movement therefore refers to the local chapters of environmental NGOs and the informal accords between local organic farmers who provide each other with support for their businesses.

iii) The Actions

As in the other case study countries, the action repertoires of the anti-GMO groups revolve around public education: information tables and flyer-drops in public areas and outside supermarkets. These activities are supplemented by ad-hoc highly localised activities from the organic farming community – who have visited schools or provided farm visits. The most high-profile of the grassroots groups' activities is their participation in *Fest'ambiente* – an annual environmental festival held near the Maremma natural park. Organised by *Legambiente*, they rely on the participation of local environmental groups, including organic food producers to promote the anti-GMO message amongst others. The festival is national, high-profile, and well-organised. In many of these respects it is characteristic of the anti-GM activity in Tuscany.

2.5 Protest in the UK

1) The UK Anti-Road Campaign

ACTORS
No Alignment Action Group (NAAG)
Bilston Glen Protest Camp
TRANSform Scotland
The Scottish Wildlife Trust
The RSPB
The Scottish Association for Public Transport
The Cyclists Touring Club
Friends of the Earth Scotland
Loanhead Environment and Conservation Group

i) The Issue

The case study selected here is one of protest against a road planned for a village on the outskirts of Edinburgh. Bilston is a village seven miles south of Edinburgh with the A701 running through it. In 2000 Midlothian Council was granted permission by the Scottish Executive to re-route the road from the City Bypass at Straiton to Milton Bridge, north of Penicuik, cutting through the woodland next to the village – Bilston Glen. This woodland is a site of special scientific interest. See Figure 2.8 for the route of the proposed development.




Figure 2.8: The proposed trajectory of the A701

In 2000, Midlothian Council applied to the Scottish Executive for planning permission to re-align the A701. This process required a dual carriageway to replace the existing roadway as the A701, from the Edinburgh by-pass to Penicuik. Although the project was originally intended to be funded by PPL, part of the biotech Roslin Institute, it was later decided that it would be funded by the Council. The Executive granted permission for the construction of the road, and commissioned Halcrow Ltd to investigate the issues connected with the road and to suggest option for a sustainable transport strategy. When Halcrow presented their report in 2004 the key recommendations raised concern for the environmental impact of the road (Midlothian Council, 2004). Since 2005 plans have effectively lain dormant when other transport improvements were developed including the amelioration of three junctions on the existing A701 and bus priority lanes (City of Edinburgh Council, 2004) and funding was withdrawn from the area of transport policy.

Opposition to the possibility of the future construction of the road is based on two main objections. The first of these is the ecological value of the woodland through which it would intersect: the Glen has been identified as a Site of Special Scientific Interest for its geological history, and is also the site of large wildlife colonies including numerous badger sets. The second objection is based on the increased traffic and development on greenbelt land which would result from the road. This angle is most closely aligned to climate change issues.

ii) *The Actors*

The Bilston case is unusual in the vibrancy of grassroots protest that assembled against the road. Two main grassroots groups emerged. Opposition to the proposal was headed by the No Alignment Action Group (NAAG) and a protest camp at Bilston Glen was established in June 2002 (see Figure 2.9).



Figure 2.9: The Bilston Glen Protest Camp

NAAG was a group composed of local residents, who organised purely in response to the proposed bypass, seeing it as a Trojan horse for further development of the area as well as detrimental to local wildlife and shifting the balance on public/private

transport. (Spokes, 1999). When the proposal to build the road was suspended in 2005 the group dissolved, although would no doubt return should the construction plans develop further.

The continuing presence of activists in the camp is designed to blockade the arrival of any workforce on site should construction begin, and also to raise awareness of the road's proposals as well as issues of social and ecological injustice more generally.

The camp declares itself against:

‘The needless destruction of ancient woodland habitats!
The needless construction of roads!
The destruction of Greenbelt land
Genetic manipulation of plants and animals
The expansion of biotech research facilities and Bayer
& the pursuit (sic) of corporate profits!’ (Bilston Glen Anti-Bypass Site)

The camp is populated by a number of seasoned environmental activists, some of whom have a history of protesting in other sites across the country.

Other opposition included much larger environmental movement organisations: TRANSform Scotland – a sustainable transport alliance, the Scottish Wildlife Trust, the RSPB, the Scottish Association for Public Transport, the Cyclists Touring Club and Friends of the Earth Scotland as well as local group the Loanhead Environment and Conservation Group.

iii) *The Actions line spacing and 'Actions'*

The camp activists worked closely with NAAG during the early years of the campaign and organised 'open door' evenings to encourage participation. Other actions included candlelit vigils in the woods and marching to Council offices to present petitions. This work was documented on YouTube and is designed to attract maximum public exposure. The protests techniques used echo many of those used in previous anti-road campaigns across the UK, and reinforce the non-violent direct action heritage of this protest area (Doherty, 1999). They were keen to attract a wide audience and maintained a website which invited people to their open camp or to visit on one of the special Sunday Free Cafés onsite every month (see Figure 2.10)



Figure 2.10: Bilston Glen Free Cafe Poster

The NAAG also used non-violent direct action to raise public awareness to the proposals using a very conventional action repertoire. For example, they organised protest walks along the proposed route of the bypass, or marches to the Scottish Executive. They also engaged directly with Midlothian Council by writing to them with their objections (Transform Scotland, 1999).

II) The UK Anti-GMO Campaign

ACTORS
Totnes Genetix Group (TOGG)
Local chapters of environmental movement organisations such as Friends of the Earth
Ad hoc groups of farmers

i) The Issue

The case study being considered here is that of the anti-GM movement in Devon. This is a region with a strong agricultural tradition and has been the location of GM trials. The most high profile of these trials was in 1998 when GM maize was planted close to Riverford Organic Farm. In the same vein as the *faucheurs volontaires*, locals organised a campaign resulting in the arrest of two women charged with removing GM maize by hand. A public meeting was held in Totnes at which 300 people demonstrated unanimous support for the action and the charges were eventually dropped. The impact of this action on public opinion however was

profound. Such was the anti-GM sentiment in Devon both amongst the public and within local government that in 2003 it declared itself the first GM-free county in England (BBC News, 2003) although this is an aspirational statement of intent rather than legally binding arrangement. Local authorities can request special status through Article 19 of the EU's Deliberate Release Directive which allows specific areas to be excluded from a specific GM plantation, although this mechanism has not needed to be used in Devon since public opinion and Council sentiment made it an unattractive site for field trials.

The anti-GM story here echoes other stories unfolding across the UK at that time. Doherty and Hayes note that unlike in France and Italy which had strong links with farmers, GM protest in the UK targeted at power in a more de-territorialized way – there is a far weaker relationship between the land and alimentation in Britain (2007). GM crops in other protests across the UK therefore were framed more as an issue of food safety, of particular concern in Great Britain in light of the devastating effects the BSE, foot and mouth and bird flu crises had on consumer confidence in food products (Shaw, 1999; Toke, 2004). The example of Devon and the action to defend an organic farm is slightly unusual in the context of other protests happening nationally.

ii) The Actors

The organisation which was formed in Devon as response to the Riverford Farm situation was very much of its time. Totnes Genetix Group (TOGG) was formed in 1998 and became one of the most important grassroots groups fighting GMOs in the

late 1990s. They are composed of local residents from all walks of life and ages united purely by their stance against GM crops rather than any other larger environmental issues. They describe themselves as:

‘a non-hierarchical collective and form part of a national network of groups and individuals known as GEN (the Genetic Engineering Network). All ToGG work is done on a voluntary basis and expenses are funded purely by donations’ (TOGG, 1998).

Although reduced in number since the late 1990s, TOGG still plays an active role in the anti-GM activities of Devon and maintains links with other anti-GMO campaigns across the country.

Other groups were involved in the campaign, mainly local chapters of environmental movement organisations such as Friends of the Earth, but also ad hoc groups of farmers.

iii) The Actions

During the height of their campaign in the late 1990s-2000s TOGG produced the newsletter *Genetix Update* and was active in the national Genetic Engineering Network. TOGG still campaigns with awareness-raising strategies in the local area – it holds a stall every Saturday in Totnes town centre for example. Its work is in the company of local chapters of much larger EMOs such as Friends of the Earth which were particularly active in 2003-2004 to encourage individual UK regions to declare themselves GM free through the production of briefing documents (Friends of the Earth, 2004). Since then, TOGG’s GMO campaign has been supplanted with other

issues although their stance is unchanged. TOGG remains the only truly grassroots and active face of anti-GM protest in Devon and its campaign and action repertoire supports an awareness-raising role.

2.6 Conclusion

This chapter has provided an outline of both GMO and transport policy in the context of the European Union. It has also presented a description of the issues, actors and activities at work in each of the six case study campaigns. Although this chapter serves only to contextualise the analysis that follows, some early themes emerge: differences between policy areas, between countries and between the kinds of actor involved at a local level. The chapters that follow tease out these differences in more detail and provide explanations.

3 Political Opportunity Structures: Context and Cases

‘[T]he overt collective action that constitutes the organised, sustained, self-conscious challenge to existing authorities is best understood if it is related to political institutions, and to what happens in arenas of conventional party and interest group politics’

(Kriesi, Koopmans, Duyvendak, & Guigni, 1992: 239)

3.1 Introduction

In chapters one and two we outlined the methodology and introduced the cases used to address the core question: what does europeanisation mean for the strategies and practices of the green movement? We suggested that the impact of europeanisation is not direct, but mediated through a number of intervening ‘domains’. This chapter explores one such domain – political opportunity structures (POS) – and asks: what is the impact of europeanisation on grassroots green groups as mediated through political opportunity structures?

The aim of this chapter is two-fold. First it explores how structures at the European and national level shape the europeanisation of grassroots movements, and the role of the state in that process. For organised interests like political parties or

environmental movement organisations direct involvement with the state is inevitable; in the case of grassroots or localised social movement groups however the relationship cannot be taken for granted. Grassroots groups are constrained by their political environment in a different way: they are more fluid, more spontaneous and more autonomous than organised interests. With differing degrees of access to the state along the spectrum of social movement actors, how will these individual grassroots and localised groups experience europeanisation?

The second aim of this chapter is to distinguish between *European* and *europeanised* political opportunity structures. This distinction is important because it helps to disaggregate the influence of the EU. I distinguish between POS that have been created at the European level by virtue of the existence of the EU institutions and their sub-structures (*European political opportunity structures*) and domestic political opportunity structures that have shifted as a result of the processes of EU integration (*europeanised political opportunity structures*). This approach highlights the reflexive nature of the process of europeanisation i.e. the ability of European integration to impact upon member states, and for member states and their actors to impact upon the process of European integration. This distinction between *European* and *europeanised* also expands our understanding of POS in a transnational context, beyond the common juxtaposition of purely national or European opportunity structures. Finally, this distinction teases out the three process of europeanisation that I identified in chapter one: direct, indirect and passive europeanisation.

This chapter examines the contours and core dimensions of POS in three parts. It begins with a definition of domestic POS as outlined in the literature. The chapter draws on this understanding, and develops it further to present my own definition of political opportunity structures and the variables on which I focus. I also present two linked, but distinctive political opportunity structures: European POS and europeanised POS. The last section provides an overview of the national POS in each of the case study countries as a foundation to understand the platform on which the social movement groups are working.

3.2 POS and Social Movement Activity

The concept of POS, part of a ‘political process’ approach to social movement study, has been developed over the past twenty years as a means of explaining social movement emergence and success. If New Social Movement theory, outlined in chapter one, is able to explain what a social movement *looks like*, POS explains how it *operates*. The essential message of the political process approach to studying social movements is that activists do not choose their modus operandi in a vacuum – their goals and their tactics are contingent on the political context in which they are operating. This message has been refined by scholars of political opportunity structures to delineate more clearly what we mean by ‘political context’. By observing this context scholars have been able to answer the questions: why have different social movement groups chosen to act differently at different points in time? Is their action determined only by beliefs or by the environment in which they act? Why will the same beliefs be mobilised differently in different countries?

The concept of political opportunity structures originated in the 1970s from Peter Eisinger's analysis of protest in different American cities in which he identified the openness or closure of the local public administration as a key variable in explaining the protests (Eisinger, 1973). This first variable has been added to by other variables such as electoral stability (Piven & Cloward, 1977) and the availability of elite allies (Gamson, 1990) and further developed into an overarching theoretical framework. From this body of literature one distinction is most apparent: some analysts emphasise the (static) institutional while others underline the more dynamic structures of political opportunity.

Eisinger (1973) laid the foundations for those who interpret POS as more rigid, static institutional opportunities. Within this tradition of static POS the definition developed by Kriesi et al. (1992; , 1995) is the most recognised. They identify four structural variables that determine social movement behaviour:

(1) national political cleavage structures

These are the existing patterns of political conflict within a state. These patterns have 'deep societal roots, a long history and are institutionally embedded so that it needs more than governance intervention to make them change (Kohler-Koch, 2005: 12).

(2) institutional structures of the state

States are categorised on a spectrum of *weak* to *strong*, where weak states are defined by their openness on the input side (generating policy) and by their lack of a capacity to impose themselves on the output side (implementing policy). Conversely, strong states have a high capacity to impose themselves. The internal structure of the state institutions – the extent to which they are coherent or fragmented – will determine the overall strength or weakness of the state (Kriesi, Koopmans, Duyvendak, & Guigni, 1992: 222).

(3) Prevailing strategies of the state towards challengers

These are the informal procedures or strategies for addressing challengers are either *exclusive* (repressive, confrontative, polarising) or *integrative* (facilitative, cooperative, assimilative) (Kriesi, Koopmans, Duyvendak, & Guigni, 1992: 223).

(4) alliance structures

This refers to the configuration of power within a state and the presence or absence of specific interests from government (Kriesi, Koopmans, Puyvendak, & Guigni, 1995: 53).

Their typology contrasts with the work of other scholars such as Tilly (1978) and Tarrow (1998), whose POS variables emphasise the more *dynamic* nature of the opportunities: ‘people engage in contentious politics when patterns of political

opportunities and constraints change, and then by strategically employing a repertoire of collective action, creating new opportunities, which are the used by others in widening circles of contention' (Tarrow, 1998: 28-29). With this perspective in mind he identifies four alternative variables of political opportunity (1998: 165-167):

(1) the opening up of access to participation for new actors

Access to participate in the political process is placed on a spectrum from *open* to *closed*. The suggestion is that neither fully closed, nor fully open opportunities to act produce the greatest level of social movement protest, rather they are more likely to emerge at intermediate levels of opportunity where neither fear of repression nor the temptations of institutionalisation are dominant.

(2) shifts in ruling alignments

Instability in the alignment between ruling powers, chiefly through electoral instability, creates uncertainty amongst supporters and encourages more marginal actors to become involved.

(3) availability of influential allies

A social movement is encouraged to take action when they have influential allies who are able to support them – to act as negotiators on their behalf, to grant them access they would not otherwise have had.

(4) cleavages within and among elites

Resource-poor groups are incentivised to take action when there is a division amongst the ruling elites and their chances of inserting themselves into the debate are greater.

Although clearly distinct, these two classifications of political opportunity structure from Kriesi et al. and Tarrow do share the same basic premise: to distinguish between the formal institutional structures of a state, and the less formal power relations that define it at any one time. McAdam (1996: 26-27) synthesise these approaches to develop four variables that represent a consensus on political opportunity:

- 1) the openness or closure of the state*
- 2) the stability of elite alignments*
- 3) the availability of elite allies*
- 4) the state's capacity for repression*

I draw on these pre-existing classifications to develop my own definition of political opportunity structures as *the structural features of a political system that shape the*

*conditions for social movement action.*²¹ I focus my analysis of POS on three structural features in particular that are pertinent to this study: the strength of the state to implement its policies, the openness of the state to third party interests and the access that the state affords to elite allies. I feel that these are the dimensions which best represent the political systems in the chosen case study countries; the fourth variable ‘state repression’ is better seen as an overarching lens for the general political opportunity structures of a state – the way in which the first three variables manifest themselves. I return to these dimensions of national political opportunity in section 3.3 when I develop them into a framework for European and europeanised POS.

As the variables outlined above show, political opportunity structures are able to capture some of the more nuanced institutional arrangements with a state. Rather than treat the nation state as a monolithic entity, POS insists ‘that it be treated as diffuse institutions, structurally coherent and yet flexible, capable of enormous coordination between its different bodies but also, historically, reflecting considerable internal discord, unevenness and in some cases, even subversion among its member constituents (Cunningham, 2002: 185). The ability to capture these nuances gives POS two specific advantages in our examination of social movement activity at multiple layers of governance. The first of these is its ability to provide cross-national comparison between movements, and the second is its ability to make sense of emerging political structures at a supra-national level and to connect these to social movement behaviour.

²¹ A fuller definition of political opportunity structures appears in the following pages.

The strength of political opportunity structures in providing cross national comparison has been well documented, even by those who remain critical of the approach (Koopmans, 1999; McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996; Rootes, 1999; Saunders, 2009). Because it isolates a number of structural variables within a political system it can ‘explain the different success, strategies, action repertoires, levels of mobilization, and organizational structures’ of a movement in different countries (Van der Heijden, 2006: 28). Indeed, although concerns have been expressed that political opportunity structures ‘risks becoming a “dustbin” for any and every variable relevant to the development of social movements’ (della Porta & Diani, 2006: 17) these concerns are less pointed when the concept is applied in cross-national comparison where ‘differences in political opportunity structures often concern the most stable and deeply rooted aspects of political systems, and are thus structures beyond reasonable doubt’ (Koopmans, 1999: 108).

A second strength to the political opportunity structure approach is that it is able to capture emerging opportunities within ‘new’ polities such as the European Union. It has been established that with deepening European integration ‘authority and policy-making influence are shared across multiple levels of government: sub-national, national and supranational’ (Marks et al. 1996 in Ciaffi, 2001: 115). This in turn, argues Gualini, has led to a ‘re-framing of intergovernmental relationships that displays new opportunity structures for policy actors as well as resistance to new institutional compromises’ (2003: 618). There is greater possibility for a number of actors to create alliances around conflicts within and between their national governments, to take advantage of the new European-level allies that are emerging,

and to engage in new political fora. A framework for capturing these new opportunities at a national and supranational level is offered in the following section.

3.3 Tracking Movement Europeanisation Through POS

In this section I further develop my argument about why we might look for evidence of europeanisation within POS and what such evidence might look like. The task is challenging given that ‘political opportunity may be discerned along so many directions and in so many ways that it is less a variable than a cluster of variables- some more readily observable than others’ (Tarrow, 1988: 430). My own definition of POS as *the structural determinants of opportunity for social movements to act* draws from this literature²² but focuses on three structural dimensions that are most pertinent to the countries being addressed in this thesis. I first present domestic political opportunity structures and then outline what these look like once the European dimension is added.

i) Domestic POS

The variables of domestic political opportunity structures presented here are based on those advanced by McAdam et al.²³:

²² See (Kitschelt, 1986; Kriesi, Koopmans, Puyvendak, & Guigni, 1995; Tarrow, 1988)

²³ Of course POS exist at a sub-national level as well as the national (domestic) and supranational levels discussed here. Although they are not within the scope of this study it is worth noting that such opportunities add to the dynamism of European integration.

1. The strength of the state

This corresponds to the state's political output structures (whether a state is 'strong' or 'weak' in effectively implementing its policies). This dimension includes ideas of centralisation and it also synthesises the ideas of scholars who examine the stability of ruling alliances as a separate variable (McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996). There is an assumption here that policies are more effectively implemented when the state is centralised (strong) and when it has control of market participants (financial resources) (Kitschelt, 1986: 63-64). France is the 'strongest' of the case study countries - it is usually classified as centralised with stable leadership, while Britain is semi-centralised and Italy is the 'weakest' by virtue of being decentralised and having the least stable balance of ruling elites.

2. The openness or closure of the state to third party interest

The second of these dimensions corresponds to the political input structures (whether a state is 'closed' or 'open' to a wide variety of economic and civil society actors). In 'open' states policies are also often renegotiated in the process of being implemented, so this variable refers to the formalised structures available for the mediation of diverse interests at all stages of the policy cycle. It also considers the multiple access points to government at a national and supranational level such as working groups and other fora for the negotiation of interest (Scruggs, 2003: 13). In this way, the degree of centralisation of the state is also a consideration within this dimension, because it accounts for the multiple levels of government and therefore multiple access points for civil society engagement. However, the openness of the state is distinct from the first dimension in its treatment of centralisation because it focuses on the extent to which centralisation limits opportunities for actors to be

involved in the *creation* of policy, rather than the strength of the state in *implementing* policy. An example would be Italy where the decentralised nature of policy-making increases the openness of the system, with a number of institutionalised channels of access. In Britain the structure is also open with mechanisms for formal and informal inclusion. The most closed of the case study countries is France – a product of its centralisation.

3. Access to elite allies for third party interests

The third of these dimensions is perhaps the most interesting for this study. It concerns the ability of a movement group to access elite allies – usually agents of the state such as members of parliament, or influential lobbyists. Access here is shaped by structural features such as the electoral system, but also to contextual opportunities that can vary over time such as a sympathetic political party. In Italy and France, the presence of Greens in national government within the past decade has historically afforded environmental actors the opportunity to have their voice heard. By contrast in Britain the electoral success of the Green Party in Westminster was only realised in 2010 when the first M.P. won her seat; as such movements' access to national government elite allies has meant being generally limited to a minority party with little recent experience in government.

It must be added that this relationship between social movement and elite actors does not need to rely on access to the very top figures of government. As Dryzek et al. point out, 'equally important is what is normally classified as "administration" or "implementation"'. It is here that ... impact can be felt in the development of

alternative forums for discussion, informal consultations with movement representatives regarded as legitimate participants, and the acceptance of alternative studies and information provided by environmental groups' (2003: 137). Crucially, for movement groups '[t]he effects of such processes will not appear in legislation or executive orders, but rather in the kind of details of local decisions' (2003: 137).

The definition offered above maintains the analytical distinctiveness of political opportunity structures by focusing on the strictly *political* opportunities caused by configurations of power, rather than on some of the wider political resources that facilitate movement action such as party funding or public opinion. By focusing on these fixed political structures I can discount variables that alter over time or that are contingent on other factors, which maintains the analytical sharpness of POS as a tool.²⁴ These three dimensions also separate out the formal institutional structures such as the electoral system or the degree of centralisation of the state, from the less formal structures of power relations or political culture within a given country such as public opinion or economic context. Finally, this definition of POS, which draws most closely from the those offered by (McAdam, 1996) and Tarrow (1998), is important because it emphasises the *dynamic* nature of the opportunities. This emphasis on dynamism is more appropriate in the constantly developing arena of European integration. In this context the structural configurations of power are

²⁴ Gamsen and Meyer have stressed the necessity to maintain the *political, structural*, variables of political opportunity structures: 'the concept of political opportunity structure is in trouble, in danger of becoming a sponge that soaks up virtually every aspect of the social movement environment – political institutions and culture, crises of various sorts, political alliances, and policy shifts.... It threatens to become an all-encompassing fudge factor for all the conditions and circumstances that form the context for collective action. Used to explain so much, it may ultimately explain nothing at all' (1996: 275).

subject to both national and European influences and are therefore buffeted by two forces rather than one; power shifts between the European, national (and sub-national) political levels. Perhaps inevitably, given the processes of European integration, ‘the domestic POS becomes increasingly complemented by new forms of opportunities for protest that form within the framework of EU politics’ (Reising, 1998: 5). I argue that these resultant political opportunity structures fall into two distinct categories. First of all, political opportunity structures have been created at the European level by virtue of the existence of the EU institutions and their sub-structures. These I call *European political opportunity structures*. Secondly, domestic political opportunity structures have shifted as a result of the processes of EU integration. These I call *europeanised political opportunity structures*.

ii) European POS

European POS are created at the European level. They amend the three core dimension of domestic POS as follows:

1. The strength of the EU

In the national context this dimension of POS refers to the political output structures (whether a state is able to effectively implement its policies). In the case of EU studies, however, it is more pertinent to consider implementing policy areas in which the EU has competence and where the national construction of policy is ‘outsourced’

to the EU. Put simply – European opportunities are more likely where EU competence is strong.

2. The openness or closure of the EU to third party interest

The opening up of new institutional configurations within the European Union which can create new channels of influence. Within the context of European integration this dimension refers to the movements' ability to lobby EU institutions directly.

3. Access to elite allies for third party interests

This dimension refers to the appearance of new constellations of allies *at the level of the European Union*.

These allies may include, but are not confined to political parties with representation in the European Parliament. They may also be Brussels-based networks of non-governmental actors such as Trade Unions or NGOs. The European Environmental Bureau would be one such example.

These dimensions of European POS suggest therefore that social movements are more likely to experience europeanisation if they:

- 1) Work within a policy area tightly bound by European implementation requirements
(The strength of the EU)

2) Have direct access to institutional channels of influence at the EU

(The openness of the EU)

3) Have access to new allies at a European level whose presence is a direct result of European integration

(The access to elite allies)

These European dimensions evidence the process of *direct europeanisation* outlined in chapter one. The connection between the social movement actor and the European Union one is an intentional one, and it is made with the EU at the European level, rather than connecting to domestic manifestations of EU opportunities.

iii) Europeanised POS

Europeanised POS are structural opportunities at a national level which result indirectly from European integration, rather than those which appear at the level of the EU itself. Kassim (2003: 105) observes that ‘membership of the European Union has had important organizational consequences for [national] government. Responding to both the obligations of membership and the incentives to “get things right in Brussels”, all member states have put in place structures, procedures, and processes designed to manage their input into EU policy-making’. When one is looking for evidence of the europeanisation of a social movement through its interaction with europeanised opportunity structures, it is not enough to look only at the level of the EU. *Europeanised* POS can be identified along the following dimensions:

1. The strength of the EU

The ability of a state to implement EU policy at a national level is the result of domestic adaptation to the EU – the creation of new competencies within government departments for example.

2. The openness or closure of the EU to third party interest

The creation of structures at a national or sub-national level that are a direct result of the EU such as a local ‘European Office’ or national MEPs. One could say that a green group becomes europeanised to the extent that it appeals directly to these new structures.

3. Access to elite allies for third party interests

New constellations of allies at the national or pan-European level that may not emerge as a direct response to the EU, but that are to some extent engaged with EU policy. Importantly, actors are able to look for allies outside of their national boundaries. An example would be ‘GMO-Free Europe’ – a pan-European network of institutional and social movement actors seeking to tackle GM policy over which the EU has competence, although their level of activity is purely national.

These dimensions of europeanised POS suggest therefore that a green group could experience europeanisation to the extent that it:

- 1) Responds to the national mechanisms for implementing EU policy

(The strength of the EU)

- 2) Appeals to national channels responsible for influencing EU decision-making

(The openness of the EU)

- 3) Engages with new allies at a national or pan-European level whose work is informed by, but does not necessarily directly address, EU policy

(The access to elite allies)

These dimensions of europeanised POS evidence the process of *indirect europeanisation* outlined in chapter one because they connect social movement actors with European opportunities at a *national* level. To the extent that making this connection to the EU is implicit, then a social movement will also demonstrate *passive europeanisation*.

The distinction between European and Europeanised POS is crucial: we might well expect that the europeanisation of social movements could look very different in different countries as a result of the varying political opportunity structures. Although *European* POS might be common to all, *europeanised* POS will manifest themselves differently because of the different national political opportunity structures. Reising (1998: abstract) writes

‘the europeanisation of protest occurs, displaying systematic cross-national differences. These differences are...related to the differential between the constraints of the actors’ domestic environments and the common-to-all opportunities evolving on the level of European politics’.

This idea is pursued in the following section, which compares the political opportunity structures at work in the anti-road and anti-GM campaigns in Italy, France and the UK.

3.4 National POS: Case Countries

In order to contextualise the analysis of social movement protest that follows in the next chapter, it serves to first provide a broad outline of the national political opportunity structures in each of the case study countries. This section provides generalised descriptions that in turn provide a baseline against which the europeanisation of individual protests may be measured.

i) POS in France

The political opportunity structure in France is distinctive amongst the case study countries because of the relatively high degree of centralisation of the state – what McCauley has called ‘strong and passively exclusive’ (McCauley, 2011: 6).

i) The strength of the state

Kriesi et al. have typified France’s POS as a strong state, exclusive and repressive of challengers (1992: 222). They write:

Because of its strength, the state can often choose merely to ignore challenges; if it does react, however, it will most likely confront the

challenger with repression. Moreover, since the state is strong, the challenger is neither likely to have veto power, nor is he likely to obtain substantive concessions (1992: 223).

The French state is strong by virtue of its centralisation. It is able to implement and police its own policy agenda with greater autonomy than the other case study countries considered here. In spite of this, a number of ‘opportunity windows’ have emerged when the political structures of the country have shifted. These opportunities might be precipitated by changes of government, changes in the configuration of ruling elites (mayors and national ministers for example) or even by protracted legal processes. (McCauley, 2011: 7).²⁵ In this way, the opportunities for social movement action are available, but are more contingent than in the two other case study countries because of the strength of the state.

ii) The openness or closure of the political system

Of all of the countries studied, France is closest to the notion of the closed state. It is highly centralised, with a strong tradition of excluding civil society actors. As McCauley notes ‘pluralist intermediation, particularly the inclusion of civil society actors, does not fit well within a French context’ (2008b: 155). According to the traditional POS typology of open and closed states this centralisation may be expected to suggest a dynamic movement outside the state. But evidence points to a less than vibrant French environmental movement. Fillieule (2003) remarks on low

²⁵ For examples of social movement groups taking advantage of such circumstances see (Berny, 2009; Hilson, 2002; McCauley, 2007, 2008c, 2011).

numbers of protest events compared to other movements, but also a low turnout at such events which he attributes to several factors: years of Socialist government privileging economic over environmental concerns,²⁶ the growth of French Green party *les Verts*, fragmentation and institutionalization within the movement, and a universal acceptance of environmental principles which ‘dilutes’ the ability of the movement to act.

In the context of this ‘dilution’ a green party presence in government from 1997 meant that the institutionalisation of the green movement swiftly followed, so rather than strong *movements* we find strong *professional* environmental movement organisations such as Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth (see Fig. 3.1). At the same time, paradoxically, the passively exclusive nature of the state means that ‘movements are excluded from traditionally corporatist forms of national policy-making’ (McCauley, 2011: 6). Fillieule notes that:

‘the relative pacification of the environmental movement can be related to its co-optation by the state...at the local level this phenomenon is all the more strong since local institutions finance more and more expert reports, and try to obtain the associations agreement to their public policy, the best way of doing so being the creation of ad hoc associations totally dependent for their resources upon the local government’ (2003: 73).

In France it seems the centralised state and co-opted local groups do not offer the political structure necessary to facilitate *grassroots* social movement access.

²⁶ Fillieule and Ferrier explain that socialist governments privileged economic questions over environmental concerns because they sought to demonstrate their competence as a political power (Fillieule & Ferrier, 1999: 17)

Fig. 3.1: *Les Verts* in Government

The French Green Party *Les Verts* entered government between 1997 and 2001. Although they have not managed to re-establish this electoral success over the past ten years, they have continued to benefit from four seats in the National Assembly and six MEPs.

There is a long history of environmental representation in French elections, long before *Les Verts* came into existence. There has been an ecology candidate at every French Presidential election since Friends of the Earth supported René Dumont in 1974. In spite of this tradition of environmental representation, success came late to *Les Verts*. This delay may be attributed in part to the fact that they did not grow out of a convergence of social movements like their German colleagues Die Grunen, but out of an electoral entente of ecological organisations' (Adkin, 2002: 317) which made negotiating alliances more difficult. Another of the reasons for their struggle to gain support was born with their decision in 1986 to declare themselves outside of traditional party politics '*ni droit ni gauche*' (neither right nor left). It was another ten years before the party would climb back onboard with traditional politics, but its eventual participation in the coalition of the *gauche plurielle* (Plural Left) led to electoral victory in 1997. The arrival of environmental seats in the *Assemblée Nationale* and the entry of *Les Verts* into both parliament and government altered the political opportunity structure of the state for the French environmental movement. The following year *Convergences Écologie Solidarité* (Ecological Solidarity Convergence) joined *Les Verts* and by 2000 they had two government portfolios: Dominique Voynet as Minister for the Environment, and Guy Hascoët as Junior Minister for Overseas Development and Cooperation. In spite of these portfolios, opinion is divided about the degree of political success *les Verts* have actually experienced. While Hayes argues that they had buttressed their position as the most important of France's competing green formations (2002: 1) Knapp and Wright take a more sceptical line: '*Les Verts* should not, however, be viewed simply as a party of the government: their experience of office within the *gauche plurielle* alliance has

been at best a partial success, hotly debated after the event' (Knapp & Wright, 2006: 209). Their questionable policy success notwithstanding, the arrival of *Les Verts* into mainstream French politics did change the opportunity structure for the green movement - there was a new 'presence, attitude and influence of political allies' (Hayes, 2002: 19). The presence of these allies however has caused the well-theorised phenomenon of professionalisation with the movement, forcing it to fracture into those who choose to pursue their strategies for change outside of the political system, and those – the majority - who saw opportunity in this new channel of influence. The consequence of this debate was to squeeze the more radical, deeper green groups who form the foundation of a social movement out of the arena

and it is commonly argued that while *Les Verts* held office ‘party organisation has not coexisted alongside a vibrant social movement’ (2002: 40).

iii) Access to elite allies for third party interests

One of the parameters that dictate the movement’s access to elite allies is the history of *Les Verts* in government. In 1997 the entry of *les Verts* into both parliament and government altered the political opportunity structure of the state for the French environmental movement. The following year *Convergences Écologie Solidarité* joined *Les Verts* and by 2000 they had two government portfolios: Dominique Voynet as Minister for the Environment, and Guy Hascoët as Junior Minister for Overseas Development and Cooperation. The Greens thereby buttressed their position as the most important of France’s competing green formations (Hayes 2002: 1). For the movement then, there was a new ‘presence, attitude and influence of political allies’ (Hayes 2002: 19). The subsequent electoral failures of the party have diminished their power as an ally, and they are ‘only slowly recovering’ (Carter, 2005: 210) but the legacy of their role in government and the networks of influence which resulted from that time may prove to have endured, at least in part.

The exclusion of the *grassroots* face of the green movement is a familiar tale even in the most inclusive states. Coupled with the exclusionary nature of the French state, the absence of pluralism in the policy-making process even for EMOs means that an alliance between a grassroots group and an EMO is not necessarily beneficial if the EMO itself is unable to capitalise on any access to elite allies. In other words, access

to allies is only as strong as the allies themselves. Nevertheless, there is still a robust network of institutionalised EMOs working in France from which the grassroots groups may draw support, as the case studies presented in the next chapter will demonstrate.

ii) POS in Italy

The POS in Italy may be characterised as a case of formal inclusion with a weak decentralised state. For this reason collective action in Italy has been described as ‘overwhelmingly institutionalised’ (Diani & Forno, 2007: 164). We examine below the Italian national POS according to the categories of opportunity laid out in the introduction.

i) The strength of the state

The central state in Italy is relatively weak, due not least to its changing kaleidoscope of coalition governments. Even during the well-documented period of domination by the Christian Democrat Party between 1946 and 1992 there were no fewer than 28 coalition governments. More recently political parties have broadly aligned themselves with the centre-left coalition or centre-right coalitions, undoubtedly the result of a change in the electoral system away from proportional representation. Historically, Italy has relied on almost pure proportional representation (PR) to elect

members of the Senate and Chamber of Deputies.²⁷ The consequence of PR and party list in the 2006 and 2008 elections was to incentivise each of the centre-right and centre-left blocs to pack their coalitions with as many small parties as possible in order to achieve a plurality of the vote and gain the requisite 55% majority. This strategy increases the “blackmail” potential of small parties before they even get into parliament (Benedetto, 2008) and contributes to a weak government. For social movement groups this weakness could theoretically afford a degree of traction to challenge and to police the effective implementation policy. However, as the case studies illustrate, it does not necessarily make the political system more accessible because social movements need the political and financial capital to take advantage of the formal institutional opportunities. At a grassroots level in particular, these resources are scarcely available.

ii) The openness or closure of the political system

Italy is a highly decentralised state which has led to it having ‘highly fragmented, both vertically and horizontally, policy making structures’ (Koutalakis, 2003: 12). This decentralisation creates a more porous system which is open to a wide variety of interests at different levels. The processes of administrative decentralisation which began in Italy in the 1970s meant that the various interrelated aspects of environmental policy were divided between the different levels of local government, changing the access points to power and shifting the power alignments between political bodies. Regions were put in charge of their own energy policy while

²⁷ Between 1993 and 2005 the system moved towards an additional member system which relied on 75% of votes cast under a first past the post system and the remaining 25% under PR, but in 2006 the system moved back again to proportional representation and a party list.

provinces gained greater control over their forests and communes over urban traffic and emissions of central heating systems. (Marchetti, 1996: 307-8). As Rootes notes, '[T]he revival of enthusiasm for "participation from below", a reaction to the implosion of the old political order in the course of the 1990s, has favoured the convergence of, and collaboration among a wide variety of actors' (2007: xiii) and opened the gates for the formation of localised pluralist policy coalitions with considerable access.

iii) Access to elite allies for third party interests

The environmental movement in Italy has been classified as being 'in an advanced process of institutionalisation' (della Porta & Andretta, 2000: 37)²⁸ and this assessment hints at a burgeoning network of alliances between the political elites and the movement itself. Predictably, the (hyper)decentralisation outlined above has generated points of friction between the different levels of government who are able to lay the blame for inadequate environmental policies at the feet of their partner institutions. Social movements are therefore likely to find a sympathetic partner at one of these, sometimes competing, levels of government.

This open opportunity structure presents a double-edged sword for the green movement. On one hand della Porta notes that

given the territorial structure of representation...protests are often capable of achieving the support of local politicians. These [politicians] may fear a loss

²⁸ See also (Biorcio, 2000).

of electoral support, and are then willing and able to press for a re-location of the “public bad”, pushing elsewhere the troubled question of allocation (2006b: 3).

Conversely however, this openness also enables local government to move into the space normally occupied by grassroots movements and dilutes the dichotomy between civil actors and government agencies. This dichotomy is required by the movement because it acts as the focus for political action and it helps to frame the movement as ‘an alternative’. This blurring is one aspect of an open opportunity structure which may not be favourable for the movement because institutionalisation represents an erosion of their *raison d’être*.

One avenue through which green groups may historically have been expected to access elite allies is through the participation of *i Verdi* in the Centre-Left coalition governments of the 1990s – see Fig. 3.2. *I Verdi* entered government for the first time with the election of Romano Prodi’s *l’Ulivo* coalition in 1996, while *i Verdi* ministers were also present in the governments of Massimo d’Alema (1998) and Giuliano Amato (2000). In such situations it has been hypothesised that ‘[w]hen allies are present in government, we can expect that groups will be more likely to have their demands met and voices heard domestically’ (Poloni-Staudinger, 2008: 537) see also (Koopmans, 1999)). Based on this information one might therefore characterise the Italian opportunity structure as open, because of the green movement’s access to elite allies in government.

Fig. 3.2: *I Verdi* in Government

According to theories of political opportunity and movement institutionalisation (Doherty, 1992) the role of *i Verdi* in Italian government suggests that environmental concerns would be absorbed into the machinery of the state rather than flourishing in civil society.

Since 1990 the two green parties in Italy, *Liste Verdi* (Green Lists) and *Verdi Arcobaleno* (Rainbow Greens) have been united as *Federazione dei Verdi* (Federation of the Greens) or simply *i Verdi*, twice becoming part of government. As part of the coalition *I'Ulivo* (The Olive Tree) they won the 1996 elections and *i Verdi* headed up the Ministries for the Environment and for Agriculture in the centre-left governments of Prodi, d'Alema and Amato. They were relegated into opposition by *I'Ulivo*'s failure in the 2001 elections, marking a gradual drift in the party to the far left. *I Verdi* were back in power again however after success in the 2006 general elections as part of the winning coalition *L'Unione* (The Union) and held positions as Minister for the Environment, and Under-Secretary for Economy and Finance. However, as part of their ongoing shift to the left in December 2007 they joined forces with the Refoundation Party, the Party of Italian Communists and Democratic Left to form a new coalition *La Sinistra-L'arcobaleno* (The Left-The Rainbow) which failed to win enough support to enter parliament in the 2008 election, nor did they find success in the European elections called the following year. In November 2011 *La Federazione dei Verdi* launched a new political coalition *Ecologisti e Reti Civiche* (Ecologists and Civic Networks) based on a highly grassroots model of civic participation. Their popularity will be put to the test in the next Italian general elections in 2013. Undoubtedly, the participation of *i Verdi* in national government afforded new elite allies and new points of access for environmental movement groups in Italy who had previously found themselves on the periphery. The success of minority parties such as the greens relies on the strength of their coalition and of the political context of the time - Forno writes how in the late 1980s and early 1990s the political upheaval in Italy strengthened the position of parties like the greens because 'rather than sponsoring protest, in fact, these actors collected the various sources of resentful' (Forno, 2003: 2). *I Verdi* have been especially well placed to act as elite allies to the environmental movement because they have been able to combine the receptiveness to far-left politics and radical rethinking of social systems that many social movement groups espouse, with the legitimacy and political resource of a role in government. In this regard, they have been the perfect 'bridge' between social movement actors and policy-makers. Social movement actors have been able to take advantage of the often-shifting constellation of alignments within the party itself, as well as the constantly evolving political coalitions within which the party sits. *I Verdi* have been able to provide two key political opportunities to the green movement in Italy therefore – participation in government has afforded them a legitimacy that makes them elite allies for the movement, and the flux of the internal and external political positions has given the movement opportunity to intersect the debates.

However there are two factors which restrict the availability of elites allies to the movement. The first of these concerns the number and strength of elite allies in government. For instance, as a result of the 2001 and 2006 elections *i Verdi* retained a small number of seats in parliament but in 2008 they failed to pass the threshold. The victorious centre-right coalition, as may be expected, has been far less sympathetic to environmental concerns²⁹ - most recently withdrawing all public funds from the renewable energy industry (Migliaccio, 2011). The second restriction on elite allies for the green movement is due to the fact that the environment ministry in Italy is relatively new (dating from 1986) and possesses rather weak organizational resources (Koutalakis, 2003: 14). As a consequence, it does not wield much influence within government. Both of these factors mean that although there are elite allies available to the movement, the allies themselves may be relatively weak and movement access thus not especially fruitful.

A further political opportunity structure within Italy which determines the availability of elite allies concerns abrogative referenda which allows Italians to force a vote on legislation which has already been passed. Although the obstacles to this process are considerable³⁰, abrogative referenda (*progetti di legge di iniziativa popolare*) have had considerable impact – not least of which was the change in electoral system from PR to semi-majoritarian in the 1990s. The environmental movement has also historically taken advantage of this initiative to campaign on the

²⁹ (Kriesi, Koopmans, Puyvendak, & Guigni, 1995) argue that in general elite allies on the left are more responsive to environmental issues than their colleagues on the political right.

³⁰ In order for the referendum to succeed 500,000 eligible voters across five regional councils are required to sign a petition, the petition and its subject matter must be approved by both courts and at least 50 per cent of the eligible voting population need to vote in the subsequent referendum. The whole process can take over a year.

Italian energy programme³¹. In this way, environmental groups from local chapters of national or international organisations have been able to collaborate with cross-party initiatives to change legislation. By collaborating with these local chapters, movements benefit from their access to elite allies within political parties.

iii) POS in the UK

The UK is a particularly difficult country to classify in terms of its domestic POS.

‘The problem [of identifying formal institutional arrangements] is especially acute in a “stateless” society like Britain, in which the absence of a written constitution and the prevalence of custom and convention makes the identification of stable political opportunity structures particularly difficult’ (Rootes, 1999: 7).

However, in broad terms, the political opportunity structure in the UK may be classified as a ‘case of informal inclusion, characterized by a strong state (hence a closed opportunity structure on the formal side) and inclusive dominant strategy (hence an open opportunity structure on the informal side)’ (Guigni, 2010: 6).

³¹ In 1987 they collaborated with a coalition of political parties to rule out nuclear energy plants in Italy; and after three negative referenda the government was forced to phase out nuclear entirely. The role of i Verdi in government in the 1990s helped to maintain the moratorium, but with the election of Berlusconi’s pro-nuclear government in 2008 and the announcement that there would be a ‘nuclear revival’ a second referendum was called to revoke the decision. WWF Italia, Greenpeace and Amici della Terra together with a number of political parties including i Verdi, Ecologia Libertà, and Ecodem campaigned for ‘no to nuclear’. 80,00 valid signatures were presented to the parliament on 21 December 2010 and although the case is currently under review it is widely expected to succeed (Reuters, 2011b).

i) The strength of the state

Although usually classified as a strong state, Britain has experienced the most recent and significant shifts to its political opportunity structure by virtue of the process of devolution formally began in 1997. In that year the opportunity structure for social movements shifted, creating the opportunity for them to lobby at multiple levels of government. In particular, because environmental policy is substantially devolved, there is greater scope to lobby at subnational and national levels in this area.

ii) Openness or closure of the state

With regard specifically to environmental interests the green party has never formed part of the government in Britain and is unlikely to do so for the foreseeable future; consequently environmental concerns have a history of being kept out of the state. However, Rootes is correct to argue that:

‘the characterisation of a national political opportunity structure needs to be carefully qualified. British governments have responded to different movements in a more differentiated way than a strictly structural conception of political opportunities would allow. They have, in particular, been more accommodating to the environmental movement than to the anti-poll tax movement or to the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament’ (Rootes, 1999: 6).

In this sense, although the opportunity structure is generally closed, it is still able to accommodate specific types of environmental interests and has shown itself open to the participation of NGOs and other environmental actors in the policy-making process.

iii) Access to elite allies for third party interests

Whilst the discussions of France and Italy have focussed on the co-option of branches of the green movement into government, the situation in Britain is quite different. Rootes notes that here ‘uninstitutionalized environmental protest persists’ (2003b: 21). One attributable factor is Britain’s first-past-the-post electoral system which, without a regional concentration of strength, buttresses the position of the dominant parties and makes it difficult for the greens to emerge as a serious force in general elections (Carter, 2006: 748). Therefore, the elite allies of national parliament historically available in France and Italy are much less available in the UK where there is only one green MP in Westminster and two in the Scottish Parliament – see Fig. 3.3.³²

Fig. 3.3: The Green Party in Government

The Green Party of England and Wales has been one of the slowest in Europe to achieve a seat in parliament and has never formed part of government. Since 2010 they hold a seat in the UK parliament while the Scottish Green Party finds representation with two MSPs in the Scottish Parliament.

The Green Party has its roots in the PEOPLE party, formed in 1972, which evolved into the Ecology Party in 1975 and finally the Green Party in 1990. They enjoyed their first electoral victories in the 1999 European elections, returning two MEPs who also retained their seats in the European elections of 2004 and 2009. In 2010 the party returned their first ever MP in Westminster. In Scotland, a separate but allied organisation since 1990, the Scottish Green Party, won two MSPs in the 2005 general election. In Wales the Welsh Green Party is a semi-autonomous party within the Green Party of England and Wales, but has yet to penetrate the Welsh Assembly, it also lost its only County Council seat in 2004. Although the UK Green Party in fact holds the worldwide record for percentage of votes in a national election – winning 15% in the 1989 European elections, Dryzek et al. note that the First Past the Post electoral system means that these votes have not, until very recently, translated into seats (2003: 54). Their poor electoral prospects, have made it easy for the green movement to discredit them, as well as their politics (Rootes, 1992: 186). Unusually, the politics of the Green Party have often been more radical than those espoused by the mainstream environmental groups. It has been observed

³² The Scottish Parliament uses the Additional Member electoral system which is more favourable to smaller parties, but in spite of this the Scottish Green Party still only has two MSPs in office.

that 'The British Green Party and its precursor, The Ecology Party, did provide the main platform for a very visible and radical critique of established policies and political practices, of a sort not engaged in by the main environmentalist groups' (Dryzek, Downes, Hunold, Schlosberg, & Jernes, 2003: 54). Unlike the situation in the two other case study countries, where a high degree of professionalization is required in order to access Party resources, in the UK the Green Party has a far stronger relationship with the deeper green and more radical politics of grassroots groups than its corresponding numbers in other countries. The role of the Green Party therefore in shaping political opportunity structures for the green movement has played out in a distinctive way – that is characterised by decentralised representation in Scotland and Wales, and by a deeper green ideology than that found in many of the environmental groups whom one would expect to be well placed to take advantage of these political opportunities.

In spite of this lack of political representation, elite allies are more readily available in Britain in the form of environmental independent bodies with direct access to government policy-makers such as the think tank Green Alliance, or – until 2011 – the government's independent advisory body the Sustainable Development Commission. The culture of pluralism in Britain has afforded environmental NGOs access which, in turn, it has been able to pass on indirectly to local chapters across the UK. The overlapping membership of much grassroots activism with membership of local EMOs means that at even at a grassroots level, access to elite allies is closer in Britain than one would expect given the formal structures in place.

3.5 Conclusion

In summary, the concept of political opportunity structures has historically allowed scholars of social movements to do two things: to examine the national political context in which a social movement acts, and to use these findings to help explain why a movement structures itself in a particular way and why it pursues its chosen

strategy. I have developed a definition of political opportunity structures as *the structural features of a political system that shape the conditions for social movement action* and developed and presented a set of four variables that constitute political opportunity structures at a domestic level. The strength of this POS approach lies in its application to cross-country case studies and its ability to capture emergent political opportunity structures at a supranational level. In this way I am able to compare national POS to identify why grassroots groups act in different ways in different countries and to then apply this knowledge to examine the POS at a European and europeanised level. In so doing we can capture the three processes of europeanisation: direct, indirect and passive.

I find that the domestic POS in Italy, France and UK are indeed different. Within each of the three structures of political opportunity on which I focus (strength of the state, openness, an availability of allies) the case studies could be positioned on a sliding scale. With regard to the strength of the state France has the strongest, most centralised arrangement – with Italy’s highly decentralised state at the other end of the scale and the UK in the middle. Consideration of the openness of the state reconfigures this order with the UK the most open, France the most closed and Italy positioned in the middle. Finally, examining the availability of allies we find access is limited in each of the countries although Italy is the most fertile ground for elite access, followed by the UK and then France. Clearly, there are national differences that may be observed, but without the same access to domestic state opportunities will grassroots groups still experience europeanisation?

To answer this question I have developed in this chapter the European dimension to POS – differentiating between two kinds of political opportunity structures at this level. Those that have been created at the European level by virtue of the existence of the EU institutions and their sub-structures I call *European political opportunity structures*. Those whose domestic political opportunity structures have shifted as a result of the processes of EU integration I call *europeanised political opportunity structures*. This nuanced understanding of two linked but separate concepts allows us to develop a more sophisticated understanding of the way in which evidence of europeanisation may be found in a social movement's relationship to POS. Rootes writes that 'because environmental protest is mobilized or targeted mainly at the local or national levels, it is shaped primarily by the habits and dynamics of local and national politics' (2003b: 251). In the next chapter we apply this framework of European and europeanised POS to our case studies to investigate the extent to which this holds true. Does the level of governance at which protest is directed impact the degree of movement europeanisation?

4 Political Opportunity Structures: European and Europeanised

‘When people come together to pursue collective action in the context of the modern state they enter a complex and multifaceted social, political and economic environment. The elements of the environment have manifold direct and indirect consequences for people’s common decisions about how to define their social change goals and how to organize and proceed in pursuing those goals’

(McCarthy, Britt, & Wolfson, 1991: 46)

4.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter we outlined the contours of political opportunity structures (POS) and focused on three important dimensions: the strength of the state to implement policy, the openness of the state to third party interests and the availability of elite allies to social movements. We also examined these dimensions in each of the case study countries. Finally, we discussed how europeanisation may be evidenced by a movement connecting to either *European* or *europeanised* political opportunity structures and in so doing evidence direct, indirect and passive europeanisation processes. The aim of this chapter is to apply these concepts to the case studies of anti-road and anti-GMO protest in Italy, France and the UK. The chapter is guided by the overarching question, what is the impact of europeanisation on grassroots green groups as mediated through political opportunity structures?

The chapter is divided into two main sections that examine first the evidence for European and then for europeanised political opportunity structure. Within each of these sections, the three countries, and the environmental protest within them is systematically interrogated. In France we examine the anti-road protest against the construction of the A65 between Langon and Pau in the Aquitaine region of Southern France. Also in Aquitaine, France's largest maize-producing region, we study the ongoing campaign against GM crops. In Italy, we evaluate the campaign against the *Corridoio Tirrenico* road running along the Tuscan coast, and also the anti-GMO campaign in that same region – the first of the Italian regions to declare itself 'GMO-free'. Finally, in the UK we investigate the campaign against the re-routing of the A71 at Bilston Glen near Edinburgh, and the ongoing campaign against GMOs in Devon in the South West of England – the first of the English regions to declare itself GM-free. The chapter concludes by reviewing the evidence of what europeanisation means for the green movement, and how this is manifest in the POS with which a movement connects.

4.2 European POS in Evidence

In chapter three I outlined a set of variables which constitute a European political opportunity structure. A social movement actor will be europeanised to the extent that it is able to connect to these European POS where they will:

- 1) Work within a policy area tightly bound by European implementation requirements
(the strength of the EU)

2) Have direct access to institutional channels of influence at the EU

(the openness of the EU)

3) Have access to new allies at a European level whose presence is a direct result of European integration

(the availability of elite allies)

The intentional and direct connection between the social movement actor and the European Union in this case evidences *direct europeanisation* processes at work. In the section that follows I illustrate the extent to which the social movement actors in each of the case study areas were able to take advantage of the above opportunities.

i) France

The French Anti-Road Campaign

The decision to build the A65 from Langon to Pau resulted in a project which was relatively swiftly developed in comparison to the Italian example. Since 1992 when the road was first included in the National Roads Programme it took only 14 years for plans to be approved and designated '*d'utilité publique*'. Works commenced in 2008 and the road was opened in December 2010.

The A65 *Autoroute de Gascogne* was designed to improve transport links from Bordeaux to Pau on the Spanish border, with a view to improving trade access between the two countries. The A65 also intercepts the road between Bordeaux and Toulouse creating a more robust road network in the South of France. The road was

not part of the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) so it was not a 'European' priority, but that has not stopped the campaigners from engaging with European POS through connecting to another area of EU legislation: the environment.

i) The strength of the EU

With regard to the strength of the state, this lack of European legislation vis-à-vis the proposal to develop the road is important. The road network in France relies heavily on private companies, so public-private partnerships for road-building and maintenance are common. The country's transport infrastructure is extremely well-maintained and comprehensive which means that it is a significant economic resource and one which is highly centralised. Because the A65 was driven by national rather than EU transport policy and received no EU funding there were not the same opportunities for *Alternative Régionale Langon-Pau* (ARLP) and *Fédération des Sociétés pour l'Etude, la Protection et l'Aménagement de la nature dans le Sud-Ouest* (SEPANSO) to appeal directly to policymakers or allies making transport policy. They did however engage indirectly with European POS through connecting to EU *environmental* policy – another area tightly bound by EU implementation requirements. In 2009 ARLP, SEPANSO and Friends of the Earth Landes filed a formal complaint to the European Commission based on the fact that the road would cut through eight sites protected under Natura 2000. They were well versed in European Union legislation and were able to base their complaints on contraventions of specific items of European Union legislation. The report mentions for example 'the decree of 18 December 2006 which declared the A65 project to be

of ‘public utility’ violates article 6.2 of the directive 92/43/CEE’ (SEPANSO, 2008: 10). In this way they were able to connect to European implementation requirements in environmental rather than transport legislation, thereby showing evidence of connecting to European political opportunity structures.

ii) The openness of the EU

ARLP, although a grassroots group, was able to leverage its network of partners to access EU channels of expertise. That expertise and access was demonstrated by their appeal to the European Commission which was comprehensive and well-versed in European Union legislation. A member of ARLP explained ‘SEPANSO get a bit of funding and have someone just dedicated to looking at the EU. We were able to go to them for advice and they helped us to prepare our case’ (Interview 4/11/2009). Although this access to institutional channels of influence at the EU is limited by comparison with large EMOs, it is the closest link demonstrated by any of the case study groups in any of the countries, and is significant in its demonstration of the possibility for grassroots groups to engage directly in the EU political system.

iii) Access to elite allies

Finally, ARLP’s access to elite allies was more comprehensive than the literature would expect of a grassroots campaign. The group benefitted from an organised and diverse membership. Its collaboration at an early stage with SEPANSO lent it legitimacy and the ability to access other larger EMOs who had direct contact with elite actors. For example, ARLP issued press releases co-signed by Friends of the

Earth France, Greenpeace, Réseau Action Climat, and WWF France – see Figure 4.

1.



Communiqué de presse – 15 octobre 2008

A65 : une rallonge de 300 millions d'argent public pour le concessionnaire ?

La société A'Liénor, concessionnaire du projet d'autoroute A65 entre Langon et Pau a demandé au gouvernement 300 millions d'euros d'argent public pour compenser les surcoûts générés par les mesures environnementales définies par la commission scientifique du CNPN au printemps (voir le Canard Enchaîné du 8 octobre 2008). Selon Michel Dubromel, de France Nature Environnement, « ces mesures sont indissociables de tout projet d'infrastructure et Aliénor a pris ce marché en connaissance de cause ». « Il serait ainsi

Figure 4.1: ARLP co-signed press release – 15/10/08

One of the members of ARLP explained that although this partnership was useful, it was difficult to navigate:

‘We were really keen not to be seen as NIMBYs. The big environmental associations are keen to distance themselves from NIMBYism and are concentrating on the larger discourses. Also, because of the context of the *Grenelle de l'environnement*³³ we needed to pacify the one Minister who would listen to us during the negotiations. The others didn't want to compromise their position and they thought the battle was already lost' (Interview, 17.11.2009).

This extract draws out an interesting question specific to grassroots social movement groups operating in a European context – to what extent does collaborating with professionalised organisations in order to access channels of influence at the EU level mean ‘concentrating on the larger discourses’ and in so doing distancing themselves from their ‘grass roots’? The tension here between the degrees of institutionalisation within social movements is one of the reasons why although

³³ The *Grenelle de l'environnement* was an environmental roundtable with multi-party, civilian and public service representation. It took place in 2007 with a view to generating environmental legislation to be acted at a French, European and international level.

European POS may not be desirable for a grassroots group, they may still choose to engage with other organisations who can help them to access European political opportunity structures, because it is a more effective way of running their campaign.

To summarise, in the case against the A65 in Aquitaine, there is evidence of the grassroots elements of the campaign connecting to European political opportunity structures. Although ARLP recognised that they could not appeal the road directly under the auspices of TEN-T guidelines, they did recognise that that project would be bound by other EU legislation – in particular in the area of environmental protection – and utilised this to stall the project. They also connected to SEPANSO, a more professionalised organisation with a European expert who was able to guide them in putting their case together and how best to influence the EU. Finally, although they were able to use the campaign against the road to network with EMOs who had a European presence such as Greenpeace or Amis de la Terre, their role was largely symbolic and ARLP did not at any point engage with the European offices of these organisations. Overall, the campaign against the A65 provides evidence of ARLP connecting to the first two dimensions of a European political opportunity structure, but not the third – we can conclude that they were partially able to connect to European POS.

The French anti-GMO Campaign

The anti-GMO movement in France, as with elsewhere in Europe, reached fever-pitch in the mid 1990s. *Greenpeace France* was one of the chief mouthpieces and innovators of this movement and worked closely with other organised interests, both

EMOs and farming trade unions to stabilise the French moratorium on GM crops. Alongside this organised vein of protest were a number of field actions, most notably the work of the *faucheurs volontaires*, the ‘volunteer reapers’ who captured the headlines across Europe.

In part due to such protest, the legacy of this period of protest is that 22 of the 23 regions in France have declared themselves GMO free and ‘France has witnessed the growth of a distinctively vicious societal response to the release of GMOs’ (McCauley, 2011: 7). In Aquitaine, which has a strong agricultural economy the issues of GM crops is especially pertinent. The strategy of grassroots activists remains primarily one of awareness-raising: the well-known anti-GM campaigner José Bové has been tried in a local court and the media profile of the campaign is high.

i) The strength of the EU

With regard to the strength of the polity, GMO policy is centralised by national government. With the moratorium on the commercial growing and importation of GM crops decided by central government, even decisions regarding individual field trials do not lie with regional government. This means that the pressure which anti-GMO groups exert on regional government is ‘largely symbolic’ (Interview 30/10/2008). Their strategy recognised the EU and national government as the ultimate target in changing GMO policy; ‘by persuading people to vote with their money against GM crops we hope to counter the business interests which the government and the EU holds dear’ (Interview 30/10/2008). In this regard there is

some limited evidence that the grassroots anti-GMO campaign connected to European POS by identifying the EU as critical to policy direction at a local level. Although the EU was not a direct target of protest, it was, in rhetoric at least, the *ultimate* target.

ii) The openness of the EU

The grassroots face of the anti-GMO movement in Aquitaine, as with similar campaigns in the other case study countries, shares an overlapping membership with more institutionalised EMOs such as *Amis de la Terre* and *Greenpeace France*. This connection would indirectly afford them access to institutional channels of influence at the EU level, for example through membership of the European Environmental Bureau (EEB) and a well-developed lobbying position. There was no evidence however from the documentary analysis or from the interviews I conducted that members of the grassroots campaigns sought access to the EU through these relationships, nor that they thought it desirable. In this regard, there is no evidence of the anti-GMO campaign connecting to European political opportunity structures through institutional channels of influence.

iii) Access to elite allies

In a related, but distinct arena of European POS, the availability of elite allies at a European level was not a recognisable feature of the grassroots campaign. Although there was acceptance that the EU was one of the targets of protest by virtue of their legislative powers, the strategy at a local level was to engage residents with the anti-GMO argument in order that their purchasing preferences did not support a the

market for GMOs. The engagement of the grassroots campaign with the EU was once again indirect, and did not capitalise on the possible avenues of access to elite allies through overlapping membership with large EMOs.

To summarise, there is considerably less evidence of European political opportunity structures in the case of the anti-GMO campaign. Although there was some recognition that EU legislation was important to their local campaign and that changing legislation at that level would be to their advantage, the action repertoire was designed to connect to regional and national legislation. For the grassroots *faucheurs volontaires* and *Vigilance Aquitaine* 33, although there were opportunities for them to work alongside professionalised EMOs with representation at the EU, there is no sign that they used these connections as a conduit to access this European political opportunity structure. Nor did they use these relationships to access European-level allies, either the European branches of their EMO colleagues, the European Greens, Agricultural Trade Unions or other elite allies that one might expect. Overall, there is scant evidence of the anti-GMO campaign in Aquitaine connecting to European political opportunity structures.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the evidence for engagement with European POS in the French examples illustrates a mixed picture. In the case of anti-road protest the underlying pressure to be ‘taken seriously’ and to reject NIMBYism meant that they exploited the opportunities they had to connect to EU legislation and institutional channels of influence at the EU level. In so doing, ARLP connected to European POS. Like the

road protesters, the anti-GMO campaign also benefitted from overlapping membership with local chapters of EMOs with European representation, although conversely they did not seek to exploit these channels to connect directly with Europe; and although they acknowledged the role of the EU in GM crop legislation, they did not show compelling signs of connecting to European POS.

ii) Italy

The Italian Anti-Road Campaign

Italy has a relatively well established history of road protest, the most high-profile of which was the TAV tunnel campaign in 1996³⁴. In Tuscany, the campaign against the *Corridoio Tirrenico* has a developed grassroots element. The *Corridoio* forms part of the development efforts of the Italian government to expand the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) ‘Corridor 1’ which runs from Berlin to Palermo. The amelioration of the *Corridoio Tirrenico* to bring it into line with the standards required of TEN-T roads (although it is not a TEN-T road in itself) makes the *Corridoio* a transport policy priority for national government with implicit European overtones. The road is also part of the European Route E80 – a road network which cuts West to East across the continent, although these Trans-European Motorways are overseen by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe and are not accountable to the EU. A consequence of the networked element

³⁴ TAV – *Treno Alta Velocità*. For an interesting overview of the TAV protest see (della Porta & Piazza, 2008)

of the road for the anti-road movement is that they are drawn into debating not just a regional issue, but also a national and a European one as well.

i) The strength of the EU

The anti-road campaign however shows very limited evidence of connecting to a European POS. Although road-building is an area bound by European legislation, the *Corridoio* is not part of the network of roads for which the EU is responsible. The Tuscan Regional government makes a passing reference to its E80 status its official online and paper summaries of the project (Regione Toscana, 2009b) although it does not mention the EU explicitly. Elsewhere however, the EU is seen as integral to the road's *raison d'être* and development and the *Corridoio* is framed as part of a programme of regional development works that implicitly develop the TEN-T (Baracco & Beccattini, 2006). I have argued that that European POS are evidenced by working in a policy area tightly bound by European implementation requirements. In the case of the *Corridoio* the road is not a designated TEN-T road, nor does the Regional Government intend to use TEN-T development funds to construct the road. In this regard, it does not meet the criteria for a European political opportunity structure. However, the Regional Government's insistence that the proposed road would form part of a pan-European road network, with the inference being that this network has its basis in European policy, presents an unusual situation. Although the road is technically a purely national initiative, by framing the road as subject to EU policy the Regional Government creates a kind of 'illusory' opportunity structure for the anti-road movement. The movement is not able to appeal to the EU to stop TEN-T funding for the road because no such funding is in place, nor is it able to point to

the prerogatives of environmental protection laid down for TEN-T road projects. In this regard, it is unable to connect to European political opportunity structures reserved for European legislative initiatives. Unlike the French example however, it is not appealing the road on the grounds of other European legislation that is available to it – in particular in the areas of environmental and archaeological protection. There is therefore no evidence of the campaign connecting to the first dimension of European political opportunity structures.

ii) The openness of the EU

As I noted in chapter two, the anti-road campaign was characterised by the wide variety of actors involved: from political parties like *i Verdi* (the Green Party), *il PD* (The Democratic Party), *il PdCI* (Italian Communist Party) and *il PRC* (Communist Refoundation Party); international and national NGOs: *WWF*, *Legambiente* (Environmental League), *Italia Nostra* (Our Italy) *Stop al consume di territorio* (Stop Territorial Erosion), some local environmental and agricultural interest organisations: *Soccorso Ambientale Maremmano – SAM* (Maremma Environmental Assistance), *Coordinamento Toscano Produttori Biologici* (The Tuscan Organic Producers Network); *Forum Ambientalista Toscano* (Tuscan Environment Forum) and dedicated community groups which united all of the above actors: *SOS Maremma*, *Comitato Stop Autostrada* (Stop the Road Committee). The grassroots community groups were part of these larger networks of actors that encompassed political party and EMOs – and these professionalised actors already enjoyed direct channels of influence at the level of the EU. One might have expected the local citizens who were part of *SOS Maremma* to lobby *WWF* or *Legambiente* to speak to their

European advisors about legal influence the EU might be able to bring to bear on the road proposals. This kind of influence was not forthcoming. One member of the group said:

I don't see this as an issue that Europe can help us with – this is an issue for us and the Regional Government, only the citizens have the power to stop this road by taking action and convincing them not to go ahead with their plans (Interview, 21.10.2008)

It must be noted however that although the grassroots element of the movement worked alongside those EMOs and political parties who did have the ability to lobby the EU directly, the grassroots element itself lacked these links and did not seek to utilise the resources of its allies. In this regard, they did not have access to this second dimension of European political opportunity.

iii) The availability of elite allies

The grassroots group *SOS Maremma* and local chapters of the EMOs may not have had access to channels of influence at the EU level, but they did have access to elite allies. WWF for example has a European Policy Office in Brussels and *Legambiente* is a member of the European Environmental Bureau, whilst the political parties involved in the campaign all have political representation in the national and European parliaments, so in this regard the grassroots actors within the campaign did in fact have indirect access to allies at the level of the EU. Although the grassroots level of the campaign worked in close proximity, indeed within the same networks, as the local chapters of these professionalised bodies there is no evidence that they used these connections to exploit their resources at a European level. Apart from establishing a network of commonly-motivated groups they did not seek to make

further alliances with actors in Europe. In fact, as I illustrate in the next chapter, the grassroots face of the anti-road movement explicitly tried to frame the road as very much *not* a European project and to situate the campaign at a very local level. This may be one of the reasons why, although a European political opportunity structure was available to them through their networks, they chose not to take advantage of it.

In summary, the anti-road protest in Tuscany shows no signs of connecting to European political opportunity structures. Although the proposed road was not a TEN-T project campaign groups were still able to appeal the road on the ground of EU legislation but they chose only to make the connection to regional policy. Furthermore, the grassroots groups, through the network they forged with other EMOs and political parties could have exploited these links to access the European level channels of influence or allies at a European level. The decision by SOS Maremma not to connect to these opportunities means that there is no evidence of European political opportunity structures at work in the campaign against the *Corridoio Tirrenico*.

The Italian Anti-GMO Campaign

In chapter two we noted that there was a high degree of professionalisation amongst the anti-GMO actors in Tuscany where larger EMOs dominate - Greenpeace Italy, *Amici della Terra* (and their local composite chapters such as *Amici della Terra Firenze*), *Legambiente* and WWF; aided by agro-alimentary interest groups such as *Associazione Italiana Agricoltura Biologica* and *Slowfood Italia*, as well as the

farmer's association *Coldiretti*. As a consequence there is very little truly 'grassroots' protest of the kind one finds in France and the UK, although there are ad-hoc coalitions of organic farmers working to support each others' businesses and to raise the profile amongst their local communities of organic agriculture. In light of this, and in contrast to the road campaign, the most striking feature of the anti-GMO movement in Tuscany is the institutional support from regional government which it enjoys. The high level of institutionalisation for the movement is characteristic of the political opportunity structures within which they operate. If the social movement campaign in this case is characterised by a strong partnership with Regional Government, the Regional Government's campaign is characterised by its partnership with the EU and expressed in the strong pan-European networks that it helped to forge and the EU lobbying that it has conducted. In this way, the (largely professionalised) anti-GM movement shows significant evidence of europeanisation through connecting to these pan-European networks.

i) The strength of the EU

Key to the political opportunity structures at play in the case of the anti-GMO campaign in Tuscany is the decentralisation of the policy area. This gave the local chapters of EMOs and their allies support from Regional Government. Whilst environmental protection is reserved for the national tier of government, agricultural matters have been assigned regional competence and this cleavage allows for the high levels of regional 'opt-out' despite the government's (technical³⁵) approval for the commercialisation of GM crops within its borders. Regional government does

³⁵ Although the government has granted approval for the non-commercial cultivation of GM on its territory its unofficial position is contrary. This was outlined in more detail in chapter two.

not have the competence to impose a moratorium so they are forced to speak of ‘co-existence’ (Boscarele, 2007), although in practice, they can choose to reject proposals to grow GM crops on their territories. This regional power has certainly been exercised: 16 out of Italy’s 20 regions have opted out and declared themselves ‘GM-free’ of which the Tuscan regional government was the first in 1997. The ability of the Regional Government to opt out of GM crop trials means that that EU legislation is filtered through both national and regional government before locally-based activists need respond. Therefore at a local level the anti-GMO campaign does not need to appeal directly to EU legislation to reverse local GM crop trial sites. However, it is still tightly bound in its more general arguments against GMOs (as a threat to localised food production) by EU policy, because it is at this level that policy concerning the labelling, commercial cultivation and market in GMOs is decided. In this way, the Tuscan anti-GMO campaign is, in theory, able to connect to this European political opportunity structure, although favourable Regional legislation dilutes the need for it to do so.

ii) The openness of the EU

The Tuscan Regional Government has direct access to institutional channels of influence at an EU level through their representation in bodies such as The Committee of the Regions. Furthermore, the local chapters of EMOs are part of a larger infrastructure of organisations that enjoy representation in Brussels through permanent representations or involvement in the EEB. In theory this would afford the local chapters of EMOs and the ad-hoc coalitions of farmers who work together with the Regional Government the opportunity to access those channels too and

show evidence of grassroots or local groups connecting to European political opportunity structures. In spite of this, there is no evidence of any of the local social movement actors exploiting this path. One member of a local EMO chapter said:

‘Our organisation is basically self-financing – I mean, the central administration give us a very small amount and I know they receive some money from the general public, even some from Europe I think – but basically it cost 20 euros to join our group and that subscription fee is what keeps us going. It keeps us autonomous to a large degree, I know some other environmental organisations dictate the campaigns from head office – but we are free to respond to local issues as we see fit. We are pretty removed from the head office and what goes on there’ (Interview, 23.10.2008).

This quote is illustrative of other interview participants in a similar situation, who find their local chapter quite removed from the opportunities and access of the main party. In this way, we can say that they do not connect to this aspect of European political opportunity structures.

iii) The availability of elite allies

Finally despite limited ‘institutionalised’ channels of influence, the local chapters of social movement groups that have been working alongside the Tuscan Regional Government have had opportunities to forge new allegiances at a European level. The regional government has been instrumental in the creation of two anti-GMO networks in Europe. The first of these dates from February 2003 when the International Commission on the Future of Food and Agriculture was formed at an international social and ecological conference hosted by the Tuscan Regional government³⁶. Moreover, it has published four manifestos on food and agricultural issues and has been recognised by UNESCO. The second resource for the anti-GMO

³⁶ The Commission is composed of an international ‘group of leading activists, academics, scientists, politicians and farmers from North and South working toward shaping more socially and ecologically sustainable food and agriculture systems’ (ARSIA, 2008).

campaign is the active role played by the Tuscan regional government in the Network of European GMO-Free Regions and Local Authorities. The Network was born in Brussels eight months after the creation of the International Commission, and was headed by Susanna Cenni, the then Tuscan Councillor for Agriculture. The network's charter was signed in Florence on 17 May 2007 – 'The Charter of the Regions and Local Authorities of Europe on the subject of co-existence of genetically-modified crops with traditional and organic farming' and has been active at a European level ever since.

The high level of institutionalisation in the anti-GMO campaign means that one might expect that it has access to the network of influential allies created by the Regional Government. For example, in 2009 the Network of European GMO-Free Regions and Local Authorities campaigned alongside EMOs like Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace on the 'Stop the Crop' action, sending 'a strong signal to National Ministers responsible for GMOs that European citizens do not want GMOs on their fields and on their plates' (The Greens/European Free Alliance, 17.04.2009). However, this internationally-coordinated campaign did not make it onto the ground in the local chapters interviewed. One activist said:

I'm aware of the Stop the Crop campaign, and I have signed the petition, but only because I heard about it in my regular email. It isn't really anything that we're doing here, I don't know if there are materials at head office that we could be using? We like to support these initiatives, but we tend to work with other groups on specific campaigns for Tuscany, or Florence or wherever. So we worked with Greenpeace on a campaign about rubbish collection in Florence for example, and we've done joint things on GMOs at *Festambiente*, but they haven't contacted us about Stop the Crops. I think it's a European thing (Interview, 23.10.2008)

It seems that although one might expect a professionalised movement to be able to connect to European political opportunity structures, especially when working alongside a Regional Government favourable to their ideas this was not borne out in practice. This principle does not appear to translate however to the local chapters of the movement or the ad-hoc coalitions of local farmers who work to keep the anti-GMO agenda on the table. The favourable local government dilutes the 'antagonistic' element of their awareness-raising campaign, reducing the need to combat EU legislation to effect local change. Furthermore, the local chapters are removed both in terms of institutionalised channels of influence, and in terms of formal or informal networks, from the resources of the national bases of the EMOs. In the case of the anti-GMO campaign in Tuscany, there are scant signs of social movement actors connecting to European political opportunity structures.

Conclusion

In summary, in the case of the Italian local anti-GMO campaign there is very limited evidence of the grassroots face of the campaigns connecting to European POS. Although in both anti-GMO and anti-road campaigns there was strong participation from EMOs that benefit from representation at a European level, the access to institutional channels of influence at the EU and allies did not translate into resources for the local chapters or the grassroots groups who worked alongside them. Furthermore, in the case of the anti-GMO campaign the Tuscan Regional Government may have been expected to create further scope for connecting with European POS, but their favourable political stance diluted the ability of a grassroots campaign to flourish and to take advantage of those opportunities. What the Italian

case teaches us is that at a local level, campaigns by local level and grassroots groups do not have the ability to connect to European political opportunity structures, even by working alongside those who have connected.

iii) The UK

The UK Anti-Road Campaign

The proposal to realign the A701 through Bilston Glen was one which quickly mobilised an opposition campaign composed of seasoned environmental activists and local residents. Since Midlothian Council applied to the Scottish Executive for planning permission to re-align the road in 2000 the project has attracted controversy, and the No Alignment Action Group (NAAG) was formed. The protest camp that was erected in 2002 at Bilston Glen, a patch of woodland designated a site of special scientific interest through which the road would cut, continues to be active today. Plans for the bypass have stalled since 2005 when funding for the project was declared unavailable, although the permanent presence of the protest camp is designed to maintain pressure on the Council not to reopen plans to complete the project.

i) The strength of the polity

The proposal by Midlothian Council to realign the A701 was motivated by a desire to improve the local transport infrastructure rather than to tap into any (actual or supposed) European road networks – in this regard it is different from the two other anti-road protests being considered. This means that in terms of transport policy, the

grassroots campaign was very much not working within the confines of European TEN-T implementation requirements. Like other campaigns the anti-road protesters had the opportunity to challenge the road on the basis of alternative pieces of European legislation in the areas of environmental protection, emissions reduction or noise pollution for example. NAAG requested the Environmental Impact Assessment, the Traffic Study and the Outline Business Case for the road from Midlothian Council in order to carry out their own evaluation of the scheme.

We have experienced great difficulty in obtaining a copy of the proposals, or even a summary. We believe a copy of the plans should have been deposited within the City of Edinburgh – especially given the area-wide traffic-generating impacts that the proposal would produce – and that a copy should have been made available to NAAG (No Alignment Action Group) at least. The unavailability of the Traffic Study and the Environmental Assessments has been a major hindrance to commenting on the proposal (Transform Scotland, 1999)

When these documents were obtained, one activist notes that:

‘in order to understand the proposals you really need experts in your group who know what they’re talking about – retired engineers and so on...We were pleased with the Halcrow report because it digested all of the same kind of information and did the talking for us’ (Interview, 28.03.2008)

The work that NAAG and the Bilston protest site performed on the campaign used environmental, sustainable transport and to a lesser extent, climate change frames to make their arguments. They did not, however, show evidence of linking these frames to specific areas of EU legislation and in this regard do not show evidence of connecting to European political opportunity structures.

ii) The openness of the polity

Of the avenues through which one may expect the anti-road campaign to have been able to access the institutional channels of influence at the EU – through appealing directly to the European Commission for example – or through the brokering of other EMOs; there is no evidence that either was pursued.

Of the two main grassroots protest groups, the protest camp at Bilston Glen was the least likely to desire to influence EU policy-making processes. An activist said:

‘I know that the EU has passed a lot of legislation on the environment, and talks a good talk about trying to prevent climate change, but they’re not really getting it. The governments aren’t really getting it. I don’t bother with them because I just don’t see them getting it. We need to think about the world differently – we need people to take better care of the world in which they live, for wealth to be distributed fairer and for change to come from below. That’s where it’s going to come from’ (Interview, 12.06.2009).

Although NAAG found the idea of EU legislation more legitimate ‘the EU needs to do more work in this area’ (Interview, 28.03.2008) they did not attempt to connect to decision-making power at that level of governance.

iii) The availability of elite allies

NAAG and the protest camp were supported in their campaign by national and international EMOs. The closest of their allies was Transform Scotland, a subsidiary of the UK-wide Campaign for Better Transport and a member of the European Federation for Transport and the Environment. They also have links to ‘Transport Environment’ the main Brussels-based lobby group for sustainable transport issues with a pan-European membership. As allies they were ideally placed to be able to connect to the EU, but as European Union legislation was not considered to be held

responsible for the road, or to have the ability to challenge it, then this aspect of their relationship was not explored.

For the Bilston protest camp, although it was able to develop an extensive national network, and to attract members from other EU Member States, its allies were not formed as a direct result of the process of European integration (like the European Environmental Bureau for example). In this final dimension of European political opportunity structures there is no evidence that the anti-road campaign was able, or indeed willing, to engage.

To summarise, the campaign against the A701 shows no sign of connecting to European political opportunity structures. The issue was considered to be a *local* one that was framed by *national* legislation and enacted by a *regional* council. For NAAG it was not necessary to make the connection with the EU in the hope of blocking the proposals and for the protest camp the EU was not the most legitimate actor. The effect of European political opportunity structures can therefore be said to have had no impact on the campaign.

The UK anti-GMO Campaign

In the mid 1990s GM crops rose to the top of the environmental activism agenda. In the case of our Devon case study it was in 1998 when a plantation of GM maize was planted close to Riverford Organic Farm that the regional anti-GM movement began in earnest. In the same vein as the *faucheurs volontaires*, locals organised a campaign and when some of them dug up the maize a well-publicised (but ultimately

fruitless) legal battle ensued. Such was the anti-GM sentiment in Devon, both amongst the public and within local government, that in 2003 it declared itself the first GM-free County in England. The anti-GM story here echoes other stories unfolding across the UK at that time.

i) The strength of the polity

The tight bind between the EU and the policy process for GM crops has meant that the anti-GMO campaign in Devon recognised the relationship between EU and national policy on GM crops. They prepared flyers which included reference to EU legislation. The main grassroots group Totnes Genetics Group (TOGG) also produced the quarterly newsletter 'Genetix Update' which provided a summary of press coverage of GM issues, legislation, trial sites and campaign in the UK and abroad. Figure 4.2 below shows an extract from Genetix Update (Issue 21, Spring 2002) that illustrates the degree of awareness TOGG had of the debates at an EU level.

----- STOP LABELLING

There has been an EU moratorium on the commercialisation of new GM crops in place since '98. The countries that forced this stop on the growing of new varieties in Europe initially said they wanted the Deliberate Release Directive to be revised so there was a better risk assessment process. There was also discussion about the inclusion of a full traceability scheme, but this did not make it in. So in July 2001 the EU Commission produced two new sets of regulations. The most contentious part of them was the extension of labelling to cover GM animal feed and foods derived from GMOs (e.g. oils, lecithin, etc.). The UK Food Standards Agency, the Industry, and the US Government have said such a labelling scheme would be open to fraud and excessively expensive because products could not be tested, and assurance would therefore be dependent on paper trials. They instead proposed a GM-free label - applicable only to foods that have never been associated with a GM process.

But a GM-free label will:

- be as open to fraud as labelling all GM derivatives,
- be expensive and exclude those on a low income,
- deny choice to the consumer, (a Eurobarometer opinion poll showed over 70% of people don't want to eat GM foods. Another shows 56% of Britons want GM food labelled even where all traces of DNA are destroyed, e.g. oils),
- and many European supermarkets and food manufacturers already claim not to use GM derivatives and so already have such traceability systems in place.

The industry and its cronies are lobbying hard for this one in Europe, so please let Tony Blair and John Krebs (head of Food Standards Agency) know that this pro-biotech company stance is not what the UK public wants. For further details on this legislation see MEP briefing by GeneWatch - www.genewatch.org FoE Europe Biotech mailout <http://www.foeeurope.org/biotechnology/about.htm>

Figure 4.2: Genetix Update Spring 2002

Because of their role in producing this national newsletter on behalf of the Genetics Engineering Network (GEN), TOGG was particularly well informed in matters of legislation.

'I remember when TOGG were producing the newsletter – everyone that was campaigning on GMOs that I knew used to get it and they had it in healthfood shops and places like that. There was always good content and they seemed very well informed. That's where a lot of us got our information from...yes, they understood the EU too' (Interview, 17.02.2010)

In spite of this knowledge-base, TOGG regarded the issue as a national one, and looked to national government to challenge EU legislation, rather than challenge EU legislation itself. Its awareness of the role of EU legislation in its local campaign did however indicate a degree of europeanisation in this area of European political opportunity structure.

ii) The openness of the polity

The groups involved in the campaign in Devon – primarily TOGG and local chapters of Friends of the Earth – only partially addressed their concerns to the level of the European Union. Friends of the Earth Europe has its own ongoing anti-GMO campaign that it addresses in Brussels, organised by a dedicated ‘Food Campaigner’ (Friends of the Earth Europe) and it was considered by those in the local chapters that ‘those in Brussels are taking care of the EU, it’s our responsibility to take care of Devon’ (Interview, 19.12.2008). In this way, although the national administration of Friends of the Earth may have acted as a broker for local chapters wishing to raise their concerns at the level of the European lobby, it was not felt appropriate to do so. For TOGG, although it wrote letters and petitions to the European Commission and participated in pan-European petition actions such as ‘Stop the Crop’ these were very conventional and symbolic forms of protest - its main concerns were still addressed to the national level. In this regard it did not connect to the second dimension of European political opportunity structures.

iii) The availability of elite allies

Although TOGG was too small an actor to have direct access to new allies at the level of the EU it had the opportunity to access those who did. Along with the local chapters of Friends of the Earth, Friends of the Earth Europe was the main link for the Devon campaign to pan-European networks of actors. Of the two main lobby groups operating at the level of the EU – Genet and The International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements EU Group (IFOAM EU) – membership was drawn from Friends of the Earth Europe, Genewatch, GM-free Cymru and the Soil

Association – all actors with a UK presence. Despite this, and perhaps because ‘those in Brussels are taking care of the EU’ (Interview, 19.12.2008), the opportunity to present localised Devon concerns to European-level allies was not realised.

In summary, the anti-GMO campaign in Devon shows only one sign of connecting to European political opportunity structures through its awareness of EU legislation. The failure to act at a European level however, either through attempting to influence the legislative process, or to connect to those who do, means that the European political opportunity structures were not engaged with.

Conclusion

In both cases of protest in the UK there is a marked lack of the campaigns connecting to European political opportunity structures. While in the case of the A701 the capacity of the EU to address the concerns of NAAG and the Bilston Glen protest camp was not under consideration, in the case of GMOs it was recognised and then ignored. Clearly it should not be assumed that for local-level campaigns the ability to connect local decisions to EU legislation is desirable or expedient.

4.3 Europeanised POS in Evidence

In chapter three I outlined the set of three variables that constitute a europeanised political opportunity structure. A social movement actor will therefore be europeanised to the extent that they are able to connect to these europeanised POS where they will:

- 1) Address the national mechanisms for implementing EU policy
(the strength of the EU)
- 2) Appeal to national channels responsible for influencing EU decision-making
(the openness of the EU)
- 3) Engage with new allies at a national or pan-European level whose work is informed by, but does not necessarily directly address, EU policy
(the availability of elite allies)

In the following section I illustrate the extent to which the social movement actors in each of the case study areas were able to take advantage of the above opportunities.

i) France

The French Anti-Road Campaign

i) The strength of the EU

In the previous chapter I posited that a green group can show evidence of europeanisation if they address the national mechanisms for implementing EU policy. This is illustrated in the case of the campaign against the A65 in Aquitaine; for instance one of the chief criticisms in the ARLP/SEPANSO dossier regards the ability of local and national government to manage their responsibilities to implement EU environmental legislation, in particular in providing public consultation. In this regard ARLP shows evidence of connecting to europeanised political opportunity structures. They complain that the necessary public consultation did not take place:

There is a manifest violation of the terms in article L1.21-8-I of the Environmental Code because there has never been a public debate...This major oversight also violates the terms of the 1998 Aarhus Convention regarding information, public consultation and the right to jurisdiction in matters relating to the environment (ARLP & SEPANSO, 2008b; 10).³⁷

ARLP and SEPANSO also complained about the credibility of the individual chosen to head the enquiry into the road proposals, claiming that his membership of *Béarn Adour Pyrénées* (BAP) – a regional transport pressure group - which received €22,800 from the pro-road *Pyrénées Atlantiques* Council, made his judgement partial:

The chairman of the public enquiry into the A65...is also technical advisor to the Chamber of Commerce and Industry (CCI) of Pau, which is, in association with *Béarn Adour Pyrénées* (BAP), the main lobby group for the A65. He is therefore a long way from demonstrating the neutrality required to head up a public enquiry into works that have been publically welcomed by the structure to which he is attached. It should also be noted that, in 2002 at least, BAP benefitted from a grant from the fervently pro-road *Pyrénées Atlantiques* Council of 22, 800 euros (Article in the *République des Pyrénées* on 29 March 2002) (ARLP & SEPANSO, 2008b: 11).³⁸

³⁷ Original text : *il y a manifestement violation des dispositions de l'article L.121-8-I du Code de l'Environnement dans la mesure où il n'y a jamais eu pour ce projet de mise*

en oeuvre de la procédure du débat public...Cette carence majeure viole de plus les dispositions de la Convention d'Aarhus en date de 1998, relative à l'information, à la participation du public et à la saisine des juridictions en matière d'environnement – translation my own.

³⁸ Original text - *Le président de la commission d'enquête publique de l'A65...est en même temps conseiller technique de la Chambre de Commerce et d'Industrie (CCI) de Pau, qui constitue avec l'association Béarn Adour Pyrénées (BAP) qui lui est liée, la principale structure de lobbying en faveur de l'autoroute A65. Il est donc bien loin de démontrer la neutralité nécessaire pour diriger une commission d'enquête impartiale sur un projet d'autoroute réclamé publiquement par une structure professionnelle à laquelle il est attaché. A noter que cette même association Béarn Adour Pyrénées, a bénéficié, au moins en 2002, d'une subvention du conseil général des Pyrénées Atlantiques, fervent partisan de l'autoroute, d'un montant de 22 800 Euros (article de la République des Pyrénées du 29 mars 2002)* – translation my own.

By addressing the competency of the decision-makers, on the grounds that they must implement EU environmental legislation at a local level, ARLP show clear signs of connecting to a Europeanised POS.

ii) The openness of the EU

The second variable of a europeanised political opportunity structure is the ability of the movement to appeal to national channels responsible for influencing EU decision-making. Examples include access to political parties, to representatives on the Committee of Regions, to members of the European Parliament or simply by lobbying national government. We discover in chapter six that although ARLP problematised the road at multiple levels of governance, including appealing to EU legislation, its primary focus was on decision-making powers at the local and national levels. So although it showed evidence of appealing to the national *implementation* of EU legislation, it did not appeal to national mechanisms to *influence* that EU legislation.

We saw the EU as more of a help than a hindrance; we were running out of ideas about how to change the minds of the Council and we thought that maybe by appealing to EU legislation with respect to Natura 2000 they would have to listen to us...we wanted the EU's power to influence (Interview, 17.11.2009).

In fact, it used legislation at the EU level to circumvent national decision-making channels, because EU environmental legislation was favourable to its cause. Because the road was not conceived of as a 'European project' then it was not necessary for ARLP or its allies to appeal to the EU to overturn its decision in approving the A65's construction.

iii) *The availability of elite allies*

Finally, ARLP actively pursued a strategy designed to reach out to other similar campaigns across Europe and in so doing shows evidence of engaging with the third variable of political opportunity structures – engaging with new allies at a pan-European level. A member recalls:

‘we were on Spanish TV as well as in the local and national press. Our spokesman was in a studio debate on *France 3* and that raised our profile a lot. People came from Spain and Switzerland I think to see what we were doing and to encourage us with their own experiences’. (Interview, 06.11.2008)

Although the anti-road campaigners in Switzerland and Spain were campaigning at a very local level themselves, their work was still being informed by EU policy either in the field of transport or environmental protection. The alliances that formed with other activists were loose and informal, nor were they sustained beyond the lifetime of the campaign against the A65. But their very presence at all points to a connection to europeanised political opportunity structures.

In summary the campaign against the *Autoroute Langon-Pau* illustrates the way in which a grassroots campaign may show evidence of europeanisation when acting domestically. The ARLP addressed its campaign to the national mechanisms for implementing EU policy by challenging the authority of those mechanisms themselves, in particular the validity of the public enquiry and its work on assessing the road’s environmental impact. By choosing to combat the road on environmental grounds ARLP found opportunity to circumvent the national level and appealed to the EU to change national decision-making; it therefore did not evidence the second dimension of europeanised POS. It did however begin to form informal alliances

with new allies at a pan-European level and to that extent we may conclude that the grassroots campaign against the A65 showed evidence of connecting to europeanised political opportunity structures.

The French Anti-GMO Campaign

i) The strength of the EU

One of the themes which emerged from the interviews conducted in this case was that the anti-GMO campaign squarely addressed, and supported the circumvention of, the national mechanisms for implementing EU GMO policy. The grassroots *fauchage* and Vigilance Aquitaine 33 campaigns groups were populated not only by local farmers and families but also locally elected representatives. The participation of more than one elected member in the campaign afforded them insights into *local* possibilities to circumvent national legislation. One protester explains:

The locally elected members didn't take any decisions on GMOs, nor did the citizens, the Minister of Agriculture did. So the region decided that it wouldn't finance GMO businesses and it would favour organic enterprise (Interview, 10.11.2008)

And another expands on this theme:

We knew that there was nothing we could do really to change EU legislation on the free market in GMOs and all that kind of thing. That was a campaign for bigger players than us. But we did think we could do something on the ground – after all, we're the people who get the regional government elected so we try to make demands known (Interview, 22.11.2009)

It is not unique amongst these case studies of GM crops for grassroots campaigners to deploy their resources to influence the local implementation of national and EU

GMO legislation, but it does demonstrate evidence of grassroots actors connecting to europeanised domestic POS.

ii) The openness of the EU

A key observation with regard to the national channels responsible for EU decision-making is that grassroots green groups were very attuned to the political context in which they were operating. At times of electoral significance: the Presidential elections in 2007 for example (see Figure 6.2).

‘we stepped up our campaigns outside supermarkets, on the radio we tried to get as much publicity as possible’ (Interview, 04.11.2008).

The grassroots groups were similarly responsive during the review of GMO policy in 2008. When Monsanto’s license in France came up for renewal in Spring 2008 the opportunity for protesters to push for its elimination became more promising. Indeed, at the end of the government’s environment conference, the *Grenelle de l’environnement*, in October 2007 the French Premier Nicolas Sarkozy announced that in accordance with the ‘precautionary principle’ no more GM maize trials would take place until an expert governmental group had been established, had assessed them, and deemed them to be safe:

‘I would like to revisit the issue of GMOs: the truth is that we have doubts about the current benefits of pest-resistant GMOs, and the truth is that we have doubts about the control of the release of GMOs, the truth is that we have doubts about the health and environmental benefits of GMOs. I do not want to put myself at odds with the European Union. But in respect of the precautionary principle, I hope that the commercial cultivation with GMO pesticides is suspended. This decision is pending the outcome of evaluations by an expert panel which will be created before the end of the year. We will do this in close consultation with the European Commission. We do will do

this by honouring our commitments' (French Presidential Office, 25.10.2007)³⁹.

His decision came as part of his call for an 'environmental revolution' and was flanked by high profile environmental campaigns such as Greenpeace's banner 'Ban GMOs Now!' unfurled over the Arc de Triomphe, and in their report *La Bombe OGM* published in the same month (Greenpeace France, 2007). Grassroots groups in Aquitaine followed suit:

'we took a much bigger interest in the EU to see if we could find a way of getting the government to stop, to see if anything was illegal. We figured that if the government needed to think about it then the European Union would be behind it all and that's what we needed to understand' (Interview, 06.11.2008).

They were able to take advantage of the charged political space to increase the openness of the state to their demands. By connecting the europeanised political opportunity structures, the grassroots green groups also show evidence of europeanisation.

iii) The availability of elite allies

Finally, the anti-GMO campaign engaged only to a limited extent with new allies at a European level whose work was also informed by EU policy on GM crops. *The faucheurs volontaires* capitalised on the high profile media presence of José Bové to connect to anti-GMO campaigns in other European countries. Companion groups,

³⁹ Original text - *Je veux revenir sur le dossier des OGM : la vérité est que nous avons des doutes sur l'intérêt actuel des OGM pesticides ; la vérité est que nous avons des doutes sur le contrôle de la dissémination des OGM ; la vérité est que nous avons des doutes sur les bénéfices sanitaires et environnementaux des OGM. Je ne veux pas me mettre en contradiction, José Emmanuel avec l'Union européenne. Mais, je dois faire des choix. Et bien, dans le respect du principe de précaution, je souhaite que la culture commerciale des OGM pesticides soit suspendue. Ceci en attendant les conclusions d'une expertise à conduire par une nouvelle instance créée avant la fin de l'année en concertation étroite avec vous, Grenelle de l'environnement, et avec la Commission européenne. Je prends mes responsabilités là-aussi. Nous respecterons nos engagements* – translation my own.

with some overlapping membership with the main grassroots group *Vigilance OGM* 33, included the Bordeaux branch of Greenpeace and the Landes branch of *Amis de la Terre*. These higher profile allies were part of a pan-European network of actors and the grassroots groups had the opportunity to borrow indirectly from the raised profile that the involvement of these actors afforded. They did not however show signs of taking advantage of this opportunity. Again, these connections show evidence of the grassroots groups connecting to europeanised POS, although the participation of these grassroots actors in networks with more professionalised actors did not afford the access to allies across Europe that the literature might suggest.

In summary, the campaign against genetically modified crops in France showed evidence of connecting to europeanised political opportunity structures. Although it conceded it had limited capacity to change EU legislation directly it did appeal to the national mechanisms for implementing the policy. It also attempted to influence the national channels capable of influencing EU decision-making by exploiting changes in the political opportunity structure around the presidential election and the *Grenelle de l'environnement*. Finally, in spite of its links to local chapters of EMOs and membership of national GMO and environmental networks the access to new allies at a pan-European basis was not evidenced. The greatest benefit that *Vigilance OGM* 33 accrued through membership in these groups was through the additional public profile it gave to the issue in general. The media-worthy action repertoire of the *faucheurs* afforded them great European publicity and opened small opportunities and highly individualised opportunities to engage with other actors involved in

similar campaigns, but overall in the third dimension of europeanised political opportunity structures it is difficult to prove evidence of europeanisation.

Conclusion

In summary, the grassroots campaigns in France show much clearer evidence of connecting to europeanised POS than European POS. The anti-GMO campaign exploited the windows of political opportunity around the *Grenelle de l'environnement* to address the national mechanisms for implementing EU policy, in the same way that ARLP held their national and local representatives accountable for implementing environmental legislation. Secondly, both campaigns engaged with allies and pan European level whose work was informed by EU policy. In so doing, the grassroots groups connected to europeanised POS at a national level.

ii) Italy

The Italian Anti-Road Campaign

i) The strength of the EU

Although there is very limited evidence of the anti-road campaign connecting to *European* POS, it does show evidence of engaging with *europeanised* POS. First of all, the groups involved address the national mechanisms for implementing EU policy – the campaign group makes direct reference to the woolly nature of the regional government's framing of the road as a European Project. In a dossier produced by an alliance of environmental actors opposed to the road they dedicate a chapter to discussing the road within the context of the TEN-T, concluding that 'if

the Italian authorities are hoping to build a new road parallel to the SS Aurelia, and they are basing this decision on the TEN then they have misread it' (Emilliani, Lenzi, Matteoli, Podestà, & Zanchini, 2004: 9)⁴⁰. The campaigners engage with the ability of the state to enforce this kind of policy. They note that 'if a state receives money for developing their contribution to the TEN, they are completely free to choose the kind of road they wish to spend it on' (2004: 9).⁴¹ This is certainly evidence of europeanisation within the green groups because they are recognising both the domestic adaptation to European legislation and the existence of bodies at the EU level tasked with coordinating and implementing this programme.

ii) The openness of the EU

In contrast to European POS, where the opportunities to connect to channels of influence at the EU were undeveloped, the grassroots campaign does engage with the national channels responsible for influencing EU decision-making. One of the chief complaints in the campaign materials regarded the decision-making and consultation process for the proposed works. They refer to *un processo decisionale scombiccherato* – a misguided decision-making process (Emilliani, Lenzi, Matteoli, Podestà, & Zanchini, 2004: 11; Vittadini, 2004: 1). This theme was echoed in the interviews: 'they aren't listening to us' (Interview, 03.11.2009) and 'we have attracted the attention of the locals and we've got a lot of support, but the government are too busy worrying about how they're going to afford it to care what

⁴⁰ Original text – *se le autorità italiane, per promuovere la costruzione di una nuova autostrada parallela alla SS esistente, si fondano sugli orientamenti TEN, ne fanno una lettura errata* – translation my own.

⁴¹ Original text – *i cofinanziamenti comunitari desinati alla rete stradale TEN non sono in alcuno caso vincolati dalla necessità di realizzare un'infrastruttura autostradale a pedaggio: la scelta del tipo di intervento resta di totale responsabilità dello Stato membro* – translation my own.

we think' (Interview, 02.11.2009). For the anti-road campaign then, there is evidence of connecting to the national conversation about EU transport policy and in so doing, showing evidence of connecting to europeanised POS.

iii) The availability of elite allies

With regard to the groups' allies, the institutionalised nature of some of the participating green groups was an advantage when accessing the decision-makers at a national level. The local chapters of Friends of the Earth and *Legambiente* are afforded credibility by virtue of their larger institutional umbrella. The main dossier of objection prepared in 2004 was signed by *Italia Nostra*, *Legambiente*, the WWF, *Comitato per la Bellezza*, *Movimento Ecologista* and *Soccorso Ambientale la Maremma* (SAM) (Emilliani, Lenzi, Matteoli, Podestà, & Zanchini, 2004). With the exception of this last group all of these signatories are national or international environmental organisations or local collectives of the same. The membership of the grassroots elements of the protest, for example *SOS Maremma*, overlapped with these organisations and, as in the French example, would have theoretically afforded the grassroots groups the opportunity to connect to other groups across Europe campaigning on similar issues. There is no evidence from the literature of the campaigns or from the interviews I conducted that these avenues were exploited, and therefore the groups did not connect to europeanised POS in this regard.

To summarise the anti-road campaign in Tuscany shows signs of connecting to europeanised political opportunity structures. Interestingly it demonstrates a kind of anti-europeanisation by choosing to engage with, and reject, the idea of the road as a

European project. In a similar vein, it engages with the domestic channels responsible for EU decision-making by actively dissuading them of their obligations to adhere to the TEN-T framework. Finally, with regard to the third dimension of political opportunity structure, there is no evidence that the wide variety of professionalised and institutionalised bodies involved in the campaign afforded the grassroots elements any additional capacity to access allies at a national or pan-European level. The anti-road campaign may therefore be said to be partially europeanised.

The Italian Anti-GMO campaign

i) The strength of the EU

As with their colleagues in the anti-road campaign, the work of the anti-GMO protesters is characterised by the close involvement of EMOs and political parties. In this instance, however, the particular interest that the regional government had in EU GMO legislation gave the movement greater scope to address the national mechanisms for implementing those policies. This argument is illustrated in the special privilege the Tuscan Regional Government gave to ‘heritage’ or ‘conservation’ seeds under the terms of Council Directive 98/95/EC. They transposed this into Regional Law 64/2004 ‘Protection and promotion of the heritage of local breeds and plant varieties of agricultural, zootechnical and forestry interest’. Regional government then used this law to protect the alimentary patrimony of the region and to add further armoury against the cultivation of GM crops on its territory. Antonio Onorati, President of *Crocevia* the Italian development NGO explained:

we knew this was coming so we were able to anticipate Italy's application of the Directive through the regional laws. In a sense, you could say that it's been the regions driving the national legislative process in Italy, not the other way around (GRAIN, 2005).

Awareness of, and engagement with, EU legislation has created new policies to which the local social movement groups can connect and provides evidence of europeanisation.

Furthermore, the anti-GMO campaign in Tuscany has undoubtedly been hugely influenced in other ways by its relationship to the regional government. The political output structures in Italy are such that the green movement in Tuscany does not need to drive the GMO policy agenda forward to the same extent as in the other case study countries. This is because not only is the agenda already being pursued by the regional government, but they also have the autonomy to implement local anti-GM laws. One organic farmer interviewed said:

We would react if we needed to, but at the moment we are happy just to work together to make sure the next generation understands what's at stake (Interview, 22.20.2008).

The opportunities for these grassroots green groups to illustrate europeanisation through europeanised POS are limited by the political space taken up by local government and institutionalised movement actors such as Friends of the Earth and WWF. Much of the requirement for them to appeal to the national channels responsible for implementing EU decision-making is taken away. Nonetheless, they do still address their concerns to national mechanisms, and in so doing show

evidence of connecting to the first dimension of europeanised political opportunity structures.

ii) The openness of the EU

In addition, the political input structures for the anti-GMO groups are very favourable and very open. As Kitschelt notes ‘openness increases with the capacity of legislatures to develop and control policies independently of the executive’ (1986: 63). This is very clearly the case in Tuscany which is able to generate its own policy with regard to banning GM crops. Because of the local consultation that Tuscany is able to provide, the political opportunity structure that is able to grant to the anti-GMO campaign is an open one. Regional government is able to represent the concerns of the local anti-GMO campaign at the national and European levels and the campaign in turn, appeals to that national level. An organic activist said:

‘We have a great relationship with the regional government. We feel like they are listening when we say we don’t want this seed or that seed jeopardising our livelihoods’ (Interview, 03.11.2009).

The high levels of institutionalisation in the movement here may further improve these actors’ chances of consultation, although further research in this area would be required in order to prove this relationship.

iii) The availability of elite allies

The greatest opportunity for the grassroots face of the movement to connect to europeanised POS is through the engagement of new European allies, although only through opportunities to work in tandem with larger EMOs. The most important

national environmental organisation *Legambiente* has a base in their *Girasole* (Sunflower) office in Rispeccia, Tuscany. Here they organise the annual national environmental festival ‘festAmbiente’. The festival website has a scrolling box showing the wide variety of local and international corporate partners (see Figure 4.3)⁴²:



Figure 4.3: The *Festambiente* Website

With their high degree of institutionalisation and commercial sponsorship *Legambiente* are well-placed to connect the localised anti-GMO campaign with other environmental organisations or interested parties. The low presence of authentically ‘grassroots’ actors in Tuscany, squeezed out by the dominance of local government and their EMO allies means that this brokering role is unfulfilled. In the third domain of europeanised political opportunity structures there is scant evidence of europeanisation.

⁴² The companies mentioned on the website include *Latte Fresco la Maremma* (Maremma Fresh Milk), *Demeter* (Organic Standard providers), *Parmiggiano Reggiano* (the Council of parmesan cheese producers), *e-on* (energy company), *Copaim* (local food producer), *Coop* (Italian cooperative supermarket chain), *sun system* (solar panel producers), *Novamont* (biodegradable chemical manufacturer) and *Azzero2* (an emissions reduction consultancy) represent the spread of commercial partners across environmental, alimentary and agricultural interests.

To recap the Tuscan campaign against GMOs, much of the movement's opportunities are closely defined by their proximity to the Regional Government who dominates the local legislative and awareness-raising arenas. There are much higher numbers here of institutionalised EMOs acting than in the two other case study countries, and the ad-hoc coalitions of farmers who develop their own localised support networks and awareness-raising actions are in the minority. While one might expect to find evidence of europeanisation at the EMO level of the campaign, the distance between the levels of actor (from regional government, to EMO, to farmers) means that the opportunity to connect to new allies at a national or pan-European level is restricted. Only in their ability to address the implementation and formulation of EU policy is there evidence of europeanisation.

Conclusion

In summary, the Italian case studies do show some evidence of grassroots groups showing signs of europeanisation through connecting to the national mechanisms for implementing EU policy, and the channels responsible for decision-making. In both cases however, their engagement with allies at a national or pan-European level whose work is also informed by EU legislation was not in evidence. In both cases, more formal and organised interests – either local government or EMOs defined the limits of their arena for action.

iii) The UK

The UK Anti-Road Campaign

i) The strength of the EU:

The anti-road campaign showed clear signs of addressing the implementation of policy, but this policy was not related to the level of the EU – the focus was on national and regional legislation. In a press release during the formulation of the road proposal by Midlothian Council NAAG said:

The proposed road and associated developments slice through miles of Green Belt, protected by law. Other Government commitments and legislation it breaks include ones on Out of Town Developments, transport, environmental protection, health, international treaties on Global Warming, and Midlothian's own Environment Strategy (NAAG, 1999)

They illustrate an understanding of the wider legislative framework within which the development sits, but beyond referring to ‘international treaties’ they do not address EU legislation explicitly. This approach is echoed by the activists at Bilston protest camp who engaged only with the most local level of policy-making.

ii) The openness of the EU

The national political opportunity structure for the anti-road campaign was relatively closed. There was limited public consultation by Midlothian Council during the development of the proposal to realign the A701 and once the final proposal was presented to the Scottish Parliament it was approved without public consultation. Despite continued efforts to push for a public enquiry, including calling for a motion to be passed in parliament to note their objections (Motion S1M-00643) and the

threat of legal action, the government did not rescind. It was not until the Halcrow Report, funded by the Holyrood and commissioned by Midlothian Council that comprehensive independent assessment of the proposal took place. An activist said:

‘We couldn’t believe the fact that we didn’t even get a say in it! There was no democracy involved at all, they just didn’t want to know what we had to say. In the very beginning we held a meeting with all of the different political parties there and the Labour Councillor didn’t even turn up. If you ask me was this proposal fair or democratic I would have to say no’ (Interview, 20.02.2010).

The opportunities for the Bilston protest camp to appeal to the national channels for EU decision-making were even more restricted, but they were also to an extent self-imposed. Because they defined themselves so consciously as challenging the dominant forms of power then the institutional avenues that may have been available, and that we observe in the other case studies, were not a legitimate option for the protest camp. While they were happy to act at a local level – to deliver a petition to Midlothian Council offices for example – they did not want to develop this into an opportunity to shape supranational decision-making. An activist explains ‘there is only so far you can get with the law-makers before you have to give up and take matters into your own hands and just actually stop the bulldozers at the gates’ (Interview, 03.03.2009). Whilst unsurprising, the reluctance of this most grassroots of all of the case study groups to participate in EU-generated political opportunities highlights one of the differences within the same campaign between *those who don’t* and *those who won’t*. In this domain of europeanised political opportunity the campaign shows no signs of europeanisation.

iii) The availability of elite allies

The anti-road campaign and the work of NAAG in particular gained popular legitimacy from their association with mainstream EMOs such as TRANSform Scotland, the Campaign for Better Transport, Friends of the Earth and in particular the Green Party MSP at the time Robin Harper, who participated in NAAG events. Furthermore, as a member of the Transport and Environment Committee in the Scottish Parliament, he was able to raise their concerns at an institutional level and indeed did so (Scottish Parliament, 2002). Although these connections helped to raise the public profile of the campaign there is no evidence that NAAG were able to, or sought to, exploit these links to engage with new allies either nationally or from other Member States.

The protest camp at Bilston Glen, however, shows much greater signs of europeanisation in this regard. The activists here were able to use the resources of the national activist community as a means of increasing their support. The network of allies was at its peak in the first five years of the campaign when the proposal was at its most probable. The protest camp was mentioned in the radical ecological journal 'Do or Die!' popular amongst the national activist community, which also had links to international protest campaigns (Do or Die!, 2003). It also enjoyed a strong online presence through its own website (Bilston Glen Anti-Bypass Site) or frequent mentions on social movement activist website Indymedia where it would publish appeals for people to come and join their events. The network of anti-road protests that established themselves across the UK in the 1990s left a legacy of experienced, mobile protesters and organisational bodies like Road Alert! and Road

Block (both recently dismembered) who were willing to ally themselves with the Bilston camp. Although this network in itself is not evidence of europeanisation, its international reach does indicate that possibility. Activists arrived at the Bilston camp from various European countries including Spain, France and Greece where they had been involved in other environmental or social justice campaigns. They brought with them experience of campaigning against local and national governments who are bound by EU regulation. Although these grassroots protesters chose not to address their concerns at the level of this regulation, they were still responding with pan-European alliances to a europeanised policy area. The degree of their connection to this third dimension of europeanised political opportunity structures should not be overstated, but it does highlight an interesting difference between the differential impact on groups of varying degrees of professionalisation.

In summary, the campaign against the A701 evidenced extremely limited signs of connecting to a europeanised political opportunity structure. The preference that NAAG and the Bilston camp showed for maintaining the local dimension of the proposal meant that EU policy was not considered either in terms of addressing the way in which it was implemented nationally, or in terms of influencing the construction of the legislation at the level of the EU. Interestingly, there were greater signs of europeanisation through access to allies amongst the Bilston protest camp than amongst NAAG.

The UK Anti-GMO Campaign

i) The strength of the EU

In the previous section we acknowledged that the anti-GMO campaign in Devon had a good awareness of EU legislation and the role it played at a national level. While it seems it chose not to address the construction of the policy at the EU, did it attempt to address the way it was implemented domestically? Here the answer is yes – but only at the at the most local level.

The degree of centralisation of the UK's environmental policy provides a contrast with Italy, where it is possible for regional GM bans to sit alongside national approval. The most local and radical elements of the movement are therefore able to exploit anti-GM agendas at the regional level which they can be sure are not being addressed by central government. In Britain only local Councils are able to ban GM crops from being cultivated on land administrated by them, and this is a symbolic stance rather than one that has legislative approval. There is therefore a territorial dimension brought out by the British POS that is not seen in the other campaigns.

ii) The openness of the EU

The targets of the Devon anti-GMO campaign were domestic. To the extent that it held national government responsible for challenging EU legislation on GM crops, the movement showed signs of trying to influence European decision-making, indeed they showed good legislative understanding. However, although the ultimate intention may have been to change EU policy, its strategy primarily involved targeting local and national actors such as individual farmers considering GM trials

or supermarkets whose ability to influence EU policy was, at best, limited at worst, non-existent:

We wrote hundreds and hundreds of letters to the local supermarkets over the years campaigning for better labelling and non-GM goods like milk for example' (Interview, 17.02.2010)

In this regard, neither TOGG nor the local chapters of EMOs involved in the anti-GMO campaign showed sufficient engagement with using national channels to change EU decision-making to evidence europeanised political opportunity structures.

iii) The availability of elite allies

TOGG were especially well connected amongst the anti-GMO groups in Devon by virtue of their central role in the Genetic Engineering Network and their production of the newsletter Genetix Update. This network was firmly grounded in the UK, so although they were keenly aware of similar protests occurring across Europe, they did not find the possibility of making contact with these protesters to be strategically useful. Interviews underscored the idea that although they conceived of GMOs as cross-border problem, it was not their role to create cross-border alliances. Furthermore, the alliances that they built nationally with other anti-GMO groups were united in preventing specific field trials rather than by a common concern for GM policy more generally. In this regard their alliances were only very tangentially contextualised by European GM policy.

Overall, the UK anti-GMO campaign does not show any evidence of connecting to europeanised political opportunity structures. The preferred arena of action is most certainly local – the ‘decision-maker’ targeted by their campaign was most often national government or local Councils who had the power to symbolically ban GMOs from Council land. Often, the target of their campaign held no-decision-making responsibilities. Furthermore, although TOGG held a privileged position in the UK anti-GMO network, the concerns that it shared with other UK groups were more often for specific trial sites than wider environmental issues contextualised by European legislation.

Conclusion

In the arena of europeanised political opportunity structures the UK campaigns have shown remarkably little evidence of europeanisation. The pan-European networks created by the Bilston protest site are the only concession amongst the case studies. The opportunity to address those who could influence EU decision-making at a national level was eschewed for both ideological and strategic reasons. For those in the protest camp the EU is not a legitimate actor, so addressing it even through national channels was not deemed appropriate. For NAAG, influencing environmental or transport policy at the level of the EU was not strategically useful, although this may be because the road-building programme did not advance as far as it did in the French and Italian examples. The anti-GMO campaign too found it more strategically useful to concentrate their efforts on highly localised issues. In both policy areas, evidence of europeanisation is almost non-existent.

4.4 Conclusion

This chapter has examined the way in which the six case study campaigns have been able to connect to the political opportunity structures around them. I analysed the capacity for these groups to respond to European POS and europeanised POS, arguing that they would be europeanised to the extent that they were able to connect to either of these. A number of findings come to the fore.

The most striking finding is that these social movement groups were largely disengaged from European political opportunity structures. There was little sign that these groups recognised the role of EU legislation in a domestic context, gained direct access to institutional channels of influence at the level of the EU, or accessed allies at that level. Signs of engagement with europeanised POS were more prevalent, but should not be overstated. A number of further distinctions between the cases studied suggest reasons for this difference which may be understood in terms of strategic advantage and ideological conviction.

The first distinction is between policy areas. In the case of road-protest the role of EU legislation in either causing, or helping to remediate, the road was addressed differently. In France, although the road was recognised as a national project ARLP and SEPASO saw an opportunity to appeal to EU environmental legislation to try to block the proposal. In Italy the opposite level of engagement was true and the campaign sought to distance itself from any suggestion that the road might be connected in any way to EU legislation – a kind of ‘anti-europeanisation’. In the UK

the role of the EU in shaping the legislative framework within which road proposals are considered was not addressed at all. The degree of europeanisation within road protest therefore varied widely. In the area of anti-GMO campaigns the situation was more uniform. There was greater recognition that EU legislation was important at a national level across all of the cases studied, although this did not change the way in which the groups chose to mobilise at a local level.

A second distinction emerges from this chapter between those groups who considered the EU to hold a legitimate role in their campaign and those who did not. In other words, the way in which ideological conviction shaped the political opportunity structures addressed by the campaigns. Two groups clearly rejected the legitimacy of the EU, although for different reasons. They were within the anti-road campaigns in Italy and the UK. In Italy the actors in SOS Maremma and their colleagues saw the Tuscan Regional Government's framing of the road as a European project as a strategy to give it unfounded legitimacy. By actively rejecting the role of the EU in sanctioning the road or being able to mitigate it they were delegitimising the project. In the UK on the other hand, the Bilston protest camp saw the EU as an illegitimate actor in the campaign for ideological reasons. Its commitment to challenging the dominant discourse of power meant that its decision to act locally stemmed from ideology rather than strategy. These two campaigns raise some interesting questions about the extent to which European political opportunity structures are seen as desirable by social movements – we return to this theme in chapter seven.

Finally, the idea of EMOs as brokers between local actors and European-level actors or networks was a recurrent one in this chapter. Where the literature on the europeanisation of social movements finds evidence of europeanisation within NGOs, this chapter highlights the disconnect between the NGO and their local constituencies. It is not proven possible here for a local chapter to connect to European or europeanised political opportunity structures simply by hanging on the coat tails of these larger europeanised actors. Nor, importantly, is it seen as necessary. It is striking that even though the opportunity to access pan-European and influential networks might be recognised, the actors in all campaigns apart from that against the A65 in France eschewed this opportunity. There was a strong preference for establishing a local or national network and to let those based in Brussels take charge of influencing the European Union. The implication in the literature that overlapping membership between grassroots and institutionalised groups on the same campaign might create a kind of ‘europeanisation by proxy’ has not been confirmed by these case studies. Rather, grassroots groups have remained largely disconnected from their professionalised colleagues and declined any perceived strategic advantages that such a relationship might bring. We undertake now a similar examination of these campaigns in the context of the frames they adopted. The analysis that follows offers further insight into these distinctions, and teases out in particular explanations for cross-national differences that we observe here.

5 Frames: Context and Cases

‘Social movements exist in a larger societal context. They draw on the cultural stock for images of what is an injustice, for what is a violation of what ought to be’.

(McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996: 266-267)

5.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter I illustrated how the domain of political opportunity structures can capture europeanisation in social movements. This chapter concentrates on another such domain – frames. I construct a framework in order to answer the question ‘what is the impact of europeanisation on social movement frames?’ In answering this question I have two aims. The first is to explore the role that both national and supranational frames have on social movement behaviour. Frames are part of the fabric of social movement identity and social movement strategy. They determine the way in which the issue is conceived, the way support is recruited and the way in which action is taken. Furthermore, because frames are a product of collective negotiation, they are the embodiment of the diffusion of social movement ideas. In this way, they are particularly well suited to capturing transnationalism, and in this case europeanisation, within social movements.

The second aim is to capture the nuanced impact of europeanisation on social movements; in doing this I distinguish between two kinds of frame: European frames

where *the problematisation of the issue, the proposal of action, the mobilisation and rationalisation are a direct result of the policies or activities of the EU* and europeanised frames where *the framing is contextualised by the process of European integration but does not address it directly*. This distinction, as in the case of European and europeanised POS, highlights the reflexive nature of europeanisation because it accounts for both the ability of the EU to dictate the mobilisation frame chosen by the movement and for the movements to negotiate a common frame between themselves which is then exported to other member states. This distinction also teases out the ability of frames to diffuse outside of formal structural mechanisms through the negotiation of frames across movements – nationally and specifically, across Europe. In so doing, they may evidence passive europeanisation processes.

The chapter is structured into two parts: the first part offers a definition for ‘framing’ and outlines the utility of the concept within social movement studies; the second section describes the parameters of European and europeanised frames, then concludes with an outline of the national environmental frames in each of the case study countries.

5.2 Frames and Social Movement Activity

Frames are an important aspect of social movement activity because they provide a rationale for the group’s activity, they represent a sympathetic way for movements to present issues to the general public, and they create a shared understanding of issues which helps to facilitate networking within and between social movement groups. I

define frames as *action oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate the activities of a social movement group*⁴³. Scholars have attributed various different characteristics to frames but the overarching principle remains: it is the *collective negotiation of meaning*, rather than the sum total of individual meanings that creates a frame. In this way it is not a static or fixed understanding but one which can adapt and be constantly redefined according to the membership of the group, the changing nature of the problem and the parties involved in managing it. This definition suggests that frames are well-suited to accommodate the dynamic nature of the process of europeanisation.

The vehicles through which an issue is framed may be textural (constructed through the language used in flyers, posters, websites), visual (logos, pictures in printed communications) or aural (speeches, radio or television appearances). Doerr et al. recognise this diversity: ‘the world view of social movements is not only enshrined in manifestoes and email lists, but it is also visible in the design of posters and t-shirts, in the use of visual symbols and in photos that are used for campaigning’ (2008: 161). In this chapter I draw data from all three sources, analysing the text and images of campaign materials as well as the language of interviews and television appearances to identify evidence of europeanisation where it exists. Further information about the process of data collection is included in Appendix 1.

⁴³ This definition is based closely on the definition offered by Robert Benford who applies these qualities to social movement *organisations* (R. D. Benford, 2000: 614). I believe this definition applies equally across the spectrum of social movement groups from the most organised NOGs to grassroots groups.

The focus on frames allows me to operationalise the broader issue of beliefs in grassroots green groups. Mueller and Judd note that ‘belief consensus has long been regarded as one of the defining characteristics of social movements’ (Mueller & Judd, 1981: 183). Frame analysis captures this consensus. Frames embody the subjective interpretation of a problem and the identification of appropriate solutions. This problematisation reflects, and helps to construct, the beliefs of the group. ‘In the cognitive process of interpreting reality, the actors in a conflict construct and exploit frames of references that “allow individuals to find, conceive, identify and label the events which occur in their lives and more generally in the world at large” thus giving sense to their actions’ (D. Snow, Rochford, K., & Benford, 1986: 464). In short, framing is the process of negotiating and re-negotiating a common understanding of an issue, while frames are the articulation of those understandings.

Frames, Ideologies and Beliefs

It should be noted however, that while the terms ‘frames’ and ‘ideologies’ both imply the idea of ‘belief’ and both terms address the meaning that is attached to objects and actions, they are not synonymous concepts. In the early development of the concept of framing, ‘ideology’, ‘culture’, ‘belief’ and ‘meaning’ were conflated. Klandermans argued that a successful social movement needs to be able to garner support for its beliefs, and then to motivate people to act upon them: he labelled these processes ‘consensus mobilisation’ and ‘action mobilisation’ (Klandermans, 1984). It took several years before what was variously referred to as ‘ideological factors – values, beliefs, meanings’ (D. Snow, 1988) or ‘belief systems’ (Gerhards & Rucht, 1992) became disaggregated into distinct concepts. In distinguishing between

ideas of meaning in this way we are better able to understand how people present their concerns publically. It is possible for example to have two very different ideologies within the same masterframe. Oliver and Johnston illustrate this idea in the debate about abortion in 1970s America: 'both sides...adopted the civil rights masterframe. The pro-life movement stresses the right of the fetus to life, while the pro-choice movement stresses the right of the woman to control a fundamental aspect of her life.' (2005: 187). For the green movement this means that debates about the ideology of 'ecologism' may be kept distinct from social movement actors using ecological or environmental frames in their campaigns. In other words, a movement using an ecological frame does not give them an ecologist ideology, the former is designed to be immediately powerful and the latter requires a longer process of contemplation. 'Ideologies cannot just be "resonated with" they have to be learned...Ideologies are complex systems of thought that cannot be communicated accurately in stock phrases or sound bites' (Oliver & Johnston, 2005: 196).

Framing Tasks

When frames are applied in practice they may be broken down into a series of sub-functions. Snow and Benford call these 'framing tasks' (1988: 199):

- 1) a diagnosis of some event or aspect of social life as problematic and in need of alteration;
- 2) a proposed solution to the diagnosed problem that specifies what needs to be done;
- 3) a call to arms or rationale for engaging in ameliorative or corrective action.

The first two of these tasks map onto the idea of ‘consensus mobilisation’ while the latter maps onto ‘action mobilisation’ (Klandermans, 1984). The more interconnected these tasks – also called tools or properties (Triandafyllidou & Fotiou, 1998) – the more successful the movement’s frame will be. Let us examine each of these three tasks in turn.

The diagnostic element of a frame is composed of two parts: firstly to convert a particular event or phenomenon into a social problem and secondly to apportion blame. Inevitably the identification of these problems and responsibility is a very selective task – other potential sources of protest are neglected in choosing just one. della Porta and Diani argue that because actors must choose from various sources of frustration, those causes against which they should direct their energy, the process is a reduction in social complexity. Once these frames have been established it becomes difficult for other conflicts to penetrate. In this way the diagnosis of frames is a process that can lead to asymmetry of power with some concerns being squeezed out of the dominant frame (della Porta & Diani, 2006: 76).

The prognostic element of the frame moves beyond identifying the problem to seeking solutions, creating new consensus and devising new ways of doing things. It is also responsible for devising tactics and identifying targets. This is the element of the frame with a utopian dimension – the rejection of global capitalism for example. It is also the area of framing that has the greatest potential for conflicting approaches within the same movement. While a movement may agree that global capitalism is a social problem those on the left may underline the exploitative practices of

capitalism and call for it to be overthrown, while nationalists may highlight the threat to national sovereignty and call for greater regulation (della Porta & Diani, 2006: 77). It is the process of negotiating a common frame and devising an appropriate solution that gives a movement its sense of shared beliefs that keep the movement together.

The final task of a frame is to motivate citizens into action. They must be convinced that there is cause to act, opportunity to act and legitimacy to act. In order to construct a frame that will do this the collective experience must be able to connect at an individual level. Social movement actors need to demonstrate that a particular problem is common to other groups of actors and that it is relevant to their life experience. Benford identifies the four ‘vocabularies of motive’ which are employed in mobilising actors in this way: vocabularies of *severity* (the immensity of the danger), *urgency* (the urgent necessity to fix the problem), *efficacy* (your power to change things) and *propriety* (your awareness is needed). These vocabularies provide good reasons for identifying with a cause and for acting on its behalf (R. D. Benford, 1993). We see these vocabularies of motive illustrated in the case studies in the following chapter.

Masterframes and Frame Alignment

To be successful, social movements need not only to link multiple groups of actors together, but also to link their multiple frames together. Snow and Benford refer to this linkage as a “master frame” – ‘the diffusion of movement activity across different population and organisational sectors of society’ (1992: 26). The range of

problems that can be accommodated by a masterframe gives leverage to the variety of actors within it focussing on one or more of these problems. It helps the movement to develop an interpretation of reality which resonates with the greatest number of actors. della Porta and Diani emphasis the temporal and cultural context of a masterframe noting that ‘the discourse of a single movement (or the organisation of a movement) must be placed in relation to the general orientations of a given period’ (2006: 80). Fisher calls this ‘narrative fidelity’ because the masterframe rings true with existing cultural narratives (1994).

The notion of a masterframe may be linked to another aspect of framing commonly referred to as ‘frame alignment’. Developed by Snow et al. the terms refers to ‘the linkage of individual and SMO interpretive orientations, such that some set of individual interests, values and beliefs and SMO activities, goals, and ideology are congruent and complementary’ (1986: 464). In order to achieve frame alignment they identify four processes: frame bridging, frame amplification, frame extension, and frame transformation. The premise here is that actors’ beliefs may be taken as a given – the movement must simply effectively market their ideas in such a way as to make them attractive to those actors.

The concepts of masterframes and frame alignment are developed in this thesis in the notion of ‘national frames’. I define these national (master) frames as a way of interpreting and problematising a phenomenon – in this case ‘the environment’ – in a way which resonates with the majority of the population in a particular place and time. In this way, I argue, we will expect to find a peculiarly ‘French’ understanding

of the environment, or a specifically Italian environmental frame. della Porta and Diani underscore the relationship between frame alignment and national context: ‘frame alignment broadly relies on a dynamic relationship between the development of a movement and the cultural heritage of both the country in which it operates and its institutions’ (2006: 83). Where a social movement is able to connect their own frame to that of the masterframe or national frame, then those ideas have greater resonance and salience with a greater number of national actors. In this way, the ability of the movement to connect their own frames to the national frame would be expected to increase their chance of success. I expand on these national frames further in section 5.4 when I examine the national environmental frames in each of the case study countries.

5.3 The Diffusion of Frames

In light of our focus on europeanisation it is another important feature of frames that they can be diffused and transferred amongst different actors: ‘frames are not fixed to the context in which they emerge. They are also transferable to other contexts may they be geographically distant or differ in cultural terms.’ (Doerr, Teune, & Garavini, 2008: 162). Indeed, the idea of frames as vehicles for the transfer of ideas from one place to another is not a new one:

‘Protest makers do not have to reinvent the wheel at each place and in each conflict...they often find inspiration elsewhere in the ideas and tactics espoused and practiced by other activists. In short, they play the role of adopters in the cross-national diffusion of movement ideas and tactics’ (McAdam & Rucht, 1993: 58).

This means that frames are a good conduit for the transnational diffusion of understanding, which in turn shapes movement behaviour. If frames are a product of their environment, then we might expect the diffusion of social movement frames within the European Union to be influenced by this context, and in turn the understanding and the mobilisation around an issue will reflect this. In short, because frames are informed by their political and cultural context, and they may be diffused to like-minded actors, we may expect to find evidence of europeanisation in social movement frames.

I use the definition offered by Katz and McAdam and Rucht of diffusion as:

the acceptance of some specific item, over time, by adopting units – individuals, groups, communities – that are linked both to external channels of communication and to each other by means of both a structure of social relations and a system of values, or culture (1993: 59).

I argue that this process of diffusion, of common acceptance of ideas, is important to the study of europeanised social movements in two ways. Firstly, the process of *diffusion* helps to forge social movement identity by forging *networks*. Social movements exist to the extent that individual actors are persuaded to act collectively and provided with the opportunity to do so. Indeed, the very act of networking is central to the definition of a social movement – social movements are better conceived of as networks that alter as new groups form, as activists from other groups become part of the movement and others ...drop out' (Doherty, 2002: 13). The diffusion of frames through the forging of networks is therefore central to social movement identity and social movement behaviour. Moreover, the two concepts of frame diffusion and networking are complimentary concepts because framing tasks

share many similar characteristics with network functions. Passy identifies (Passy, 2003: 23):

- Socialisation – creating the will to participate
- Structural-connection – the ability to match prospective members with opportunities for action
- Decision-shaping – the idea of group cooperation and the influence of the collective over the individual

These functions echo the themes of Snow and Benford's prognostic, diagnostic and mobilisation tasks (1988: 199). In this way, by examining the possibilities for europeanisation within the diffusion of frames we are able to examine europeanisation at the heart of the movement itself.

Secondly, in examining the diffusion of frames amongst grassroots or local groups we can develop new insights into the relationship between europeanisation and the mechanisms of the state. At a formal level many of the EMOs rely on state or European funding to advance their agenda and to expand their network. For groups at a more local level this is not an option and networks are constructed more through interpersonal than inter-institutional linkages (Doherty, 2002: 13). Furthermore, where the frames being diffused do not intentionally address the impact of European Union activities then we illustrate the process of passive europeanisation. Without the state resources afforded to institutionalised interests, how will frames be diffused through networks at a grassroots level? We know that a given institutional framework will be more favourable to some EMO frames than others (Bomberg, 2012) – by investigating the diffusion of frames we are able to trace europeanisation to those areas outside the an institutional framework (formal political actors, political fora) in the process of europeanisation.

Scholars have suggested a number of reasons why social movement campaigns find success, or not, at the European level (Bomberg, 2012; della Porta & Caini, 2009; Imig & Tarrow, 2000, 2001). One of the reasons commonly cited why some frames diffuse better than others across the EU is the movement's attitude to the European Union itself:

the attitudes of various national actors on Europe confirm widespread support for European integration, but also extremely different conceptions of Europe. Europe emerges as an 'imagined community' that means very different things to collective actors. Support or opposition to Europe are positions usually pertaining to territorial identity, pitting nationalists against Europeanists – or intergovernmentalists against federalists. However, at various points in time and on various policies national actors have symbolically intertwined their positions on Europe with those held on other issues, some using their veto powers, other fashioning themselves as Europe's entrepreneurs (della Porta & Caini, 2009: 115).

This 'imagined community' therefore implies that the ability of a movement to connect to other countries within the community will dictate their success at an EU level. But what does their attitude towards the EU say about their success domestically? If grassroots actors against a road or a field of GM crops do not require change at a European level, will they be more or less predisposed to importing or exporting the frames from other EU member states? Tarrow explains:

No domestic claim is inherently interesting outside a country's borders unless it is framed to appeal to a broader audience. This does not necessarily require outright "frame transformation": often the symbols and issues that appeal to a domestic audience can be extended without much frame transformation to an international one. But many campaigners for domestic support reframe domestic claims to get international recognition (Tarrow, 2006: 147).

In the analysis which follows in chapter six we examine these ideas further. We focus on how the movements framed the issues in their campaign, the level of governance to which they attributed the problem, and any attempts that they made to

either transmit or to receive the frames from similar campaigns across Europe. But first, in the following section I explain how the social movement frames of European Union policies may be *European*, or *europeanised*.

5.4 Tracking Movement Europeanisation Through Frames

Why look for evidence of europeanisation within social movement frames and how should we measure it? The answer to both of these questions lies in revisiting the existing literature. If we consider the qualities of frames we see just how integral they are to the foundations and manifestations of social movement behaviour. Snow and Benford call these properties ‘framing tasks’ (1988: 199):

- 1) a diagnosis of some event or aspect of social life as problematic and in need of alteration;
- 2) a proposed solution to the diagnosed problem that specifies what needs to be done;
- 3) a call to arms or rationale for engaging in ameliorative or corrective action.

For the purposes of investigation in chapter six I have distilled these three diagnostic, prognostic and motivational elements down into two kinds of frame: mobilisation frames and problematisation frames. Mobilisation frames refer to the way in which the issue is being presented in order to mobilise support – what is at stake? Why is it important? Problematisation frames refer to the attribution of blame – who is

responsible? At which level of governance? In our consideration of europeanised frames I also investigate the diffusion of frames in order to account for the ability of a frame, informed by the context of European integration, to be constructed domestically and then exported to another EU member state.

We can see that the way in which a particular issue is being framed dictates much about the way a social movement group works. In the negotiation of the frame some actors will be drawn in, finding the frame appealing, while others will find that the frame does not resonate with them. The frame therefore dictates not only the three tasks above, but it also has a bearing on the actors involved. It follows therefore that if there is to be evidence of europeanisation within any aspect of a social movement's behaviour, it may be observed to a greater or lesser degree in the way in which it frames a given issue.

Frames have also, in one way or another, long been considered part of the process of europeanisation. Radaelli for example refers to the “soft” “framing” mechanisms of ‘Europeanization’ (2000: 18) or ‘Europe as logic and frame’ (2004: 10) while Knill and Lehmkuhl discuss ‘framing integration’ (1999). If frames are integral to social movement behaviour, and part of the process of europeanisation, then it is a logical step to examine them alongside one another.

In spite of this, the framing considered in this chapter is distinct from much of the other literature on framing in three significant and connected ways. First of all, much of the literature concerning European protest or frames on a European scale

does so with ‘framing *Europe*’ in mind (della Porta & Caini, 2009; Imig & Tarrow, 2001; McCauley, 2011). It addresses *the popularity of the EU itself* where this research is also concerned with the construction of *domestic frames within and across the European Union*.

Secondly, this research defines ‘europeanised frame’ differently from many other works of its kind. Scholars such as Koopmans refer to europeanised frames as those which ‘make reference to European identities, interests, norms and legal frameworks’ (Koopmans, 2007: 196). This kind of understanding does not distinguish between those frames which explicitly ‘reference Europe’ and those which are (directly or indirectly) shaped by the product of European integration. I classify this distinction as European or Europeanised frames.

Thirdly, the concepts of *European* and *europeanised* frames draw out nuances in the distinction between direct and indirect europeanisation. As I explain in more detail below, European frames refer to the *direct agency of the European Union*, while europeanised frames refer to the *influence exercised indirectly through the context of europeanisation*. In broader europeanisation literature direct europeanisation most commonly refers to a mechanism of negotiation between a member state (actor or institution) and the European Union, while indirect europeanisation accounts for the adaptation of non-member states to European Union policy without formal negotiations with the EU (Sciarini, Fischer, & Nicolet, 2004: 354-5). My own idea of European and europeanised frames explores the ability of indirect europeanisation to occur *within* European member states. This idea develops further our

understanding of the limits of europeanisation, and contributes to the less well-developed literature on indirect europeanisation.

i) European Frames

European frames are centred directly on the agency of the European Union. They are frames which explicitly address the actors and institutions of the EU as the main protagonists in a particular issue. They evidence a direct process of europeanisation.

A 'European frame' should therefore meet the following criteria⁴⁴:

1) articulate a response to a European Union policy

In order to isolate the impact of the EU over other process such as globalisation, it is necessary that a European frame is formed in response to European Union legislation or EU policy guidelines.

2) problematise the issue as the responsibility of the European Union

The European Union must be identified as an actor who is able to influence the outcome desired by the movement.

3) require that action is taken at the EU level

The social movement must address their concerns to the European Union (either exclusively, or alongside other policy actors) and require that the EU act on them.

For example, if the environmental movement was to decide that car emissions were too high and causing pollution it may identify a range of ways to combat this: for car manufacturers to introduce cleaner technology, for the EU to make the European Union Emission Standards higher and for the general public to use public transport more often. If the movement was to take action against the EU in order to address

⁴⁴ I refer to the 'European Union' as a shorthand for its composite institutions and individual representatives. A European frame would equally apply to a social movement that specifically addressed its complaint to the European Commission for example.

this pollution then it would be evidencing a European frame. Actors at multiple levels of governance have the competency for making these changes – national governments for example have a role to play in facilitating public transport through their domestic transport policy but if they choose to problematise emissions as an ‘EU problem’ for which it must take responsibility then they are fulfilling the second criteria of a social movement frame. If they then go on to require that the EU act on this responsibility by changing its Emissions Standards then they will show evidence of the third dimension of a European frame. Were they to mobilise against national governments however – forcing them to compensate for low emissions standards with stricter domestic standards – then they would not be evidencing a European frame. Instead they would be saying that ‘the EU has caused this problem, but the national government must fix it’. In summary, in order for a European frame to be present then there must be *EU policy in debate, the EU must be identified as responsible for the issue, and demands for a solution must be targeted at the EU.*

To refer European frames back to the three tasks of social movement frames identified by Snow and Benford, a social movement is *europeanised by European frames to the extent that the problematisation of the issue, the proposal of action, the mobilisation and rationalisation are a direct result of the policies or activities of the EU.* The movement must respond to EU policy, it must problematise the issue as ‘European’ and it must require action at a European level. This kind of ‘direct’ europeanisation where there is a linear relationship between the social movement and the EU is not however the only route to europeanisation available, demonstrated below by the concept of *europeanised frames.*

ii) Europeanised Frames

Europeanised frames differ from those above because they *do not need to address the EU explicitly*, they may be constructed and diffused at a more local territorial level.

In this way, a europeanised frame may be identified by the following criteria:

1) articulate a response to European Union activity

As with our definition of European frames, in order to isolate the impact of the EU over other process such as globalisation, it is necessary that a europeanised frame is formed in response to European Union legislation, policy guidelines or similar activity.

2) problematise the issue as the responsibility of regional or national actors

National or regional government, or indeed multinational business interests, must be identified as the actor who is able to influence the outcome desired by the movement.

3) does not require that action is taken at the EU level

The movement will require action be taken by the actor they hold responsible, rather than go 'over their heads' to demand action from the EU.

4) is constructed domestically and then diffused or replicated in other European Union member states

The frame will be constructed within one nation state and then exported to another. A movement may also show evidence of europeanised frames if they import a frame from another member state. This process of diffusing these frames and building relationships across borders is necessary for the presence of passive europeanisation processes.

An example of this kind of europeanised frame, drawn from outside the green movement, would be protests against the proposed closure of the French Renault plant in Vilvoorde, Belgium. Belgian factory workers framed the problem as a case of French 'aid shopping' from the European Union and persuaded the Spanish government to withdraw its plans to subsidise an expanded Renault plant at

Vallodolid, Spain, because Renault were planning to use structural funds to fulfil their plans. The workers also managed to stage a number of protests at the site of the plant and mobilised the European Metal Workers Union to take action in Brussels.⁴⁵ In this case the involvement of the EU was tangential as the problem arose from their structural funds. Responsibility was said to lie nationally with the French Government and with Renault and action was demanded there, but the frame was europeanised because it was able to unite and mobilise a number of different actors around Europe.

This understanding of a europeanised frame may be best thought of as lateral, in that the framing is contextualised by the process of European integration but does not address it directly. By contrast a European frame indicates a more vertical relationship between social movement and the EU with the movement identifying the EU as the main protagonist in the issue. In the next chapter we examine these two dimensions of framing in the case study countries, asking what evidence there is for europeanisation. First, in order to better understand the way in which europeanisation can be manifested in either European or europeanised frames, it is necessary to set these frames in their national contexts and to present the national 'masterframes'.

⁴⁵ For an excellent account of these protests see Imig and Tarrow (2000: 73-76).

5.5 National Frames: Case Countries

To capture the impact of European or europeanised frames, we need first to outline the national frames with which these frames interact. In this section I outline the different ways in which the three case study countries frame ‘the environment’ – the national environment masterframe – and therefore how threats to the environment take on distinctly national characteristics. By including an examination of national environmental masterframes alongside European or europeanised frames I offer a point of difference from other works on the europeanisation of movements because I do not consider the way the EU itself is framed by a movement (della Porta & Caini, 2009; Rootes, 2002a). Rather, I am interested in how a particular issue (the environment) is framed by a movement in the context of European integration. This approach affords us insights into how the EU may affect movement frames even if the EU itself is not under question.

Indeed, the majority of social movement literature that addresses the *europeanisation* of frames addresses the idea of a movement being for or against Europe. della Porta observes that ‘Europeanization proceeds through the work of norms entrepreneurs that adopt and adapt European frames’ (2006a: 80). Similarly McCauley notes from his investigations ‘[i]t is also striking how each actor has developed an ideological ‘frame’ vis-à-vis the EU in their mobilization’(McCauley, 2011: 15). The work I present here does not consider the extent to which a movement is pro-European integration, but rather the extent to which it problematises issues as ‘European’.

In the same vein, the breadth of issues and understandings covered by ‘the environment’ is bewildering, but that breadth does not imply that there is therefore a common international understanding. Liberatore opines ‘environmental problems are not given per se but are socially constructed, and the way in which this construction process develops is influenced by the prevailing cultural, economic and political conditions in different social contexts’ (1995: 59 in Szarka, 2002: 4). In examining these prevailing conditions in the context of European integration I hope to shed light onto the way in which issues are framed by social movements within and across EU member states.

The notion of national interpretation may therefore be recognised as an important one: ‘[a] central theme in the discourse of local oppositions to large-scale public works regards the territorial scale of the conflict’ (della Porta, 2006b: 59) where the territory may be either local or national. In chapter six I will expand on the way in which issues are problematised at these different levels of governance, but in the following section I concentrate on the national masterframe. The advantage of a territorial understanding of frames, and of extracting general national frames, is that we are able to draw cross-national comparisons, which in turn affords insights into the cross-national diffusion of frames and the processes of europeanisation *across* borders. We turn now to examine the environmental frames across our three case study countries.

i) Frames in France

The national environmental frame in France is similar, but distinct, to that of Italy. Here, the alimentary patrimony of the country is also important, but the environment is predominantly framed in terms of *terroir* and farming. The idea of *terroir* is more than ‘terrain’ – it encompasses both a sense of the agricultural specificity of a place, but also the cultural identity that a *terroir* imbues. Barham confirms ‘terroir refers to an area or terrain, usually rather small, whose soil and microclimate impart distinctive qualities to food products... [while] figuratively, *terroir* can also designate a rural or provincial region that is considered to have a marked influence on its inhabitants’ (Barham, 2003: 131). This strong connection between ‘the rural’ and ‘the environment’ is a product of France’s socio-political history. Until the end of the Second World War France was a country characterised by its predominantly rural population and although ‘the major rural exodus thereafter profoundly altered French society...family connections with the countryside often remained strong, rural traditions have retained their place and agriculture is still accorded great political priority’ (Szarka, 2002: 10). The framing of the environment as part of France’s rural history is illustrated in this quote from Jacques Chirac, former Minister for Agriculture and French President:

At a time when concerns over the environment and quality of life are prioritised, who can deny the irreplaceable role played by agriculture in conserving our surroundings? The enhancement of the countryside, the protection of our landscapes, our flora and fauna, are likewise the result of the labour of our farmers who put ecology into practice on a daily basis, in perhaps too discrete a manner. The wine grower, the stock breeder, the forester, the market gardener do not only produce goods: they are the guardians of the values intimately bound up with a rural locality and constitute a civilisation, in the strong sense of the term’ (Alphandery et al. 1991: 13-14 in Szarka, 2002: 11).

We can observe here that not only is the framing of the environment as a question of rural patrimony, but that this is a highly politicised frame. It reflects a conscious shaping of the environmental frame by interested parties who use their valuation of the past to assert a new vision for the future of the countryside (Barham, 2003: 132). Therefore, in the same way that the Italian political system supports the privileged role for the region, so the French policy system favours agricultural issues. Hervieu et al. call agricultural policy the ‘most public of all policies. The protagonists, the decisions, the processes and the effects of agricultural policy are more explicit...than those of other areas of State intervention’ (1991: 6). The environmental masterframe then is one which although firmly rooted in France history has been consciously and knowingly reinterpreted into France’s policy-making structures. The anti-globalisation angle is a linked, but more recent extension of this environmental frame. It is possible then to reconcile these two ideas into one French masterframe: the environment as valuable territorial heritage – see Figure 5.1.

Fig 5.1: The Counter-Globalisation Frame in France

One of the most prominent frames in French public discourse is that of counter-globalisation. The frame has a particular resonance in France that has made social movement actors, policy-makers and economic interests alike frame their arguments in these terms.

The global justice or counter-globalisation frame has steadily risen in popularity over the course of the previous two decades so that it has now taken on the role of something of a master narrative for the ‘new’ social movement sector amongst others, binding diverse struggles over cultural, environmental and social identities’ (Hayes, 2006: 821). Although the rise of the counter-globalisation movement has been manifest in all Western democracies, the frame has taken on particular salience. That anti-globalisation politics are particularly strong in France should come as no surprise as, notes Birchfield (2005), France has always been sceptical of the virtues of unregulated capitalism, has a deeply rooted protest culture and a strong tradition of venerating their cultural and culinary heritage which is perceived as being emasculated by increasing globalisation. Waters explains ‘in a country with a vibrant culture of social protest, where an extensive and deeply cherished

public sphere exists, protest against economic globalisation has been particularly passionate and intense' (Waters, 2004: 855). At a time when the politics of the left has been declining, the rise of the counter-globalisation frame has breathed new life into political debate and has helped to invigorate French social movements. Indeed, for activists across the world, France is often held up as a reference point, a 'model to follow' in the organisation of anti-globalisation protest. Anti-GMO activists have been helped considerably by individual personalities like José Bové who has become a posterchild for the counter-globalisation movement and a household name. The enduring appeal of the counter-globalisation frame in France means that these debates have transferred across policy areas: for example in agriculture Heller notes '[t]he French debate about GMOs now has shifted to one about the commodification of life, the fate of the small farmer, and the global homogenization of culture by multinational capitalism' (2008: 27). This frame, above others, is the frame which has found the greatest salience in France across the greatest spectrum of policy areas.

ii) Frames in Italy

Central to Italy's understanding of the environment is its relatively recent history of statehood. With the *risorgimento* of 1861 came the amalgamation of numerous independent states in the Italian peninsula into the Kingdom of Italy and a loss of regional autonomy. Nonetheless, a strong sense of this regional identity has persevered, and 'the region' continues to be of symbolic importance today. The legacy of Italy's unification is a stronger sense of regional identity than in the other case study countries. A consequence of this privileged role for the region is that the environment too is understood in terms of its local cultural, political and historical significance. Anything which is perceived as a threat to the local environment therefore becomes imbued with these regional values.

Defence of the territory through defence of the environment has been observed across a number of studies of environmental projects in Italy. In their study of proposed eco-parks Carrus et al. noted 'the positive role of regional identity in

predicting support for specific parks. This effect emerges for that dimension of regional identity regarding people's pride for their own regional traditions, history, and culture' (2005: 251). Similarly, of campaigns to build a TAV line (*Treno Alta Velocità* – High Speed Train) in Val di Susa and a bridge on the Messina Straits della Porta and Piazza observe that 'those who contest large-scale public works frequently underline a communitarian defence of a territory that is suffering from external aggression' (2006b: 59). In this way environmental protection is framed in terms of territorial protection.

Italy's political arrangements have arguably supported this 'progressive extension of the territorial and symbolic dimension of mobilisation' (della Porta, 2006b: 13). Decentralisation is key here; Italy is the most highly decentralised of all of the case study countries with regions holding competence for a lot of environmental policy. Decentralisation is also highly prized, with any incremental moves towards centralisation resulting in the proliferation of regional political parties as an expression of resistance to this idea. Nanetti observes 'the decentralisation of the institutional structure has...stressed the differences and the specificity of each regional context' (Nanetti 1988: 9 in Woods, 1992: 58). In Italy therefore, the way in which the environment is framed in regional terms is supported by the underlying political structure which encourages the development of regional specificity.

So how does the link between the environment and the local territory manifest itself within a national frame? In short, the environment is framed as a source of regional pride – as a backdrop to the cultural, political and particularly the alimentary

patrimony of the area. To illustrate, when Greenpeace launched a campaign in 2007 against GM milk being used to make parmesan cheese they wrote '*Si tratta di una ricchezza sia agroalimentare che culturale che deve essere protetta*' – 'it is about its riches, both in terms of agriculture and culture that must be protected' (Greenpeace, 2007: 7) – see Figure 5.2. The idea that the local environment is intrinsic to local identity is supported by the research of Diani and Forno who found that between 1988-1997 over half of all nationally reported environmental protests in Italy were local in the level of mobilisation – higher than the statistics for either France or Britain (2007: 141). In Italy therefore, we conclude that the environment is framed in terms of regional patrimony, or heritage.

Fig 5.2 The Italian Agri-regional Frame in Action

The ideas of regional specificity, territorial identity and agriculture heritage are all exemplified in the battle to keep parmesan cheese GM-free. Interestingly, although environmentalists framed the suspected presence of GMOs in the cheese as 'contamination', their frame was countered by attempts on behalf of the local council to re-frame the issue as one of cultural patrimony.

Parmesan cheese is one of Italy's best-known exports, produced in the Northern city of Parma in Emilio-Romagna and the surrounding areas of Bologna and Modena. The symbolism of the cheese and the Italian heritage that it embodies transformed it into a symbol of GM resistance. In a report by Greenpeace Italy of June 2007 'il caso Parmigiano-Reggiano' it frames the issue in terms of food security: '*in virtù dei seri dubbi sulla sicurezza degli Ogm per il consumo umano e animale, invocando il principio di precauzione, gli Ogm non dovrebbero essere utilizzati per la produzione di alimenti o mangimi*' – 'because of serious doubts about the safety of GM food for human or animal consumption, invoking the precautionary principle, GM should not be used for the production of food or feed.' That GM milk was suspected of being used to make the cheese became synonymous with the language of contamination. A national campaign was launched to persuade the Council of Parmigiano-Reggiano (charged with overseeing the authenticity and labelling of the product) to forbid the use of GM milk in the cheese's production. The Council denied the existence of GMOs in the cheese and attempted to reframe the debate as a battle to safeguard the *nationality* (rather than *purity*) of parmesan cheese. At the time of Greenpeace's campaign the Council was locked into a legal battle with German producers who were flooding the market with non-specific hard grating cheese. The Council took the case to the European Courts of Justice, who eventually ruled in their favour that only cheese produced around the city of Parma

could be called Parmesan cheese. The Council used the context of the legal battle to diffuse the GM campaign and to garner support for its own. Furthermore, it was able to connect its own struggle to parmesan cheese with the national frame of regional specificity. The way the issue has been framed, and the counter-frame established by the Council of Parmigiano-Reggiano underscores the idea that territorial and alimentary history play a key role in the framing of debate.

iii) Frames in the UK

The UK framing of the environment is set apart from the other two case study countries by its rather more anthropocentric characteristics. Nonetheless, although environmental protest in Britain is now more comparable to that of its European neighbours, this ‘environmental consciousness’ has taken a different direction.

The first of these differences is that the concept of regional identity or *terroir* has not translated into the UK’s framing of the environment. The relationship between the citizen and the landscape is not interactive in this way, rather the environment is a self-contained environment which may be ‘visited’ but is not inherent in the cultural patrimony of the people. Doherty and Hayes explain:

‘the idea of *terroir* is most certainly weaker in Great Britain, where agriculture is regarded as more of an economic activity than one which is concerned with social integration and where there is a far weaker relationship between food and agriculture (processed foods are more widely consumed than in France) (2007: 189).⁴⁶

We can observe that the environment is not participatory as in France or Italy; rather it is a backdrop for pastoral leisure activities and the production of food is something to be secured rather than celebrated – see Figure 5.3.

⁴⁶ Original text : ‘la notion de *terroir* est assurément faible voire inexistante en Grande-Bretagne où l’agriculture est majoritairement perçue comme une activité économique plus que comme une activité qui génère de l’intégration sociale, et où les liens entre alimentation et agriculture sont davantage indirects (la nourriture préparée y est plus consommée qu’en France)’ – translation my own.

Fig 5.3: The Food Security Frame in the UK

One of the most interesting frames to emerge in the UK over the past ten years is that of food security. The UK has suffered a number of issues with viruses entering the food chain in cases of BSE and Foot Mouth Disease as well as a deep suspicion of GMOs. The UK public is, as a consequence, particularly sensitive to food risks and subsequently both scientific experts and activists are likely to frame their arguments in terms of food security.

The arrival of the food security frame may be traced to the mid 1990s and the anti-GMO campaign. Marris et al. observe that in 1996 tomato paste made from GM tomatoes was on sale (clearly labelled) in two major British supermarkets and was selling well. Although Greenpeace was acting to stop the GM soya that was being imported from the US, the public remained largely unaware. Any debate which was happening was confined to key interest groups such as food supermarkets, nature conservation agencies like English Nature or specialised NGOs (2001: 41). In 1998 two events turned the tide: a documentary was broadcast about the dangers of GM crops, and the first act of GM crop destruction occurred when activists attacked a field of sugarbeet in Norwich. By mid June many other crop sites had been reported as damaged. Momentum gathered behind the anti-GMO campaign as public figures such as Prince Charles became involved. GMOs were considered unsafe 'frankenfoods' and Marris et al. note how public responses to GMOs were shaped by underlying factors which blurred the boundaries between 'science' and 'politics', and also between 'risk' and 'ethics' (2001: 7). Concerns about food safety were compounded by the government's revelations in 1996 that it had covered up evidence linking BSE and CJD. The public outcry, at home and across Europe led to British beef exports being banned and, despite of incidences occurring in Germany, Belgium and Portugal, it was British food safety that was vilified in the European media, setting the UK against the rest of the continent in 'The Cattle of Britain' (The Sun. 22.05.96). The rolling issues of GMOs and BSE were joined in 2001 by an outbreak of Foot and Mouth disease that saw over seven million sheep and cattle culled across the UK causing an agrarian recession. The government's ability to deliver food to its citizens was being undermined in the national press and they were forced to establish the Food Standards Agency as a response to public concerns over food safety (Wales, Harvey, & Ward, 2006). Certainly, although agricultural issues were also evident on mainland Europe, the UK was by far the worst affected by the crises of foot and mouth and BSE. These concerns became closely intertwined with 'anxieties about food and the methods of food production, e.g. chemical additives, microbiological safety and BSE' (Shaw, 1999: 13.1).

The idea that the frame of the environment is deeply entwined with human cultivation of the natural world is supported by the kinds of environmental organisations that have taken root in the UK: from the Commons, Open Spaces and Footpaths Preservation Society in 1865 to the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB) in 1889 and the National Trust (NT) in 1895. These forefathers to the

current spectrum of environmental organisations had at their core the protection of land access (Rootes, 2003a: 21) rather than the farming trade unions that we have seen in the other case study countries.

‘Where in France the countryside is seen as a populated and cultivated resource, in Britain it is mainly regarded as unpopulated, like “a landscape without silhouettes” and a refuge for flora and fauna’ (Doherty & Hayes, 2007: 189).⁴⁷

The framing of the environment as a recreational resource, and the legacy of the early EMOs is also manifest in data on environmental protest in Britain. Although Britain has historically been characterised by its low levels of protest, Seel et al. unpick this idea further to illustrate that it has experienced low levels of *environmental* protest, rather than protest more generally, and that this low level of environmentalism has gradually reversed thanks in part to a growth of environmental consciousness during the 1980s (2000: 15-17). Elsewhere, Rootes identifies the four main sets of environmental issues that have prompted mobilisation: transport, animal welfare, nature conservation and pollution/industrial issues (2003a: 29-31). Of these four issues, the questions of transport and nature conservation in particular underscore the idea of human dominance of the landscape, rather than the reciprocal relationships between citizen and environment that we see in the other case study countries.

In summary, I have outlined three distinctly national environmental frames: the environment as regional identity in Italy, the environment as territorial and

⁴⁷ Original text : *Tandis qu’en France, la campagne est vue comme une ressource peuplée et cultivée elle est majoritairement considérée en Grande Bretagne comme ‘non-peuplée’ comme une ‘paysage sans silhouettes’ et un refuge pour la flore et la faune’* – translation my own.

agricultural heritage in France and the environment as a pastoral resource in the UK. In spite of these robust national frames, the relationship between the national environmental frames described here and the European or europeanised frames outlined above is a complementary one. National frames by no means avoid the possibility for a europeanised or European frame – the national frame does not need to be subordinated, only amended. In this way, europeanisation may be observed to the extent that europeanised or European frames play out against the backdrop of national frames.

5.6 Conclusion

To conclude, this chapter has illustrated the utility of frames in understanding the beliefs driving social movement behaviour. We have noted that frames are able to bridge ideologies by focussing on specific issues outside of a particular world-view. They are tools of social movement activity in that they help to make sense of the problem in hand, to identify a response, to mobilise and to justify the course of action taken. They are, however, also part of the repertoire of action itself because ‘they are not static ideas belonging to individuals so much as a product of collective action’ (Doherty, 2002: 89). Because of the pervasive role of frames in social movement activity, they are well-suited to observing changes in behaviour as a result of europeanisation. At the same time, the concept of europeanisation itself helps us identify and examine ‘soft mechanisms’ of europeanisation or the idea that Europe itself is a frame. For this reason, looking for europeanisation in the domain of social movement frames is a useful endeavour.

By distinguishing between European and europeanised frames in this thesis I offer a more nuanced understanding of europeanised frame beyond a catch-all term for the way in which social movements frame the European Union – i.e. does a social movement ‘like’ the EU. The distinction I draw disaggregates those movement frames which explicitly reference Europe and those movement frames which are shaped by the process of European integration itself. This permits me to unpack the concept of europeanisation into direct and indirect europeanisation – helping to draw out the europeanisation that takes place within and across member states. Equally, where we observe the diffusion of frames that do not intentionally address EU activity at an EU, or at a national level, but may be contextualised by it, then we are able to recognise a passive europeanisation process at work.

Finally, in this chapter I also observe three distinctly national conceptions of ‘the environment’ – from *terroir* in France, to regional heritage in Italy, to a recreational space in the UK. How might these national frames map onto the European territory? In the following chapter I examine each of the case studies to illustrate how national frames may be amended by European or europeanised frames to give evidence of europeanisation.

6 Frames: European and Europeanised

‘When and how movements add to or change the cultural stock are an important dimension for understanding social change in general. The cultural stock becomes the backdrop for social movement development and political choice in the next round of collective mobilisation and choice. Thus, a comparative focus on outcomes contributes to locating social movements in a historical process’

(Zald, 1996: 274).

6.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter we identified the four main properties of frames: to problematise the issue, to identify the target and strategy, to mobilise and to rationalise that action (Triandafyllidou & Fotiou, 1998). Other writers similarly refer to these as the ‘tools’ or ‘tasks’ of frames: to motivate actors, to devise a strategy to address the problem, and to attribute causality to the problem (R. D. Benford, 2000).

I synthesised these properties and tasks into two areas of framing:

- 1) Mobilisation Frames (What is concerning? Why is it important?)
- 2) Problematisation frames (Who is responsible? At which level of governance?)

I also presented the way in which these properties map onto the concepts of European and europeanised frames: frames that respond explicitly to the European Union, and frames that are informed by the context of European integration but that do not directly address the EU. I then examined how each of my case study countries frames the environment in a nationally distinctive way. The aim of this

chapter is to apply our understandings of national, European and europeanised frames to both anti-road and anti-GMO protest in France, Italy and the UK. I use these studies to answer the overarching question: what is the impact of europeanisation on social movement frames?

The chapter is divided into three sections: the first of these examines the case for European frames and the second for europeanised frames. In France I examine the anti-road protest against the construction of the A65 between Langon and Pau in the Aquitaine region of Southern France. Also in Aquitaine, I study the ongoing campaign against GM crops. In Italy, I evaluate the campaign against the *Corridoio Tirrenico* road running along the Tuscan coast and the anti-GMO campaign in that same region. Finally, in the UK I investigate the campaign against the re-routing of the A71 at Bilston outside Edinburgh, and the ongoing campaign against GMOs in Devon. In the subsequent section we then examine how frames are diffused cross-nationally and what implication this diffusion has for social movement europeanisation. I argue that despite some evidence for a cross-national diffusion of frames, the tenacity of national frames impedes the creation of a highly-developed 'europeanised' frame because, exemplified in the case of France, they are not sufficiently adaptable to the individual contexts of localised protest.

6.2 European Frames in Evidence

In the previous chapter I outlined the properties and tasks frames, synthesising them into two areas of investigation:

1) Mobilisation Frames (What is concerning? Why is it important?)

2) Problematisation frames (Who is responsible? At which level of governance?)

These areas of investigation in turn help to guide us in our definition of European and europeanised frames. We established that a European frame should meet the following criteria:

- articulate a response to a European Union activity
- problematise the issue as the responsibility of the European Union
- require that action is taken at the EU level

The mobilising frames used by a social movement group may allow it to problematise the issue as European. Or, the frames might be very national in nature and resistant to the influence of European frames. In the following sections we apply this framework to the individual protests, tracking any evidence of European frames.

i) France

The French Anti-Road Campaign

i) Mobilising Frames

In its official documentation and on its website ARLP created three main mobilisation frames. First it conceived of the road as economic folly – the project was going to cost too much money to build, the toll charge would not cover costs and would adversely affect those who lived close to the A65 who would have no other choice of road. At a press-conference on 29 June 2008, Julian Milanesi – the spokesperson for ARLP explained some of its economic concerns:

The most important factor is the surge in the price of oil, which makes this highway completely "useless". "The barrel is now at 143 dollars. The project was designed with a barrel at 30 dollars. Bitumen is a petroleum derivative. It increased by 30% in 2007, even more in 2008. Given the price of petrol, it is obvious that this highway, which will cost 18 euros for users between Langon and Pau, cannot be made profitable by the traffic (César, 2008).⁴⁸

The economic theme crops up again in ARLP's own briefing paper where it claims: *ce projet n'est pas financièrement acceptable et, par conséquent, ne correspond pas à la notion d'utilité publique* this project is not financially acceptable and consequently does not qualify as a 'public good'. Anger emerged over the proposal that local taxes would be used to pay for a road that could not ever be profitable, and would cost the residents money to use.

Secondly, the road was presented as ill-thought through. They ARLP and SEPANSO argued it could not be justified by the degree of traffic congestion it claimed to alleviate:

The weakness of traffic warrants, according to the Regional Directorate of Public Works, the allocation of public money to compensate for the road's lack of profitability. The road project Langon-Pau cannot be based on current traffic or on the effects of traffic congestion on the existing road network. Traffic is light and smooth on the road between Langon and Pau (ARLP & SEPANSO, 2008a: 12)⁴⁹.

Nor had the proposals undergone sufficient public consultation:

⁴⁸ Original text : 'l'élément le plus déterminant est la flambée du baril de pétrole, qui selon lui, rend cette autoroute totalement "inutile". □ Le baril est aujourd'hui à 143 dollars. Le projet a été pensé avec un baril à 30 dollars. Le bitume est un dérivé pétrolier. Il a augmenté de 30% en 2007, encore plus en 2008. Compte tenu du prix de l'essence, il est évident que cette autoroute, qui coûtera 18 euros aux usagers entre Langon et Pau, ne pourra être rentabilisée par le trafic' – translation my own

⁴⁹ Original text *Le projet d'autoroute Langon-Pau ne peut être fondé sur le trafic actuel ou sur des effets de congestion de trafic sur l'axe existant. Le trafic est faible et fluide sur la route entre Langon et Pau. La faiblesse de ce trafic justifiait, selon la Direction Régionale de l'Équipement, un apport d'argent public pour pallier à l'absence de rentabilité de l'équipement'* – translation my own

It is worth noting one major flaw in particular, namely the lack of public debate prior to public inquiry on 27 February 2006(ARLP & SEPANSO, 2008a: 10)⁵⁰.

In this way the frame was one of injustice – that a flawed proposal had been developed, and that it had been developed without sufficient consultation.

But the most dominant of the frames in their literature was the ecological protection frame.

This was made apparent in their official dossier of complaint, but was also the most obvious frame in their campaign materials and website. The work of the *planteurs volontaires* illustrates the idea that the road's threat to biodiversity was central in mobilising local residents. Figure 6.1 illustrates the kind of language used to articulate this frame.

⁵⁰ Original text : *Un vice de forme majeur est à noter, à savoir l'absence de débat public préalable à l'enquête publique en date du 27 février 2006* – translation my own



The poster reads:

A65: THEY MISLEAD US, WE PLANT!⁵¹

- >Rare species are disappearing 1000 times faster than they would 'naturally'
- >The planet is heating up
- >Does your local politician not understand?
- >Make a statement with a tree!

**SUNDAY 30 MARCH 15,00
COMMUNE D'ESCAUDES
BRING A SAPLING AND
SOME WATER**

Figure 6.1: *Les planteurs volontaires* poster

Above all else, the road was seen as a threat to Natura 2000 protected wildlife, to the Landes National Park, and to the local ecosystem in general. One activist expressed their wider concerns:

It was so amazing to see all the *planteurs volontaires* turn up to plant trees. People just came down for a bit and planted their tree and stood around and talked about what a shame it would be to lose this place. There's already less wildlife here than when we were young, and now they might be none at all. We all agree it would be tragic (Interview, 06.11.2008).

This concern about the local ecosystem is a different way of understanding the environment from that of the French national environmental frame – the idea of the environment as '*terroir*'. Nonetheless, this *terroir* frame too ran, to a lesser degree, through the campaign materials but became more apparent during the course of the

⁵¹ The *planteurs volontaires* use a play on words in their slogan – where taken literally it means 'they plant, we replant' but figuratively 'to plant' can also mean 'to mislead'.

interviews. In their joint dossier, ARLP and SEPANSO touched upon the idea of *terroir* through their concerns about the destruction of forest habitat. They wrote:

This road project will create a corridor that will lead inevitably to changes in the local climate. Farms and forestry will be carved up, which in turn will alter the landscape and make their work more difficult. The projections for how this development will work do not take into account the cost of decades of work on specific projects (irrigation, creation of water supply, drainage, etc.) (ARLP & SEPANSO, 2008b: 21)⁵²

Similarly, a poster for a day of action at the beauty spot ‘9 Fontaines’ near Bostens advertises a ‘discovering patrimony (heritage)’ forum (Fig. 6.2).



Figure 6.2: *L'Appel des 9 Fontaines* Poster

The importance of this spot as a part of local history was a theme that was mentioned in more than one interview. One activist said:

⁵² Original text : *Ce projet d'autoroute va créer un couloir qui provoquera inévitablement des changements climatiques locaux. Les exploitations agricoles et sylvicoles seront cloisonnées, ce qui modifiera le paysage et rendra le travail plus difficile. Les remembrements projetés ne rendront pas aux exploitants les espaces qu'ils ont aménagés parfois au prix du travail de plusieurs décennies en fonction de projets particuliers (irrigation, création de réserves d'eau, drainage, etc)* – translation my own.

It's only a place of about 500 inhabitants, Bostens, but there's a plot there that everyone knows called 9 Fontaines. It's the spring where women used to go to wash their clothes, and it's where I played as child. It's ecologically so rich, it's a Natura 2000 site too. The local people can't believe that the road might destroy something so important to us (Interview, 11.11.2008).

Frames were effectively employed to motivate people to take part, by empathising with the idea of a threat to a landscape to which they felt connected. This connection to the agricultural lifestyles of the past was echoed in ARLP's early briefing paper:

In the Landes area of the Gascogne...heritage is a reference point for our changing society. The identity of the Grand Landais is tied to the period of agro-forestry-grazing where farmers roamed the moors on their stilts and the men who harvested the resin from pines? What grandfather has not told his children and grandchildren of his memories of pignadar and the hard life he led in a smallholding of wood and mud? Which of our grandmothers does not remember the long walks to the mill to grind the grain that gave precious life to so many mouths? (ARLP, 2008)⁵³.

In summary then there were three main frames which were used to mobilise support for the campaign: economic folly, indignance at a poor proposal with poor consultation and finally the threat to the local ecosystem. Also present was a fourth frame which was an undercurrent to all of these – the national theme of *terroir*. These were the concerns that resonated with the activists and that were used to garner support. The possibility of EU involvement was linked to only one of these frames – the ecological frame, although the call for action at an EU level was clearly articulated and robustly developed.

⁵³ Original text : *Dans les Landes de Gascogne...le patrimoine est une référence pour toutes les couches de notre société en pleine mutation. L'identité de Grand-Landais fait fortement référence à la période de l'agro-sylvo-pastoralisme où les pasteurs parcouraient la lande sur leurs échasses et les résiniers sur leurs pitey gemmaient les pins a coup de hapchots. Quel grand-père n'a pas raconté à ses enfants et petits enfants ses souvenirs du pignadar et de la rude vie qu'il menait dans les métairies de bois et de torchis? Laquelle de nos grand-mères n'a pas souvenir des longues marches vers le moulin pour y faire moudre ce précieux grain qui faisait vivre tant de bouches?* – translation my own.

ii) Problematising Frames

The construction of the A65 was not officially at any point a ‘European Road’ – the impetus was national and the financing was not through a TEN-T programme but rather in public-private partnership. In spite of this, the idea of creating a regional transport corridor to reduce the journey time between France and Spain and to better connect the industry across the hubs in the South of France is one that sits well within the TEN philosophy (Aliénor, 2007). It was also a suspicion of ARLP that the construction of the A65 was a Trojan horse for the construction of further roads across the Pyrenees which would eventually connect Bordeaux to Valencia:

As the public inquiry continues the challenge is to prove that development of the A65 as a ‘public good’ is in fact masking the true goal of the road: its European future (ARLP, 2008: 65)⁵⁴.

As such, one might expect the anti-road campaign to legitimately address EU transport policy, although this angle did not materialise. Instead, as we noted above, ARLP framed the road as an ecological threat, and used this environmental frame to address EU environmental policy, as well as the obligations of environmental protection the EU sets out under the TEN framework. ARLP, SEPANSO and Amis de la Terre Landes lodged an official complaint with the European Commission on the grounds that the road would adversely impact the environment. They identified eight Natura 2000 sites which would either be touched by the road or impacted by its presence:

Finally, it is important to remember that the A65 is set to impact 8 Natura 2000 sites, all of them designated sites of public interestTherefore, the impact assessment of Natura 2000 could not justifiably conclude that

⁵⁴ Original text : *Telle que l'enquête publique est présentée, il existe une tentative pour prouver que la réalisation de l'A65 est d'utilité publique en masquant sa réelle finalité, c'est-à-dire son devenir européen* – translation my own.

no significant harm will be done, on the contrary, it must conclude that the impact of the A65 on Natura 2000 sites will be significant (2009: 6).⁵⁵

In connecting the road to EU environmental policy the groups showed clear evidence of problematising the issue as a European one, and clear evidence of European frames. Although the EU was identified as a body that could *help* with their campaign, the French national and local government was explicitly identified as ultimately responsible for the road. A failure to stop the project, argued the campaign, would be hypocritical:

While the preparatory work for the A65, which will connect Langon to Pau has begun, associations of environmental protection (ARLP, SEPANSO, L'Alliance pour la Planète, Les Amis de la Terre, France Nature Environnement, FNAUT, Fondation Nicolas Hulot pour la Nature et l'Homme, Greenpeace, Réseau Action Climat France, WWF, CGT-UIT and CFDT) question the government on the commitments made during the Grenelle Environment Forum. The fact that the proposal for the A65 is in advanced levels of development is used as the main argument against revaluation. However, it is not too late to reconsider this project that contradicts the official statements made during the Grenelle. Nicolas Sarkozy's speech was clear: "Clearly, a project whose environmental cost is too heavy will be refused. (...) It will be for un-ecological projects to prove it was not possible to do otherwise (Réseau Action Climat, 2008)"⁵⁶.

⁵⁵ Original text : *Enfin, il est faut rappeler que l'autoroute A65 devrait impacter 8 sites Natura 2000, qui sont tous des projets ou des sites d'intérêt communautaire.... Par conséquent, l'étude d'incidence Natura 2000 ne pouvait légalement conclure à l'absence d'impact significatif et aurait du, au contraire, conclure à l'impact significatif du projet A65 sur les sites Natura 2000* – translation my own

⁵⁶ Original text : *Alors que les travaux préparatoires de l'A65, qui doit relier Langon à Pau, ont commencé, les associations de protection de l'environnement (ARLP, SEPANSO, L'Alliance pour la Planète, Les Amis de la Terre, France Nature Environnement, FNAUT, Fondation Nicolas Hulot pour la Nature et l'Homme, Greenpeace, Réseau Action Climat France, WWF, CGT-UIT et CFDT Aquitaine) interrogent le gouvernement sur le respect des engagements pris pendant le Grenelle de l'Environnement. Le niveau d'avancée du projet d'A65 est aujourd'hui le principal argument utilisé à l'encontre de sa réévaluation. Il n'est pourtant pas trop tard pour revenir sur ce projet d'autoroute qui cumule les contradictions avec les déclarations officielles faites lors du Grenelle. Le discours de Nicolas Sarkozy était alors sans équivoque : « Très clairement, un projet dont le coût environnemental est trop lourd sera refusé. (...) Ce sera aux projets non écologiques de prouver qu'il n'était pas possible de faire autrement »* - translation my own.

ARLP was also responsible for some of the more creative acts of protest that were designed to shame local politicians and the Minister of the Environment for their role in the construction of the A65. In March 2007 ARLP held a wheelbarrow race in the town square of Mont de Marsan. In each wheelbarrow sat someone dressed up as one of the four local politicians who were responsible for facilitating the road. They raced the caricatures to find out who was the biggest *bétonneur* or ‘concrete layer’ of them all. Other activity targeted Jean-Louis Borloo the Minister for the Environment. A float was taken by the ARLP to the Climate Parade in Paris in April 2008. Someone dressed as the Minister rode on top of the float while ‘DJ Borloo’ played ‘tractomix A65’ a rap especially written for the occasion.

Overall, the most notable finding in the case of the anti-road protest in Aquitaine is the environmental frame that was used to mobilise support. The French national frame was present, and activists were clearly motivated by the threat the road posed to their local environment, but it was subsidiary to another environmental frame – that of ecological damage. By framing the road as a threat to endangered wildlife, ARLP and *les planteurs volontaires* were able to address their concerns directly to the European Commission. They connected to EU Environmental Policy and to the environmental obligations of the TEN-T. The road was problematised as hypocrisy by national and local government, which became the targets of protest; but the road was also connected to EU policy and to EU channels of influence through the frame of ecological threat. In this way, a partial European frame emerges through problematisation rather than mobilisation.

The French Anti-GMO Campaign

i) Mobilisation

The anti-GMO campaign in Aquitaine had one very dominant masterframe – that of food quality. The issue is framed in two slightly different ways, but each of them is a permutation of this one idea of *la qualité alimentaire* – food quality.

The first frame which encouraged mobilisation amongst activists and members of the public is intrinsically linked to the national frame of *terroir*. One campaigner said:

I grew up on a farm, and although I live in the city now the countryside never leaves you. You can't underestimate what the countryside means, and how important not polluting it is. There are people working hard out there to make good food and good wine – just like my family used to do. We must honour that, and GMOs are the opposite of the good work that they are trying to do (Interview, 04.11.2008).

The economic and cultural importance of Bordeaux's wine producing region, together with the strong maize-growing heritage of Aquitaine means that GM crops were framed as a threat specific to the region. By underlining how *invaluable* the agricultural traditions are, the anti-GMO campaign managed to incite a sense of urgency because the stakes for the region were so high.

Running parallel to the idea of GMOs as a *local* threat to food quality was the idea that GMOs were also a *global* threat to food quality. In a pamphlet from local chapters of Amis de la Terre and Attac the GM maize is shown as a ticking time bomb (see Fig. 6.3).




Figure 6.3: *Amis de la Terre/Attac* GMO flyer 17/04/08

In the interviews it emerged that these two issues were woven together in order to mobilise local residents: ‘we don’t want GMOs here, but we don’t want them anywhere else either. We can’t campaign everywhere though so we make our mark here, and we make it locally’ (Interview, 14.11.2008). GMOs were thought to be unpredictable – once they had been released in one place, or even country, there would be no guarantee that the rest of the world’s agriculture could be isolated from them.

A third frame was linked to the threat to the small farmer by multi-national corporations such as Monsanto. This frame also taps into broader concerns about global capitalism versus localised food production. One of the strategies employed by the anti-GMO activists from local chapters of EMOs, *Vigilance OGM* 33 and *faucheurs volontaires* to highlight the role of multinational biotech companies is to perform a ‘citizen inspection’ at their offices or at a field trial of crops. An activist said:

I was involved a few years ago when we all performed a citizen inspection on Monsanto. They were distributing GM maize to local farms and we wanted to draw attention to it. They're so big, and so powerful, and the government are in their pocket; but that still doesn't stop us from making our point known (Interview, 18.11.2009).

While another argued:

I have so many farmers among my friends and family and their situation is going downhill fast. Companies like Monsanto need to take their fair share of the blame for that. They'll get rich selling their dangerous technology to rich farmers, and they'll get rich selling dangerous foods cheaply – is it any wonder that we're worried?! (Interview, 18.11.2008)

The idea of protecting the farmer sits well within the national frame of *terroir*. It also permits the GM protests to connect to the large and influential community of farming interests in the region and the country as a whole.

In summary, there were three frames used by the anti-GMO campaign to mobilise support: as a threat to *terroir*, as a threat to securing GMOs globally and the threat of multinational biotech firms to local food production – all of them united by the overarching concern about food quality. The mobilisation activities that these frames inspired however were all locally-based and made no connection with the EU at all.

ii) Problematisation

The legislative role of both the French government and the EU was recognised by protesters. The nature of the issue is, however, highly localised and as a result the local and national levels of governance are a much clearer target of protest. Campaigners recognised the over-arching importance of EU policy, but for the localised networks of actors, local decision-makers were much more accessible targets. As such, GMOs tended to be framed as a 'French' problem rather than a European one. An activist commented:

The French government is so beholden to the biotech companies, but it needs to put its foot down. We need the government to keep telling the EU that it won't be forced to accept GM crops it doesn't want. And we want them to tell Monsanto to clear off. At a local level we need more green representatives who will be willing to stick up for us in Aquitaine (Interview, 18.11.2009).

During the French Presidential elections of 2007 the *faucheurs volontaires* and local chapter of *Attac Landes* inserted GMOs into the political debate by handing out flyers around Bordeaux – see Figure 6.4:



The flyer reads:

All of the candidates
apart from
Sarkozy oppose GMOs

I think I'm too small, I
want to be genetically
modified"

Figure 6.4: *Attac Landes/Faucheurs/Vigilance OGM 33* French Presidential elections flyer

According to those interviewed, they did not use similar tactics during, for example, European Parliamentary elections. This illustrates that although the legislative

ability of the EU over GMOs was recognised, the activists called for action at a national level rather than directly at the European level.

In summary, the issue was problematised as a multi-level concern although the national government was held most accountable. The mobilisation frames did not facilitate attributing blame to a European level of governance because there were in part, specific to the region. This points to only partial evidence for a European frame in the problematisation of the issue.

ii) Italy

The Italian Anti-Road Campaign

i) Mobilisation

In Tuscany, the anti-road campaigners linked the construction of the road to important local resources: as a potential threat to local organic farms (the produce of which was of national importance) and to local sites of historical interest. Here, the national frame of the environment representing regional identity is very much in evidence. In its briefing paper on the road the *Comitato Aurelia Sicura Subito* writes:

The territory covered by the project includes the two important archaeological sites of Tarquinia and Vulci, many other protected landscapes, historical and archaeological sites (remains of Etruscan settlements, Roman villas and farms and castles and medieval religious complexes), the natural thermal spa (and archaeological) area of the OAS. It also interferes with 9 parks and protected areas (the coastal tract also touches the Maremma Regional Park) and 12 sites of Community

Interest or Areas of Special Protection (Comitato Aurelia Sicura Subito, 2006)⁵⁷.

An activist confirms:

There are so many different reasons to dispute the road, but they all come down to one thing: respect for the place we live in (Interview, 21.10.2008).

The second of the mobilisation frames is close to the French idea *terroir*. The campaign connected the road to the agricultural patrimony of the area, in particular the wine-making areas for which Tuscany is famous. In their leaflet '*No all'Autostrada*' *Legambiente* frames the road as a threat to alimentary identity – something which is valuable both culturally but also economically:

The road would cut through the vineyards of Morellino Scansano (DOC red) of Bianco di Pitigliano (DOC), but also of Ansonica Costa dell'Argentario (DOC white) of Tarquinia (white and red DOC). This is a territory that over the past decades has shown itself to be one of the fastest expanding areas for quality wine production, growth of vineyards, entrepreneurial ability in the wine industry, helping local traditions to blossom but also showing itself to be at the forefront of innovation with thousands of acres of crops and rapidly expanding. It is tradition that grows alongside the rapid growth in wine tourism, but the Wine Routes like the Strada del Vino colli di Maremma will effectively be cut in two by the road. This is a place that tells its story through its culture, the human history of the Etruscans and perhaps earlier, until the modern age, where the contemporary draws inspiration from authentic ancient traditions and practices. Where nature shows off its best side: its colours, its climate, its scents and the hills are reflected in the sea. Where the woods are wild but know that countryside and man can live side by side. This is the countryside, its agriculture, so important to the area's

⁵⁷ Original text: *Il territorio interessato dall'intervento comprende le due importanti aree archeologiche di Tarquinia e Vulci, numerosi altri luoghi tutelati da vincoli paesistici, storici e archeologici (resti di insediamenti etruschi anche di tipo urbano, di ville e fattorie romane e di castelli e complessi religiosi medievali), l'area termale (e archeologica) dell'Osa, e interferisce con 9 parchi ed aree protette (il tracciato costiero coinvolge anche il Parco Regionale della Maremma) e 12 siti di interesse comunitario o zone di protezione speciale* – translation my own

economy. To mention agriculture in these places is to remember the good things in life – like cheese, oil and above all others – wine (Legambiente)⁵⁸.

Both of these frames draw on an affiliation with the ecological, historical and cultural resources of the region, although they were not utilised in the campaign's protest activities. The strategy was drawn from a very traditional action repertoire: a number of marches have been organised at various points along the proposed road, as well as public meetings and petitions. Fig. 6.5 shows a flyer for a protest bike ride organised by the *Comitato Stop Autostrada Tirrenca*, typical of the action repertoire of the campaign.

⁵⁸ Original text: *L'autostrada taglierebbe le terre dei vigneti del Morellino di Scansano (rosso DOC), del bianco di Pitigliano (DOC) ma anche dell'Ansonica Costa dell'Argentario (bianco DOC), del Tarquinia (bianco e rosso DOC). Un territorio che negli ultimi decenni ha evidenziato una delle più notevole crescite in Italia per qualità, espansione dei vigneti, capacità imprenditoriale in campo enologico, riportando alla fioritura delle tradizioni locali, ma anche a proposte innovative che l'hanno poste all'avanguardia, con migliaia di ettari oggi in espansione. Una tradizione che cresce con turismo enogastronomici in rapido aumento, con strade del Vino segnalate che verrebbero di fatto tagliate in due dall'Autostrada, come la 'Strada del Vino colli di Maremma'. Questo è un posto che racconta attraverso la sua cultura, la storia dell'uomo degli etruschi e forse anche prima, fino ai nostri tempi, ove il moderno ha preso spunto dalle tradizioni antiche e dagli usi più genuini. Dove la natura esprime il meglio di sé con i suoi colori, il suo clima, i suoi profumi e le colline quasi si specchiano nel mare. Dove i boschi sanno di selatico mentre la campagna si allea con l'uomo. Ecco la campagna, l'agricoltura, un caposaldo dell'economia della zona. Dire agricoltura in questi posti e ricordarsi delle cose buone come formaggi, olio ma soprattutto vino è un tutt'uno* – translation my own.



Figure 6.5

Flyer for *Comitato Stop Autostrada*'s

bike ride to stop the motorway 17/11/08

The poster reads:

BIKE RIDE TO STOP THE
MOTORWAY...

...SATURDAY 7 NOVEMBER
'09, 10.00

TO ASK FOR

>Maximum citizen involvement
– open public consultations

>The completion of the tract
Grosseto – Civitavecchia,
section '0' at Livorno and the
sliproad at Piombino

>Improve and make secure the
existing Aurelia

>Develop rail and sea travel

AGAINST the damage from
transforming the Aurelia into a
motorway:

>The tollbooth – not only to pay
for the
construction but to make S.A.T.
rich off
the backs of the citizens

>More traffic, more cement

>More noise and air pollution

ii) Problematisation

The *Corridoio Tirrenico* was framed by local government as part of a European project although this argument was challenged by the protesters. In this sense the

campaign explicitly addressed the fact that the road was not a European policy. In their leaflet '*Parte l'Autostrada Tirrenica*' the Regional Government says:

'In the link between Europe and the South of Italy there's a hole. And we want to fill it. With lots of green' (Regione Toscana, 2009a)⁵⁹.

With the implication being that the road will form part of a TEN-T, the campaign against the road refute this. In their dossier it writes:

At the meeting in Alberese on 11 October 2001 for 'il corridoio tirrenico: the Tuscan proposal' which was sponsored by the Tuscan Regional government, it was stated that there is no longer any 'European motivation' for the project – neither in the statement, nor in the technical reports. But even though this has been so firmly emphasised it would be useful, for all of the citizens, once and for all, to say quite clearly that this project had no formal or material basis in the European Union. Indeed, the construction of the road - over coast or hills - is rather at odds with European guidelines' (Emilliani, Lenzi, Matteoli, Podestà, & Zanchini, 2004: 10)⁶⁰.

Because the campaign saw the road as an Italian project without a European connection, the target of protest was very much the local government rather than the EU. There was no requirement for action at a European level, and the campaign did not address itself directly to the EU.

⁵⁹ Original text: *Nei collegamenti tra l'Europa e il sud Italia c'è un buco nero. Che vogliamo colmare. Con tanto verde* – translation my own.

⁶⁰ Original text: *Anche se nell'incontro di Alberese dell' 11 ottobre 2001 "il corridoio tirrenico: la proposta della Toscana" promosso dalla Regione Toscana la motivazione europea non compare più, né nelle dichiarazioni di giunta, né nelle relazioni tecniche, questa motivazione è stata a lunco drasticamente affermata e insistita dinanzi ai cittadini che sembra utile, una volta per tutte, dire con tutta chiarezza che essa non aveva sin dalla sua origine alcun fondamento né dal punto di vista formale, né nel punto di vista sostanziale, anzi, da questo ultimo pointo di vita, la soluzione autostradale – di costa o collinare – appare piuttosto in contrasto con gli orientamenti europei* – translation my own.

In summary there were two frames used to help mobilise the campaign against the road. The first was the threat to historical and natural landmarks of great regional and national importance. The second was to highlight the threat to the agro-alimentary areas of the region. Both of these frames connect with the national masterframe of the environment as regional heritage. The problematisation of the road echoed this local theme and *regional* government was the targets of their protests – they actively eschewed any role for the EU in the development of the road project. As such, the case of the *Corridoio Tirrenico* shows no evidence of European frames.

The Italian Anti-GMO Campaign

i) Mobilisation

The dominant mobilisation frame in the anti-GMO campaign was similar to that used by the anti-road campaign – the threat to the regional organic farming industry and the cultural value of the goods that it produced. Again, the national frame of the environment being closely linked to regional identity is very much in evidence.

As one might expect, given the anti-GMO stance of the Regional government, the frames of the government are similar to those of the campaigners. At a recent press conference the Tuscan Councillor for Agriculture stated:

Tuscany cannot be in any way a place where GMOs are produced or researched. It cannot be allowed. If rumour spread that there was even the slightest possibility that Tuscany could be contaminated by GMOs there would be an incalculable loss of competitiveness on the part of our agri-

alimentary sector, which is focussed entirely to quality (Regione Toscana, 2011)⁶¹.

The grassroots face of the movement is all but squeezed out of the anti-GMO agenda in Tuscany, but member of local chapters of environmental organisations are in agreement. There is something exceptional about the threat of GMOs to Tuscany because of the agricultural importance of the region. The poster in Fig. 6.6 illustrates the relationship between what is a typically Italian dish, and the threat of GMOs to that heritage.



Figure 6.6: Greenpeace Italy 'Risotto OGM' poster

ii) Problematisation

The issue was problematised by the anti-GMO campaign as a multi-level one that needed to be addressed at a regional, national and European level. The weight which was afforded to each of these levels depended on the nature of the anti-GMO group involved. The larger NGOs and EMOs benefitted from a place on the EEB or from

⁶¹ Original text: *La Toscana non può in alcun modo essere una terra dove si produce o dove si fa ricerca in materia di Ogm. Non ce lo possiamo permettere. Se si spargesse la voce che in Toscana ci potesse essere anche il minimo rischio di contaminazione da Ogm ci sarebbe un'incalcolabile perdita di competitività da parte del nostro settore agroalimentare, tutto vocato alla qualità.*- translation my own

Brussels-based European Offices. These organisations also worked in tandem with political parties such as *i Verdi* and with the Regional Government; all of whom attributed a role for the EU in addressing the GMO situation in Tuscany and who evidenced a European frame.

And since the government seems to be going in the opposite direction, we will make ourselves the head of a new movement against GMOs...We won't keep this to ourselves, we'll be taking it to Brussels too (Regione Toscana, 2011)⁶².

But the smaller groups and the ad hoc coalitions of farmers addressed their campaigns to a more local level of governance.

We go into schools and talk to the children about the produce, and why we want to grow organically, they'll go home and tell their parents – it's all about just keeping it at the back of their minds. Those are the people that the Tuscan Regional government represent' (Interview, 22.20.2008)

In conclusion the anti-GMO campaign was characterised by a wide variety of environmental actors, many of whom were highly institutionalised and who worked with the Tuscan Regional Government. The Regional Government itself framed the issue of GM crops as a threat to the region's agri-alimentary traditions, so there was considerable frame alignment between the actors involved. The issue was problematised differently, however, amongst the actors with the least institutionalised members concentrating on holding the regional government accountable for the implementation of policy, and EMO actors recognising a role for action in Brussels. Their activities point to a partial European frame in the problematising of the issue, although this is not represented across the spectrum of movement actors.

⁶² Original text: *E poiché il Governo sembra andare in direzione opposta noi ci metteremo alla testa di un nuovo movimento anti Ogm.. "Non ce la terremo per noi ma la notificheremo a Bruxelles* – translation my own

iii) The UK

The UK Anti-Road Campaign

i) Mobilisation

There were a number of frames present in the campaign against the A701, some of them were privileged more than others according to the nature of the groups involved. For example, the actors who represented an interest in sustainable transport framed the road both as a project that would worsen the social and environmental effects of car travel whilst wasting Council resources:

[the proposal] would massively expand road capacity in the Edinburgh to Penicuik corridor, encourage long-distance car commuting along the corridor, and place potential for modal shift towards public transport at a further disadvantage. We consider that the proposals would be a grave misuse of Midlothian Council funds (Transform Scotland, 1999).

The No Alignment Action Group (NAAG) also shared this dual transport/economic frame. It was aligned with the sustainable transport interest groups (for example its website was hosted by Spokes, a cycling advocacy group) and they articulated the following arguments on their website – see Figure 6.7⁶³:

⁶³ The full text accompanying each of these bullet points has been abbreviated in order to insert it into this thesis. The complete version of these arguments is available on the Spokes website at: <http://www.spokes.org.uk/oldsite/naagback.htm>

NAAG - No Alignment Action Group
***Midlothian Council wants to waste £20 million on a new dual
carriageway.***
Haven't they got anything better to do?!

The "A701 realignment" would:-

- triple the road capacity on this part of the Edinburgh to Penicuik corridor
 - generate car traffic along the road corridor.
 - damage or destroy sites of local, regional and national wildlife importance
 - shift the balance between public and private transport yet further in favour of private car use.
 - be a Trojan Horse for out-of-town greenfield developments to sprawl across Midlothian.
 - land Midlothian council taxpayers with huge bills.
 - mean all Midlothian taxpayers will contribute to the road, whether they use it-or not.
- The A701 realignment, in short is a disaster waiting to happen.

Fig. 6.7: NAAG Website

The frame used by the protest camp at Bilston Glen was different: it emphasised the ecological threat to the woodland and its ecosystem, and the threat of creating a car culture through facilitating multinational development (see Figure 6.8). They make reference to ‘a beautiful wildlife corridor, special site of scientific interest...the development in Midlothian, the hundreds of new houses, expansion of biotech and retail parks which are promoting a culture dependant on car use, creating an infrastructure which is reliant on a new road’ (Bilston Glen Anti-Bypass Site, 2011).




Fig. 6.8: Bilston Glen Protest Site Flyer

The relationship between NAAG and the protest site was a cooperative one, and so by combining these assorted, but overlapping frames, the campaign as a whole was able to connect to a broader spectrum of concerns. The national UK frame of the environment as a recreational resource is evident in both NAAG and the protest site's frames – by tapping into the ideas of 'a beautiful wildlife corridor' and 'future

greenfield development' the area is being framed as a beautiful landscape of intrinsic worth for its recreational value.

i) Problematisation

Because there was no European Union involvement in the development of the proposal to realign the A701, the opportunity for protesters to connect to a European frame meant that they would have to appeal to the EU tangentially through other policy areas such as transport or environmental policies. There is no evidence however that the issue was problematised at this level. The mobilisation tactics of the protest groups point to a local and national frames: occupying the site, of the bypass, or writing to local Councillors and committees at the Scottish Executive. An activist explained:

'We couldn't believe that the Scottish Executive approved the plans without a public enquiry – we have marched down to Holyrood to let them know that they can't do that – too many people have a vested interest in what happens there' (Interview, 03.03.2009).

And another says 'some of us from the site delivered petitions to Midlothian Council, they need to know that the people don't want this road. They're the ones who want this, not the people' (Interview, 20.06.2008). Responsibility was clearly allocated to the local and national levels of government to stop the realignment, and the idea of action at an EU was not appropriate.

Overall, the most notable finding in the case of the A701 is that the road was framed in overlapping, but distinct ways by the two main protest groups involved: first as financial irresponsibility by the Council and a threat of further unsustainable

development in the area and secondly as a site of ecological value and the continued expansion of multinational companies and out of town retail parks. The target of these protests was very clearly localised and there was no visible attempt to connect these issues to broader policy debates at the level of the EU. A European frame was not in evidence to any degree.

The UK Anti-GMO Campaign

i) Mobilisation

The mobilisation frames used in the Devon campaign against GM crops were three-fold: as a question of food security, a threat to the ecosystem and as the proliferation of multinationals at the expense of localised food production. Figure 6.9 from the website of the Totnes Genetic Group illustrates these ideas:




Figure 6.9: TOGG Website: 'Who We Are'

Because the main activist group TOGG grew from a mobilisation to protect a specific local organic farm, it is unsurprising that the protection of small-scale organic farming was the frame which resonated best with activists and the general public in the beginning. As one of its members explains however 'it started with the

farms and ended with the supermarkets' and the issue of food security became more important:

We started with the marches down the high street and then some protesters tore up the crops the following week. I'd never been involved in any kind of environmental issue before, but I couldn't believe that an organic farm wouldn't be allowed to stay that way. It was disgusting. The within about six weeks of our campaign it spread around the country and everyone was talking about 'frankenfoods'. There were a number of people in TOGG that helped to campaign around the country, going to supermarkets or other trial sites and the like (Interview, 27.02.2009).

This frame resonates with the way in which the issue was being framed nationally (Shaw, 1999) and also with the national frame of the environment. The UK's framing of the environment as a resource for the population to enjoy, rather than the French and Italian ideas about identity and agri-alimentary heritage, means that in the relationship between farm and fork, the fork is more important. This awareness-raising campaign has continued with a weekly stall outside the market in Totnes town centre as well as writing letters of protest to supermarkets reminding them to source their stock from GM-free producers.

ii) Problematisation

Although the group recognised the role of the EU in legislating on GM crops, and distributed information which included some of this information, it problematised GM crops at a local and national level. While letters and petitions were sent to DEFRA, The National Farmer's Association and to Downing Street, the issue was considered to be a local one. Members from TOGG addressed questions to Devon County Council during its Executive Committee meetings (Devon County Council,

2003) in the run-up to Devon declaring itself a GM-free zone and put pressure on local supermarkets. Their consideration of the role of the EU, however, was not an integral part of their activities:

I was aware of the work that José Bové was doing in France and at a European level, he was magnificent. I didn't have anything to do with that sort of thing myself though, not many did. We were more concerned with what we could do here .

To the extent that TOGG and local EMO chapters recognised the role of European Union legislation they problematised the issue as European, but this was to a very limited degree.

In summary, in the case of anti-GM protest in Devon three frames were used to mobilise support: as a question of food security, a threat to the ecosystem and as the proliferation of multinationals at the expense of localised food production. What started as a campaign to protect a specific farm developed into a broader frame of public safety and food security. This resonated well with the national frame, and was problematised at a national level. There was no real evidence of a European frame at all except for a small degree of European problematisation.

My investigation of European frames has highlighted two interesting properties of social movement frames. The first is the endurance of the national frame. In all but the cases of GM crops in Italy and road-building in France where the issues were problematised as multi-level, I note the dominance of problematising issues at a national or regional level. The second theme that emerges is the role of mobilising frames shaping this problematisation. By adopting an environmental frame the

French road protesters were able to problematise the issue in some measure as European. Conversely, by deliberately mobilising on issues of regional specificity rather than, for example, transport policy, the Italian anti-road campaign deliberately problematised the issue as a regional one and focussed their mobilisation strategy on the Regional Government. The extent to which these campaigns show evidence of europeanised frames as well as, or instead of European frames is addressed in the next section.

6.3 Europeanised Frames in Evidence

According to the framework that I developed in chapter three, I established that a frame is europeanised to the extent that it meets the following criteria:

- articulate a response to European Union activity
- problematise the issue as the responsibility of regional or national actors
- does not require that action is taken at the EU level
- is constructed domestically and then diffused or replicated in other European Union member states

The europeanised frame looks different from a European frame in three main ways. First of all it problematises the issue as the responsibility of national or regional government. It may recognise that the EU could play a role in developing the situation, but the issue is not framed as a 'European' one. Therefore, the second point of difference is that a europeanised frame does not require that action is taken at the EU level. Finally, a europeanised frame is constructed domestically and then exported to other member states. This is unlike a European frame which, by virtue of

relating directly to that which is already diffused through member states, need not be exported further.

l) France

The French Anti-Road Campaign

i) Mobilisation and Problematisation

In the previous section I noted the mobilisation frames used by the anti-road campaign: economic folly, ill-thought through and, the most dominant frame – ecological destruction. It was through this ecological frame that ARLP, SEPANSO and Amis de la Terre Landes were able to address their concerns directly to the European Commission and EU environmental policy. In recognising the role that EU legislation could play in the construction of the road, and demanding action at an EU level, the anti-road campaign problematised the issue, in some degree, as European.

Overall, however, the anti-road campaign was problematised at multiple levels of governance, not just the European level. I noted in the previous section that its action repertoire appealed to regional and national government through letter-writing, flyer-dropping and a number of innovative events such as racing caricatures of local politicians in *tracto-brouette* (tractor-wheelbarrows) around the town square of Mont-de-Marsan. These local mobilisations were the most prolific, and the problematisation locally and nationally was the most dominant frame. Therefore, we can conclude that although the campaign exhibited some evidence of European

mobilisation and problematisation frames, the dominance of national-level activity lays the preconditions for *europeanised* frames.

ii) Frame Diffusion

The second key determinant of europeanised frames is the exportation of frames that were constructed nationally to other EU member states. This was a strategy pursued by the anti-road movement, who were keen to reach out to other road campaigns across Europe. An activist remembers:

We were on Spanish TV as well as in the local and national press. People came from Spain and Switzerland I think to see what we were doing and to encourage us with their own experiences. We talked about why we were doing what we were doing and I think we had a lot to learn from one another. Some of them are going to look at their environmental impact assessments again like we did (Interview 4/11/2009).

Because the French protesters were reaching out to campaigns similarly guided by EU legislation, and because they were able to export their ecological frame and their experiences about how instrumental it had been, they therefore showed clear evidence of europeanised frame diffusion.

In summary, the way in which the road campaign chose an ecological mobilisation frame for the road permitted them to problematise the issue at regional, national *and* European levels. Despite this limited evidence of European frames, the issue was mainly problematised at a national level and therefore suggests europeanised frames. The exportation of those frames to other campaigns in Europe further confirms the europeanised frames that the French road campaign adopted.

The French Anti-GMO Campaign

i) Mobilisation and Problematisation

In the previous section we illustrated the three mobilisation frames used in the anti-GMO campaign in Aquitaine: concern for local food quality, global food quality, and the localisation of food production. Although these frames fitted well with the national *terroir* frame of France, the fact that they focussed on the distinctiveness of the Aquitaine region made it difficult for them to problematise the issue at a European level. Their activities were locally based, from the crop destruction of the *faucheurs volontaires* to the petitions and supermarket flyer-drops of the local chapters of Friends of the Earth and other NGOs. In holding the national and regional governments accountable for GMOs on their territories and not demanding action at a European level the campaign shows evidence of europeanised rather than European frames.

ii) Frame Diffusion

Interestingly in the case of France, the most famous export of the GMO campaign was the action repertoire. The distinctively French *faucheurs volontaires* became household names across Europe in the late 1990s and soon the idea of targeting GM trial sites and destroying them in a theatrical fashion had caught on to other anti-GMO campaigns in other countries. Although the anti-GMO campaign in Aquitaine also adopted and reinforced this action repertoire it cannot be said that this was unique to the region.

In terms of the frames that the campaign adopted or exported, there is evidence of a europeanisation of frames. There is evidence that the idea of regional agri-alimentary specificity – or *terroir* – is a frame that has successfully been used in other European countries. The campaign was composed of a variety of different actors, many of whom were members of either international networks such as GMO-Free Europe, or were affiliated to international NGOs such as Greenpeace. The most grassroots actor *Vigilance Aquitaine* 33 was connected to the *Maison de la Nature et de l'Environnement* which made them part of a regional network or environmental associations. Through the involvement of these more institutionalised actors in the campaign the idea of GMOs as a threat to regional agricultural goods and heritage became as mutually constructed and europeanised frame. One of the activists observed:

I think José Bové's work in Aquitaine has really made our work here world famous. Other people around Europe and the world look at what we've done and how we got so much attention. Those higher up get invited to do press interviews and we tell the world what we know (Interview, 22.11.2009).

We return to the idea of this frame in our discussion of the Italian case.

In conclusion, the anti-GMO campaign in Aquitaine did recognise the role of the EU in generating the GMO policy which was to be implemented by the French government, but the problematisation of the issue was distinctly national and evidenced europeanised frames rather than European frames. These europeanised frames were reinforced by the mobilisation frame of *terroir* which was successfully replicated in other French regions and member states. There is therefore evidence of europeanised frames.

ii) Italy

The Italian Anti-Road Campaign

i) Mobilisation and Problematisation

We saw in our earlier discussion of the campaign against the *Corridoio Tirrenico* that the protesters very consciously problematised the issue as a national issue and did not require action at an EU level in order to address it. In this regard, the movement was precluded from having a European problematisation frame. In terms of the mobilisation frames, the road was positioned as a threat to both the dominant national frame of regional identity (through the destruction of important sites of archaeological and cultural interest) but also as a threat to the important wine and olive-growing resources of the area. This made the idea that Tuscany was exceptional their dominant frame and the extent to which they showed europeanised frames is dependent on the extent to which this frame was imported or exported to other European member states.

ii) Frame Diffusion

In this case the breadth of actors involved in campaigning against the road – from political parties to NGOs and coalitions of local residents suggests that there would be improved opportunity for the campaign to engage with other similar campaigns across Europe. What sets the Italian example apart from the French and UK road protests is the very limited involvement that it had with the wider social movement community. One protester said:

‘I suppose there are these sorts of campaigns happening all the time. But this is really a long and complicated issue for us in Italy and it would be hard for

others to get involved. We just need Tuscany to see sense, that's all' (Interview, 21.10.2008).

In the case of the *Corridoio Tirrenico* there is no evidence of europeanised frames because although there was no requirement for Europe to act, the grassroots groups involved were not sufficiently receptive to the way in which other European anti-road campaigns were being framed to evidence europeanised frames themselves.

To conclude, the campaign against the *Corridoio Tirrenico* actively isolated the road from European policy and problematised it as a purely national issue. In spite of the breadth of actors, and the opportunities that this afforded them to connect to other campaigns the mobilisation frames they adopted were also highly localised and insular. There was consequently no evidence of europeanised frames.

The Italian Anti-GMO Campaign

i) Mobilisation and Problematisation

The dominance of the Tuscan Regional Government in dictating the anti-GMO agenda in Tuscany left little room for the involvement of social movement groups. The actors tended to be those local chapters of larger national or international NGOs who were sufficiently institutionalised to work in tandem with the regional government on their continued awareness-raising campaign. The grassroots face of the movement represented almost exclusively by local farmers problematised the issue as a local one and concentrated its pressure on the regional government to develop favourable agricultural policies. The NGO chapters, however, were more disposed towards problematising the issue as multi-level and demanded policy-

change at the EU level. This all goes to provide some precipitous conditions for europeanised frames.

ii) Frame Diffusion

One of the most interesting characteristics of the Tuscan mobilisation frame (GMOs as threat to the agri-alimentary traditions of the region) is that it has so much in common with the French frame of *terroir*. It is quite distinct, however, from that of the UK anti-GMO movement, so it suggests that there was some cross-fertilisation of frames between France and Italy and, in particular, evidence of europeanised frames in the Italian anti-GMO campaign.

In summary, the anti-GMO campaign had a strong European frame on the part of the Tuscan regional government and those more formal environmental groups that worked with it, but the less institutionalised actors problematised the issue as a multi-level one. The clearest evidence of europeanised frames is the diffusion of the mobilisation frame: notions of *terroir*. In the case of GMOs, there is evidence of both European and Europeanised frames manifested in differently along the spectrum of actors.

UK

The UK Anti-Road Campaign

i) Mobilisation and Problematisation

The campaign against the realignment of the A701 involved a variety of different mobilisation frames, but all of them problematised at a national and regional level.

For NAAG the road was framed as worsening the social and environmental effects of car travel whilst wasting Council resources and for the protest site at Bilston Glen the road threatened the ecology of the area while facilitating the development of multinationals. By demanding action from Midlothian Council and the Scottish Executive the protest excluded the possibility of displaying European frames.

ii) Frame Diffusion

What marks the anti-road protest at Bilston apart from the other cases in this thesis is the mobility of the actors on the protest site. A protester explains:

People have come and gone over the years, but they come and go from all over. Some of us have got experience on other protest sites and that's how we learned how to build the houses and walkways and what to do. Some of us have been doing this for years.... We get people from other countries too who just come for a few weeks or months. They tell us about what's going on back home with them – it's a cool place to be (Interview, 03.03.2009).

This diversity of experience and background is expressed in the frames that the protest camp used – appealing to ideas of ecological destruction and multinational business are more universally accessible and attractive frames than emphasising what is so different about a particular place. Although this in itself does not evidence a europeanisation of frames, it does suggest cross-fertilisation of ideas amongst activist communities; especially the more mobile communities of protest camps.

Overall, the spectrum of mobilisation frames used in the campaign represented the diversity of actors involved. All of these frames problematised the road as a matter of national or regional interest and adopted appropriate action strategies accordingly. The preconditions of europeanised rather than European frames are in evidence here.

The diffusion of these mobilisation frames is similarly more inclined towards europeanised frames, although unlike in other case studies here this was manifest in the most grassroots level of the campaign.

The UK Anti-GMO Campaign

i) Problematisation and Mobilisation

Earlier in this chapter I noted that there were three mobilisation frames used by the anti-GMO campaign in Devon, with the weight shifting between them over time: as a question of food security, a threat to the ecosystem and as the proliferation of multinationals at the expense of localised food production. However; all of these frames were problematised primarily as national and local issues.

ii) Frame Diffusion

The original mobilisation frame for the Devon campaign – the protection of small organic farms – quickly aligned itself with the emerging national frame of food security. They took part in national days of action – for example in 2004 on a national day of action against Sainsbury's a collection of farmers parked three tractors outside the store in Barnstaple and demanded that they cease using GM feed in their milk production. In this way the campaign's frame showed itself to be relatively porous. Although the frames showed evidence of diffusing within the UK, they did not evidence diffusion to other EU member states, and so cannot be classed as europeanised frames.

In sum, in the UK example the campaign against GM crops shows no evidence of European frames because they problematised the issue as a national one. But nor do

they show convincing evidence of europeanised frames because the frames they used in order to mobilise support were not exported or imported or mutually negotiated with other campaigns in EU member states.

6.4 Conclusion

In conclusion, the examination of frames in my case study areas and case study countries has highlighted some interesting findings about the variables which account for how europeanised a movement's frames will be – and in what that europeanisation will look like.

The first of these is that despite identifying three distinct national frames there are no clear cross-national differences in evidence. The road campaign in France shows evidence of both European and europeanised frames, and can therefore be said to be highly europeanised. The same is not true of the anti-GMO campaign in the same region. So the country in which the protest occurs cannot be said to be wholly responsible for the degree to which a campaign's frames are europeanised – clearly there are other important variables at work within the case study countries.

The most significant of these variables, and an important finding, is the importance of the relationship of 'goodness of fit' between the protest frames and the national masterframes. Where they fit well together there is an increased likelihood of a europeanisation of frames. We see that where europeanisation of frames occurred (e.g. the French road protest) the protest frame did not sit well within the national

frame. The road was framed primarily as an ecological threat, while the national masterframe of *terroir* would have privileged the threat to farmsteads and the agricultural traditions of the countryside). Where the opposite is true, and the protest frame nested within the national masterframe (in the case of Italian roads threatening regional heritage for example) then the national frame becomes reinforced. This would make it more difficult for the protest to accept incoming europeanised frames, and indeed the French road campaign was open to sharing its experience of using the ecological frame with other European road protests, while the Italian example was firmly national in scope.

Furthermore, these case studies underscore the dominance of national frames. Even in those areas where EU policy could be directly, or indirectly applied – such as legislation on environmental protection and where there were similar campaigns happening in three different EU member states simultaneously the grassroots level of protest remained firmly embedded in the national environmental frames. This finding supports the work of other scholars who have noted that ‘in many cases domestic politics and the domestic polity serve as forces of inertia and explain the resilient or “sticky” responses to europeanisation’ (S. Bulmer, 2007: 48). Work on parties (Bomberg, 2002) and policies (Jordan & Liefferink, 2007) has underscored the tenacity of national styles of ‘doing things’. The findings in this chapter therefore hint at similarity in the patterns of europeanisation found between social movements and other political actors.

Finally, in this chapter we should note the evidence of a commonly constructed and diffused frame for GM crops in France and Italy: the idea of a threat to regional

terroir or agri-alimentary specificity. The membership of their campaigns looked rather different, with the French protesters being drawn from a more evenly spread spectrum of environmental interest groups rather than the largely institutionalised EMO actors in Italy, but they shared membership of some pan-national organisations and attracted good international media attention. This observation is significant because our analysis of POS showed that overlapping membership of grassroots and more professionalised or institutionalised groups within the same campaign did not result in political alliances. Grassroots groups were reluctant to reach ‘up’ to more institutionalised or professionalised groups. The overlapping membership between grassroots and professionalised groups in France and Italy does, however, appear to have resulted in the diffusion of frames. It seems that networking between social movement groups is more central to the europeanisation of frames than to the europeanisation of political opportunity structures. These findings are teased out further in the following chapter.

7 Comparisons and Conclusions

‘A qui profite l’Europe? La question, dans sa formulation abrupt, sous-tend les arguments du débat politique sur l’intégration européenne, tant pour ses promoteurs que pour ses opposants’

(Balme & Chabanet, 2002: 21)

‘Who benefits from Europe? This blunt question underpins the political debate on European integration, as much for its proponents as for its detractors’

7.1 Introduction

This thesis has sought to explain what europeanisation means for the mobilisation strategies and practices of the grassroots green movement in Europe. I have identified three types of europeanisation process: *direct europeanisation* (where an actor connects directly to the EU), *indirect europeanisation* (where an actor connects to a europeanised member state) and *passive europeanisation* (where actors europeanise unintentionally outside of state mechanisms). All three of these processes have been observed across two domains of social movement activity: political opportunity structures (POS) and frames. The empirical evidence supports my central argument *that europeanisation exists in places where the literature does not currently expect or look to find it*. It may be found in the opportunities available through member states or the EU itself, but equally there is evidence that europeanisation occurs in the process of networking across social movement groups. In short, *europeanisation need not always be mediated by the state*.

It is evident in these case studies that a lack of physical protest in Brussels or the absence of petitions to the European Commission does not mean that europeanisation is not taking place within and across states. On the contrary, this thesis demonstrates incidences of europeanisation at both a European and domestic level. It should be noted however that variation in the degree of europeanisation across the case studies is striking. I have demonstrated that campaigns against roads are constrained by different political opportunity structures and different frames to campaigns against GMOs. In the same way, member states have distinctly different national political opportunity structures and frames to one another. The conditions for social movement activity and the extent to which they show evidence of europeanisation are both determined by the intersection of these variables.

The degree of europeanisation identified by this thesis should not be overstated – in some cases it is not in evidence at all, and in other cases there are only partial indications of europeanisation. The incidence of European or europeanised political opportunity structures and frames, across each of the case studies and within each of the areas of analysis are shown in Figures 7.1 and 7.2 below.

DIMENSIONS OF POS:	EUROPEAN POS			EUROPEANISED POS		
	STRENGTH	OPENNESS	ALLIES	STRENGTH	OPENNESS	ALLIES
<i>FRENCH ROADS</i>	X	X	-	X	-	X
<i>FRENCH GMOS</i>	X	-	-	X	X	-
<i>ITALIAN ROADS</i>	-	-	-	X	X	-
<i>ITALIAN GMOS</i>	X	-	-	X	X	-
<i>UK ROADS</i>	-	-	-	-	-	X
<i>UK GMOS</i>	X	-	-	-	-	-

Figure 7.1: European and Europeanised Political Opportunity Structures

DIMENSIONS OF FRAMES:	EUROPEAN FRAMES		EUROPEANISED FRAMES	
	MOBILISATION	PROBLEMATISATION	MOBILISATION / PROBLEMATISATION	DIFFUSION
<i>FRENCH ROADS</i>	-	X	X	X
<i>FRENCH GMOS</i>	-	X	X	X
<i>ITALIAN ROADS</i>	-	-	-	-
<i>ITALIAN GMOS</i>	-	X	X	X
<i>UK ROADS</i>	-	-	X	X
<i>UK GMOS</i>	-	-	-	-

Figure 7.2: European and Europeanised Frames

These tables offer a broad overview of the incidences of europeanisation within the movement groups but they should be read carefully. Where there is any evidence of europeanisation at all it has been recorded with an 'x' – so the table does not reflect the limited degree of evidence in some of the case studies. Furthermore, it does not indicate differential evidence of europeanisation within different actors in the same movement – for example between the Bilston Glen protest camp and the No Alignment Action Group (NAAG). These tables therefore provide only a snapshot of the evidence for europeanisation

Nonetheless, these findings do signpost something important – that europeanisation does not rely on the ability of a social movement to connect to the state in order to become europeanised. They also highlight some of the variables that determine the extent of europeanisation including member state, protest issue, political opportunity structures, frames and the kinds of local social movement actors involved. This chapter provides an overview of the comparative conclusions from the thesis, analysing our findings across policy areas, then across countries, across domains and finally examining our findings across the different kinds of actors involved.

7.2 Comparison by Domain

I have identified two intervening variables or 'domains' that determine the shape of europeanisation experienced by social movement actors at a local level: political opportunity structures and frames. Within each of these domains I have illustrated that a movement may connect to that domain *directly at the level of the European*

Union, or indirectly at a domestic level, or the process of europeanisation may occur passively and unintentionally outside of institutional channels.

Distinguishing between these two domains allows us to compare the importance of structural factors (POS) with more fluid ones (frames) in the process of europeanisation. This comparison in turn raises some important questions: is europeanisation channelled more obviously through political structures such as configurations of allies than through the creation and diffusion of shared beliefs? To what extent does a social movement need to be institutionalised to have access to the opportunities in either of these domains? The focus on passive europeanisation in addition to direct and indirect europeanisation means that I am able to move beyond the focus on those social movements who have the resources to mobilise in Brussels and therefore experience europeanisation (Fairbrass & Jordan, 2001; Imig & Tarrow, 2000, 2001).

There are two main observations that are distilled from a comparison of domains of protest. The first of these is that *there is greater europeanisation of political opportunity structures than frames*. Scholarship that privileges europeanisation as a process that transmits more easily through concrete structures such as policies and politics, than through the more fluid dissemination of norms and beliefs between citizens is reinforced (Börzel, 1999, 2003; Knill & Lehmkuhl, 1999; Ladrech, 2001; Vink & Graziano, 2007a). In short, the degree of movement europeanisation is explained more by the political opportunity structures in which they act than by the

frames they construct and diffuse. Figures. 7.1 and 7.2 illustrates how the degree of europeanisation between these domains breaks down, and here we can observe a point of similarity between the two domains – in both cases *there is greater evidence for connecting to europeanised rather than European domains*. This observation points to the resilience of social movements' mobilisation against policy implementation rather than policy formulation, and to the enduring preference for a domestic arena of action.

A second observation is that *frames may be used to orientate movements towards particular europeanised opportunity structures*. This means that social movement actors are able strategically to select their protest strategies in ways that will facilitate or close down opportunities for direct and indirect europeanisation. In short, they are able to use frames to select the most advantageous POS for their campaign. By framing an issue as a very local concern, rooted in local heritage then the activists are able to channel the campaign into addressing local or national POS. This may be helpful because policy in that area is decentralised or devolved or because local political elites are favourable to their concerns. Equally, an issue may be framed as a European policy problem in order to situate the campaign within European political opportunity structures. This may be advantageous because it circumvents unfavourable national or local opportunity structures or because it offers access to more powerful allies for example.

Direct and indirect europeanisation

The case of anti-road protest in Aquitaine illustrated the strategic value of frames. We saw how movement actors intentionally created a frame that would exploit *European* political opportunity structures. Although the construction of the A65 was originally contested by ARLP and SEPANSO as a question of transport policy, the fact that it was a national rather than a European road project meant that they were constrained by national political opportunity structures to challenge transport decision-makers. However, by framing the road as an environmental issue they were able to problematise the issue at multiple layers of governance. They thus ‘created’ a European level of POS and exploited it by submitting a complaint directly to the European Commission. This was advantageous to them because local elected officials were favourable to the road, because they felt disenfranchised from the decision-making process and because it offered the opportunity to raise the profile of the campaign. Frames were therefore used to access the most strategically useful political opportunity structures.

In the discussion of direct and indirect europeanisation a second important observation is that across all of the case studies there is more evidence of movement actors connecting to europeanised rather than European domains. Where there *is* evidence of European POS or frames it is few and far between. The lack of European frames or POS can be explained by two factors. In the first part we can see the importance of the local nature of the protest – groups who mobilise in Brussels require expertise or resources that their less institutionalised colleagues do

not have. Although it is not the sole deciding factor, the degree of professionalisation and institutionalisation is therefore still an important factor in determining the arena of action. The degree of europeanisation is also, in turn, determined by the level of European legislation against which a movement is mobilising (see section 7.3). If the implementation of the offending legislation is determined at a local level, then this is more likely to be the locus of the protest. This finding supports those who have argued that ‘however much policy and regulation is made at the EU level, it is at the national and local level that policy is implemented and it is the implementation of policy rather than its formulation that leads to most protest’ (Rootes, 2003b: 251). In short, domestic mobilisation – and the indirect europeanisation that accompanies it – remains dominant.

But access to resources and expertise to address EU political opportunity structures, or to engineer a European frame, does not explain all of our findings. ARLP had access to SEPANSO’s European Officer who helped them to mount a challenge at the European Commission. Why did other case study campaigns not seek out similar expertise? We have already noted that it may not have been considered strategically beneficial to address European POS, but a third point to note is that the EU may not be considered a *legitimate* arena of action. Two of the grassroots groups involved in anti-road campaigns purposefully distanced themselves from the EU but for different reasons. In the case of the *Corridoio Tirrenico* the local grassroots groups acted strategically to keep the road and their campaign as far as possible from ‘European questions’. They sought to delegitimise the road, which was being framed as part of a European network by the Regional government, by asserting that it was a distinctly

local project. They therefore chose not to mobilise at a European level nor to seek the assistance of those who might help them to do so. The Bilston Glen protest camp also eschewed the EU in its campaign, but in this instance it was because it questioned the legitimacy of the European Union itself and the social and political system that it represented. It chose not to act at a European level, not because it would legitimise the road but because it would legitimise the EU. In comparing direct and indirect europeanisation processes we are able to explain the dominance of europeanised POS and frames in the context of how strategically useful or legitimate any intent to connect to the EU may be.

Passive europeanisation

The comparison of domains has also drawn attention to the third ‘passive’ process of europeanisation. The case studies capture an interesting contrast between the degree of passive europeanisation in frames (higher) and political opportunity structures (lower). This is because in the process of constructing a network through which passive europeanisation processes can take place, europeanised political opportunity structures require elite allies, while europeanised frames may be diffused between other grassroots groups. It is harder for grassroots groups to connect to elite allies who may not consider them sufficiently legitimate, experienced or resourced. As we have also noted, elite allies with access to European influence were equally not considered legitimate partners by some of the case study groups. For this reason, although there is the opportunity for passive europeanisation across both domains of europeanisation it is more likely to occur within and between grassroots actors

themselves rather than through networks of grassroots and elite allies facilitated by europeanised political opportunity structures.

As we saw in the case of the UK anti-road protest a rejection of consciously connecting to the EU, whether at an EU or national level, did not preclude the passive europeanisation of the campaign. The Bilston Glen protest camp evidenced the process of passive europeanisation through the national and pan-European networks that it created which it used to recruit other European activists to the camp and to help construct a protest frame that addressed both the road but also issues of wider ecological and social concern that lie within the gift of EU policy-making. In France, ARLP did not actively reject the opportunity to connect to the European Union, but it still evidenced passive europeanisation through the network it created of actors in similar campaigns across Europe.

7.3 Comparison by Protest Issue

The second variable that has proven significant in determining the degree of movement europeanisation is the issue around which the actors are campaigning. This is important because it determines the political opportunity structures within which the movement operates, but it is also strategically useful because a movement can frame an issue in such a way that manipulates the opportunities available. In short, the protest issue dictates the mobilisation strategy of a movement.

In the case studies considered here I examined two protest areas: road-building and genetically modified organisms (GMOs). In France we examined anti-GMO protest in Aquitaine, as well as the campaign against the construction of the A65 motorway between Bordeaux and Pau. In Italy we investigated anti-GMO protest in Tuscany, and mobilisation against the proposed *Corridoio Tirrenico* road running along the Tuscan coastline. Finally, in the UK we examined anti-GMO protest in Devon and the campaign against the proposed bypass at Bilston Glen in Scotland. These two areas of protest were selected because although they are both subject to European Union legislation (which allows us to better isolate the process of europeanisation rather than other processes such as globalisation) they offer some important contrasts. The first distinction concerns the degree of European regulation – genetically modified crops are subject to much more binding and comprehensive regulation than road-building projects. Making this distinction between the protest areas affords insights into the relationship between europeanisation of legislation and europeanisation of protest. In other words, does social movement protest become more europeanised when addressing more europeanised policies? Our case studies show that yes, the policy issue is important – but in different ways. Where the EU holds clear competence for a policy area (such as GMOs) European political opportunities and frames are more likely. Where the EU policy is interpreted and implemented with national discretion (such as road-building) then europeanised political opportunity structures and frames are more likely.

The second distinction is in the way in which these two policy areas manifest themselves on the ground. While road-building proposals are concentrated on a

specific project and a physical site around which protest can mobilise, GMO campaigns are more likely to revolve around awareness-raising. Road-protest issues are more likely to be seen as a local issue, while GMO issues may be more generalised and express concern about food security or globalisation for example. These two issues require very different action repertoires, which will be delineated by different frames. Are social movements more europeanised when they frame an issue in more general terms than localised ones? The case studies tell us that both the frame, and the kinds of actors involved are dictated by the protest issue and *both* of these variables affect the degree of europeanisation within a movement.

The overall conclusion we may draw from the comparison of protest issues is that *although the protest issue does not directly dictate the degree of europeanisation it facilitates particular political opportunity structures or frames that do*. We can observe variation across all three kinds of europeanisation processes: direct, indirect and passive according to the protest issue against which the groups were mobilising. In particular we note that European POS (evidence of direct europeanisation) was stronger in the case of anti-road protest, europeanised POS (evidence of indirect europeanisation) was stronger in the case of anti-GMO protest, and the conditions for passive europeanisation are more evident amongst anti-GMO protesters than their neighbours campaigning against roads. We examine each of these findings in more detail below.

Direct and indirect europeanisation

Across our case studies we observed that there was a difference between the protest area and the movement's ability to connect to European or europeanised political opportunity structures. If we revisit figures 6.1 and 6.2 the first point to note is that there is a greater likelihood of anti-GMO protest showing evidence of connecting to European frames than do anti-road protests. GMO cases thus showed more evidence of direct europeanisation.

This finding may be explained by two factors: the degree of regional governmental autonomy over the policy area, and the kind of actors involved in the campaign. GMOs are much more tightly bound by European legislation than road-building policy. The GMO campaigns in our case studies all recognised the enhanced role of the EU in legislating at even a local level. The social movement literature would suggest that recognising the role of EU legislation in GMO policy would lead these actors to connect to European political opportunity structures, to require that action is taken at the level of the EU and to problematise the issue as the responsibility of the EU.

This relationship should not be overstated however. The case studies' connection to European political opportunity structures in the area of GMO protest was marginal. UK groups recognised the role of the EU although chose not to address it, French groups at a local level relied on more institutionalised partners at a national or European level and in Italy the proximity of anti-GMO groups to the Tuscan

Regional Government European networks did not translate into a europeanisation ‘by proxy’. Furthermore, there is minimal evidence of European frames evidencing direct europeanisation in either protest area. In sum, even in those protest areas where there is a high degree of EU legislation, direct europeanisation is not a foregone conclusion.

A second observation that can be made is the greater evidence of connecting to europeanised POS and frames in anti-road campaigns than in anti-GMO campaigns. The process of europeanisation has been mediated through the nation state in these cases and anti-road groups are more likely to address their campaign to this national level, thereby evidencing indirect europeanisation. The strategy of these anti-GMO campaigns shows that in protest issues that target specific projects the europeanisation of social movements is brought about by mobilisation at a national level rather than at a European one.

Passive europeanisation

The presence of passive europeanisation also appears to vary according to the protest issue because the kinds of local social movement groups active in these areas represent different manifestations of the social movement spectrum. Different kinds of social movement actor will have different abilities to construct medium to long-term networks of allies across Europe. The greater the depth and breadth of the network of actors created, the stronger the opportunity for passive europeanisation to occur.

Anti-road campaigns tend to be a one-off event, precipitated by a decision to build a specific road in a particular place. We noted in the case studies that the membership of the anti-road campaign is largely localised to the site of the road; campaigners may invoke ‘NIMBYism’ and focus on preventing the construction of the road. In all of the case studies the campaigns linked their arguments to wider discourses about climate change, environmental degradation, capitalism – but once the road has been built or overturned they did not continue to campaign on these issues. An exception is the Bilston Glen protest camp where activists continue to occupy the site although the road proposal has been suspended. The members continue to participate in other local campaigns such as Occupy Edinburgh or the Camp for Climate Action.

Because of the ‘flashpoint’ nature of anti-road protest the actors involved are often new to protest, they lack material resources and experience. These are the actors who, although they may understand the role of EU legislation and EU opportunities in their campaign, will lack the ability to connect to them directly. The limited experience and resources of these actors may present an obstacle for connecting to European or europeanised political opportunity structures or frames and experiencing direct or indirect europeanisation. However, the brief duration of the campaign makes it more difficult for them to experience passive europeanisation. Network building takes time. It is in the process of constructing networks of allies on a national and pan-European scale that passive europeanisation occurs. When protest issues revolve around specific short-term events such as a road, social movement groups are unlikely to have enough time to develop this network.

Conversely, anti-GMO campaigns tend to be much longer-term. Although the arrival of a particular group might be precipitated by a specific GM trial site (the case of TOGG in Devon for example), once the immediate threat of the site is over the groups studied continued their campaign in an awareness-raising capacity over a period of years. The activities of the movement have become more routine and require the kind of permanent presence that it is easier for local chapters of EMOs to provide than transient ad-hoc coalitions of actors. This means that the kind of actors involved in anti-GMO protest are likely to be better-networked, more experienced and more professionalised (although not professional) and therefore more able to connect to the opportunities and issues at a European level. This networking was evident in Tuscany where the domination of the Tuscan Regional Government meant that local EMO chapters were more involved than grassroots groups in the campaign. These tenacious networks were also evident in France where the overlapping membership between the *faucheurs volontaires*, *Vigilance OGM 33*, *Amis de la Terre* and other groups meant that there was a well established network of actors. In this way, in the case of anti-GMO protest the networks of groups suggest that social movements are more able to experience passive europeanisation when they are campaigning on a long-term issue.

7.4 Comparison by Country

The third variable that has proven significant in determining what europeanisation means for grassroots and local movement groups is the country in which the campaign takes place. Figures 7.1 and 7.2 illustrate that there is a very clear

difference in the overall tally for europeanisation across the different case study countries. The UK shows the least evidence of either European or europeanised POS and frames, followed by Italy with France showing the greatest evidence of europeanisation. How might we explain that, and does this headline capture the full spectrum of europeanisation processes at work? All of the case studies investigated in this thesis underscore the importance of national context: the distinctive political opportunity structures in each country together with the dominance of national frames. But what do very different national contexts mean for the prospects of social movement europeanisation?

The comparison of case studies by country draws out two important themes. The first is that the better the fit between the protest frame and the masterframe, the less likely there is to be any kind of europeanisation – direct, indirect or passive. This is because europeanised frames are an alternative to dominant national frames, they problematise the issue in a way that the national frame does not, and so europeanisation is borne out of this friction. The second point of interest is that the more entrenched the national protest tradition, the more likely passive europeanisation becomes. This is because it increases the availability of ready-made networks through which passive europeanisation can diffuse. Both of these findings are explored in more detail below.

Direct and indirect europeanisation

The most striking finding in the area of direct europeanisation is evident when we examine the frames used by the movements studied. Here we discover an important relationship between the national frame and the protest frame. *The more comfortably the protest frames sit within the national master frames, the less likely europeanisation is to occur.* This is best illustrated by the case of the A65 in France when the protest frame did not sit well within the national frame. The road was framed primarily as an ecological threat by ARLP and SEPANSO, while the national masterframe of *terroir* would have privileged the threat to farmsteads and the agricultural traditions of the countryside. The ability of their campaign to problematise the road as a European issue meant that they could legitimately address their concern to the European Commission and in so doing showed evidence of direct europeanisation. Interestingly, the opposite was true in the case of the *corridoio tirrenico*, and the protest frame of regional heritage nested well within the national masterframe of the environment as an expression of regional distinctiveness. Indeed, the campaign actively rejected any suggestion that the road was a European project. As a result there is little evidence of either direct or indirect europeanisation – instead we would expect the national frame to become reinforced and more entrenched. We can conclude therefore that direct europeanisation processes are more likely to occur in countries where the protest frame is from the national masterframe. This finding echoes the idea of ‘goodness of fit’ but forward by Green Cowles et al. (2001). According to this conceptualisation of europeanisation adaptational pressure is applied by the EU to the rules and policies of national institutions in order to get them to align or ‘fit’ with the European way of doing

things. The degree of this pressure determines the degree of europeanisation. Echoing this idea a kind of ‘inverse goodness of fit’ principle applies to the relationship between the protest frame and the national master frame. Europeanisation of frames may only occur where there is a poor fit between the frames used by the protesters and the national frame.

Passive europeanisation

The incidence of passive europeanisation also varied by country, but was strongest in France and the UK where both GMO and anti-road protesters developed a pan-European network. There are two reasons for this that set these cases apart from the Italian protest: the established history of national protesters in those two areas, and the ability of the movement to frame the issue as a general rather than regional concern.

The history of anti-road protest in the UK afforded the campaigners, particularly those in the Bilston protest camp, with a well-established network of allies immediately that the campaign began. The involvement of Transform Scotland (part of Campaign for Better Transport, formerly Roadblock UK) was particularly advantageous. The mobility, particularly international mobility, of some of the activists at the Bilston Glen site meant that activists with experience on the road protest sites of the 1990s in the UK were also able to lend their skills to the campaign in Scotland. Similarly, the anti-GMO group TOGG played a pivotal role in the development of the UK’s anti-GMO movement which afforded it the opportunity to

gather allies across the country. In France, although there was not such a strong history of anti-road protest as in the UK, those activists involved in the campaign against the A65 did actively seek to reach out to other similar European campaigns in the hope of sharing ideas and experiences. In the case of anti-GMO protests, for which France has gained international notoriety, the movement groups involved were also able to draw on a pre-existing network of sympathetic allies with whom to work. These relationships were national, but also to some degree international, as the *faucheurs volontaires*' action repertoire gained notoriety and was exported to other protests across Europe. Notably, in Italy where there was not the same established history of either anti-GMO or anti-road protest, the relationships built by the various groups on each campaign were weak or non-existent. It is this history of protests, and the ready access to networks of allies that made it easier for these local groups to gain experience, share ideas and to communicate their work with other groups.

Secondly, the decision of the UK and French anti-road protesters to frame their campaigns in terms that resonated not just locally, but also nationally and internationally facilitated passive europeanisation. They used 'climate change' or 'capitalism' to connect to a wider audience whilst also diffusing their environmental frame to other anti-road campaigns in Europe. This gave their frames an appeal or 'universality' beyond their national borders. The UK example shows that even when there is little evidence of direct or indirect europeanisation taking place, passive europeanisation may still be occurring within those two domains. The ability to disconnect from the national masterframe therefore facilitated passive europeanisation. Where national frames are more entrenched it is harder for social movement actors diffuse their frames across borders and thereby participate in the

process of europeanisation. Strict cross-national differences in frames are an obstacle to social movement actors being able to evidence europeanised frames. For grassroots social movements the results of this study indicate that in order to become europeanised the issue must be framed in a way that transcends national borders – either by problematising the issue as European, or by appealing to universal rather than national frames.

7.5 Comparison by Actor

A final observation should be made about the degree of institutionalisation with the local social movement spectrum, and what this means for the process of europeanisation. One particular finding that has been distilled from the investigation presented here is that grassroots' alliances with local chapters of europeanised EMOs does not result automatically in europeanisation 'rubbing off' on the group (or what I have called 'europeanisation by proxy'). In those policy areas which are most tightly bound by European legislation, and which encourage the participation of long-term, experienced social movement actors, one is more likely to find evidence of those actors connecting to *European* political opportunities and frames. Where the inverse is true and an environmental decision is less well defined by European legislation and the actors involved are more likely to be mobilising on a one-off basis, they are more likely to connect to europeanisation through *europeanised* political opportunities and frames.

A second observation to make is that the greater the level of European legislation in a given policy area, the more likely social movement groups are to engage in direct europeanisation by circumventing the nation state and taking action directly in Brussels. It is striking that across the case studies so many the local and grassroots groups were remarkably reluctant to engage with any opportunities thought to lie with the national and international professionalised EMOs, even within chapters of those same EMOs. In other words, the disconnect between an EMO and its local chapters was far greater than anticipated and led to much lower levels of europeanisation than expected. This was most evident in the case of the *corridoio tirrenico* when in spite of their access to numerous other professionalised groups with bases in Brussels and Rome, SOS Maremma chose not to reach out to those partners and to eschew the very idea that the EU was a legitimate arena for their concerns.

These arguments are reinforced by the work of Fairbrass and Jordan whose examination of institutionalised EMOs and ‘interest groups’ reinforces the possibilities for social movements to connect directly with the European Union rather than have their access mediated by national institutions. Indeed, the Commission actively seeks such links:

The Commission was particularly assiduous in its efforts to expand the EU’s competence in [biodiversity policy]...National and international environmental groups have served as the Commission’s ‘eyes and ears’ at the national level, by identifying implementation failures...Thus, environmental groups have been able to circumvent national barriers by exploiting the opportunities created by EU policymaking (Fairbrass & Jordan, 2001: 513-514).

We saw in the case of anti-GMO protest in Tuscany that GMOs gave an important dimension to the political opportunity structures available: the decentralisation of environmental policy. This decentralisation allowed the Tuscan Regional Government to find a way of circumventing the pro-GMO position of national government by creating Regional Law 64/2004 'Protection and promotion of the heritage of local breeds and plant varieties of agricultural, zootechnical and forestry interest'. In so doing it was able to ring-fence Tuscany as a GMO-free region and to create a local political opportunity structure that favoured the participation of larger anti-GMO organisations and EMOs. This political opportunity structure favoured those groups who were the most professionalised and therefore the most likely, according to the literature, to be institutionalised and to experience europeanisation (della Porta & Caini, 2009; Rootes, 2002b).

These same decentralised political opportunity structures had the opposite effect in the case of anti-road protest where the Regional Government was squarely held responsible for the development of the road by grassroots and local level groups. This is in spite of the Tuscan Regional Government framing the development as a European project to which one might have expected professionalised EMOs and political parties to respond with their European-level resources. Instead, the grassroots actors responded to the decentralised political opportunity structure, problematised the *corridoio tirrenico* as a regional issue and mobilised in a very local way. Here, the POS favoured the involvement of multiple smaller, local and grassroots groups which showed the least evidence of europeanisation. The two

protest areas of GMOs and roads in Tuscany were subject to the same national and regional political opportunity structures, but facilitated different kinds of actors who evidenced different levels of europeanisation.

7.6 Conclusion

In this chapter we have found comparative evidence that allows us to answer the first of the research questions posed by this thesis: where does the europeanisation of social movement predominantly occur – at the domestic or European level? We have found that for grassroots and local groups europeanisation *through the state occurs primarily at a domestic level*. National political opportunity structures and frames are enduring and powerful. My findings support the theory that local environmental protest targets the implementation rather than the formulation of EU policy (Rootes, 2002a, 2003b). However, we have also observed *europeanisation taking place unconsciously at a pan-European level*, through the construction and diffusion of norms across protests (in the cases of the A65 and A701) and through the construction of national and pan-European networks in response to issues arising from European legislation. In this way we have demonstrated that europeanisation does not need to be channelled through the state in order to occur.

We are also able to answer the second question in this thesis' research design: what extent does the degree of movement institutionalisation impact the degree of movement europeanisation? We have seen that the degree of institutionalisation

within a social movement campaign is varied. We have noted coalitions between ad-hoc grassroots groups and local chapters of NGOs or EMOs who have more in common than the local and national branches of the same EMO. Grassroots social movements therefore are a more nuanced structure than the social movement literature implies. This disconnect between the local chapters and the national or European-level of the same EMO has important consequences for the process of europeanisation at a local level. The europeanisation of EMOs has already been established in the literature (della Porta & Caini, 2009; Imig & Tarrow, 2000, 2001) but this thesis shows that this does not result in a kind of europeanisation ‘by proxy’ for the local chapters of the organisations. There are other factors that determine the degree of europeanisation amongst local chapters, such as protest issue or political opportunity structure, that dictate the degree of europeanisation more strongly than their affiliation to more institutionalised brethren. Therefore, although the alliance of grassroots groups and local chapters is helpful to the campaign, it does not automatically afford them access the same europeanised political opportunity structures or frames as their larger colleagues.

Nested within these conclusions lie a number of other important comparative findings. In section 7.2 I explained how although there is greater evidence of europeanisation in the domain of POS than frames, movement groups are using frames to situate their campaign within the political opportunity structures that offer them the best strategic advantage. The arenas of europeanisation are therefore interconnected and the process of europeanisation should be considered a diffuse one. In section 7.3 we noted that although there is variation across protest areas this is not because of the protest issue itself, but rather because of the kinds of POS and

frames that are facilitated by the degree of EU legislation in a particular protest area. We have also demonstrated that although the national distinctiveness of political opportunity structures and frames is enduring, and important in shaping social movement activity, it is the ‘goodness of fit’ between national frames and protest frames that dictates the degree of europeanisation. The better the fit, the less likely europeanisation is to occur because the protest frame serves to reinforce rather than challenge the national frame. Finally, we noted the variety of local level actors within the ‘social movement’ spectrum and how an alliance with ‘institutionalised’ actors does not translate into greater europeanisation for grassroots actors.

8 Movements, Europeanisation and Green Futures

‘Europeanization...relates to major developments affecting states, societies, and the European Union institutions. It connects different levels of analysis and types of actors, thereby posing complex ontological issues, and it displays asymmetries across institutional settings and policy processes. The relevance of Europeanization is significant in each of these respects’

(K. Featherstone & C. Radaelli, 2003: 331)

8.1 Introduction

The aim of this thesis is to determine what europeanisation mean for the mobilisation strategies and practices of the grassroots green movement. In investigating this question, I have identified a need for greater nuance in our understanding of the process of europeanisation. Specifically, I have identified three distinct processes of europeanisation:

- *Direct europeanisation*, caused by interaction between a national or sub-national actor⁶⁴ and the European Union;
- *Indirect europeanisation*, caused by interaction between an actor and europeanised agents (policies, parties, institutions) at a national level;

⁶⁴ ‘Actor’ here refers to social movements, interest groups, political parties, institutions or states.

- *Passive europeanisation*, caused by the emergence of pan-European relationships without explicitly addressing the European Union's national or supranational institutional impact.

The innovation in this framework lies in its ability to capture europeanisation that takes place outside of the state. Social movements, especially at a local level, may not show evidence of direct or indirect europeanisation because they do not mobilise in Brussels or appeal to domestic europeanised opportunities. However, if they diffuse their beliefs and strategies about a European policy through a pan-European network they will still be undergoing a kind of europeanisation. Operating at a local level, and working outside the state is an important characteristic of social movements, but this non (or extra)-state activity has remained largely neglected by the existing literature. This thesis framework represents a re-orientation of the investigation of europeanisation to accommodate non-state, specifically social movement actors. This framework further contributes to the scholarship in this area by disaggregating some of the concepts within 'direct and indirect europeanisation' such as ideas of intent to europeanise (Bache & Marshall, 2004) and formality of relationship with the EU (Sciarini, Fischer, & Nicolet, 2004).

A second contribution of this thesis is to the literature on social movements. In particular, I call for a focus in social movement literature on the specific arena of European integration rather than national or transnational processes more generally. The latter processes have received the largest share of scholarly attention, but an EU focus is revealing because it teases out the way in which social movement behaviour

shapes and is shaped by multiple layers of governance in an individual polity. I also problematise the idea of social movements as ‘non-institutionalised’. Although in social movement literature this characteristic forms the dividing line between social movement and non-governmental organisation, I show how in practice this line is blurred. The local chapter of an NGO (such as Greenpeace or Friends of the Earth) will share many more of the characteristics of a local grassroots group than of the professionalised national or European seats of the organisation. To discount these groups from the social movement category is to miss a key feature of many social movements. The extent to which these local chapters can *act as a conduit for opportunities or for the professionalisation of their grassroots colleagues is an important question for studying europeanisation within social movements*. It has been established in the social movement literature that actors are better able to connect to the state the more professionalised they are. However, I have established that it is not always necessary to connect to the state in order to experience europeanisation. In short, existing research on europeanisation is too state-centric. In the following sections I explore in more detail what this finding means for the larger debates in social and political science about the role of the state in European governance and the prospects for a europeanised green movement.

8.2 Europeanisation and European Integration

This thesis offers insights into larger questions regarding the role of the state in the process of europeanisation. In particular, it is able to offer insights into theories about sub-state actors, their relationship to the European Union and the role of the

state in negotiating this interaction. Its findings nest it within a larger body of literature on European government and governance, which I now outline before turning to the contribution this thesis offers to the debate.

There are two main areas of contemporary scholarship amongst those who have tried to define and theorise the process of European integration: intergovernmentalism and multi-level governance. Both camps agree that the European Union is a complex actor with decision-making shared between vertical layers of authority (subnational, national and supranational). But they diverge in the importance they attach to the role of the state in negotiating those layers of authority. For scholars of social movements, the pluralist multilevel governance perspective (Bache & Flinders, 2008; Hooghe & Marks, 2001; Marks, 1993, 1997) is of particular resonance because it contends that we are witnessing a shift away from the power of the nation state and towards national and subnational authority. Bache and Flinders define multilevel governance as:

the increased interdependence of governments operating at different territorial levels, while governance signalled the growing interdependence between governments and nongovernmental actors at various territorial levels (Bache & Flinders, 2008).

Although the state is still recognised as ‘the most important piece of the European puzzle’ (Hooghe & Marks, 2001: 3), it no longer monopolises the aggregation and representation of interests. Political arenas are interconnected rather than nested, meaning that subnational actors are able to act in both national and supranational arenas and create pan-European networks in the process. In so doing, these interests

are able to circumvent the national level in favour of the supranational (Fairbrass & Jordan, 2001: 501). The multilevel governance approach is defined by this vertical and lateral flow of influence, and by a segregation of actor and institution (institutions determine the political context and actors try to shape the institutions).

The interplay between these two perspectives and the importance they place on the role of the state as mediator raises some interesting questions for this thesis. These theories are designed to accommodate subnational actors. But what about social movements? They are qualitatively different from national actors explored by intergovernmentalism or Regional Governments featured in multilevel governance. So do the arguments hold true?

The first question posed by these broader debates about European integration theory is: to what extent do our studies of grassroots social movement activity mirror the role of 'interest groups' in the multi-level governance framework? The categories of actors at this level are numerous: regional government, trade unions, NGOs and also social movements. Marks and McAdam argue that the inclusion of social movements within this category is unproblematic:

Just as guilds, religious orders and other politico-organisational artefacts of the *ancien régime* had no standing in the emerging nation-state, neither do the rigid distinctions between interest groups and social movements mean much in the context of EU. All stand in much the same relationship to the integration *process*. They share the status of 'challenging groups' which hope to contest and shape the emerging institutions and philosophy of the European Union' (1996: 251).

The definition or role of social movements within European integration literature is not one that has been problematised elsewhere in social movement literature. Other authors who have investigated environmentalism in the EU have interpreted interest representation to mean environmental NGOs. Fairbrass and Jordan use the multilevel governance framework to examine the role of what they call ‘conservation groups’ like the RSPB⁶⁵, WWF⁶⁶ at a European level (Fairbrass & Jordan, 2001). Poloni-Staudinger similarly uses data on environmental NGOs such as Greenpeace, WWF and Friends of the Earth to explore political opportunities within a multi-level governance framework.

But as this thesis illustrates, it would be a mistake to conceive of a social movement as a single unit when its membership may encompass the most international NGO to the most local protest camp. The tactics of the professional NGOs involved in the French GMO campaign adopted different tactics to the *faucheurs volontaires* campaigning on the same issue. These groups have access to very different resources (both material and symbolic) and so it would be unreasonable to theorise their mobilisation at a subnational level in a uniform way. The differential mobilisation at a local level outlined in this thesis suggests that a more nuanced understanding of the role of the ‘social movement’ in multilevel governance would be useful in further studies of social movement actors in Europe.

⁶⁵ Royal Society for the Protection of Birds

⁶⁶ World Wildlife Fund for Nature

Furthermore the differential mobilisation between similar kinds of group in different countries underscores the importance of political opportunity structures in determining movement behaviour. If we are to accept that there are different levels of governance, and that social movement actors may chose to address their concerns to subnational, national or supranational arenas, then it is political opportunity structures that help to funnel their concerns in a particular direction. In the case of anti-GMO protest in Italy, the campaign addressed its concerns directly to regional government because the decentralisation in key areas of environmental policy gave it favourable local opportunity structures. These conclusions support the work of Poloni-Staudinger (2008: 552) who surmises:

Environmental nongovernmental organizations in Western Europe are presented with many avenues for action. They appear to use all of these avenues, yet vary their use based on the situation on the ground back home

So one further conclusion that we might draw is that, in terms of the theories of European integration, while a multilevel governance approach is useful in helping to capture the social movement activity at an EU level, it also remains to explain what determines the choice of arena. In the campaigns investigated here, the political opportunity structure at a local level is an important determinant of choices for local-level campaigns.

One final point must be made regarding the ability of a social movement to connect its campaign to the European level, whether through frames, political opportunity structures or any other mechanism of movement activity. *The ability to 'connect' to*

the European Union might offer evidence of europeanisation but it does not equate to an ability to 'influence' the European Union. In chapter one I argued that europeanisation was a reflexive process. As the EU was able to shape domestic actors, so those actors are able to shape the direction of integration. This remains a convincing argument, and one well exercised elsewhere (della Porta & Caiani, 2007; C. Radaelli, 2004). But the findings of this thesis suggest that even when a social movement showed evidence of connecting to European or europeanised political opportunity structures or frames, they did not necessarily achieve their desired outcome. The complaint that ARLP and SEPANSO addressed to the European Commission about the Natura 2000 species that would be destroyed by the A65 was dismissed and they did not appeal to the EU again. Similarly, when the anti-GMO campaign in Devon realised that they worked in a policy area tightly bound by European legislation, they did not address their concerns to the EU. Other authors working in the multilevel governance framework with much larger units of analysis – NGOs or regional governments – have also observed 'it is always important to distinguish between representation and influence' (Fairbrass & Jordan, 2001: 514). Similarly, Jeffery notes '[m]obilisation and influence are not synonymous' (2000: 3).

8.3 Towards a Europeanised Green Movement?

What does this thesis tell us about the chances that a pan-European environmental movement will emerge? The literature in this area is divided. In the arena of

environmental politics Rootes observes that environmentalism is a phenomenon particularly predisposed to international cooperation:

[T]he nature of environmental issues encourages a transnational perspective, and environmentalists are, for the most part, modernisers and internationalists who instinctively aspire to transnational action and seek transnational agreements (Rootes, 2002a: 377).

But enthusiasm for the transnational perspective has not necessarily been borne out in practice. There is little or no evidence that the trajectories of environmental protest within EU Member States are converging. Instead, studies have shown that protests appear firmly grounded in national issues and opportunities (Doherty & Hayes, 2007; Rootes, 2002a, 2002b, 2005). The conclusions of this literature echo my own findings on entrenched national frames and the enduring preference to protest at the level at which policy is *implemented*. The implications of these obstacles for passive europeanisation are underscored in the following pages.

In the arena of social movements, the literature is similarly divergent. Marks and McAdam suggest that, rather than the emergence of what one might call ‘super movements’, it is more likely that we will observe national movements simply having a greater choice of arenas in which to act:

[W]e expect – in fact, can already discern – significant changes in the locus and form of social movements as a result of European integration....European integration combines elements of continued state authority, with the creation of decentralised subnational power and the development of supranational decision-making bodies...So instead of the rise of a single new social movement form, we are more apt to see the development and proliferation of multiple movement forms keyed to inherited structures and the demands of mobilisation in particular policy areas (1996: 275).

However, research by della Porta and Caimi (2009: 170) points to the emergence of just such a ‘single new social movement form’:

[W]e have observed the emergence of a transnational, European social movement addressing EU politics and policies...our data...have stressed the existence of emerging structures of a European social movement, made of loosely coupled networks of activists endowed with multiple (overlapping) associational memberships and sharing a common set of values.

So while the European integration and social movement literatures point to new opportunities for social movement actors, the environmental movement literature points to the dominance of national action repertoires. Over ten years ago, Ward and Lowe called for cross-national comparisons and individual case studies to help advance these debates about the europeanisation of environmentalism (1998: 164). This thesis represents a contribution towards this advance in our understanding. What do the experiences of the local and grassroots actors in the cases presented here tell us about the likelihood of a europeanised environmental movement? First, they underline the need for nuance in this question: neither ‘europeanisation’ nor ‘social movement’ should be treated as homogeneous ideas. Europeanisation may be manifest in different process (I offer three: direct, indirect and passive) and social movements may be composed of a wider variety of actors than the literature in this area accommodates. I argue that if there is to be a European environmental movement, its creation will need to accommodate these more nuanced ideas of europeanisation and social movement. The deepening and widening of social movement networks will facilitate all three processes of europeanisation, however, my conclusions indicate three significant obstacles to this process:

- 1) a fragmentation among social movement actors, (shades of green, disconnect with grassroots);
- 2) the dominance of national frames and political opportunity structures (dictated by the legislation itself);
- 3) a question mark about the desirability of such a movement for the actors themselves.

On the face of it, conditions for European environmentalism would seem ripe. The same transnational issues are being considered by green movement actors every day across the continent. But this thesis points to two fault lines within the 'social movement' at a local level. The first of these is the variety of beliefs contained within one movement. The spectrum of dark to light green ideology marks them apart from the anti-nuclear movement, for example, or the civil rights movement. And although the common understanding is that the more local or grassroots the social movement groups become the darker the shade of green (Dobson, 2000; Doherty, 2002), this is not always the case. For example, at Bilston Glen the very dark green of the activists in the protest camp was offset by the relatively light green of some of the NAAG members who saw the road simply as an unwelcome addition to their village rather than a larger environmental problem per se. Although this disjuncture did not prevent the two groups from working together on a common campaign, on other issues, or over time, activists' differences could make a sustained alliance more difficult.

A further point of difference within the movement is the degree of institutionalisation amongst the actors. In particular, the spread of institutionalisation among environmental movement organisations and NGOs such as Friends of the Earth makes a cohesive 'movement' more difficult. This research has found that the relationship between an organisation and its local chapters varies between organisations, but it is largely a distant and disconnected relationship. Local chapters may be free to choose their own campaigns and if they do not align with the national campaign will not benefit from the resources (posters, badges, dossiers, profile) of the organisation. Many of those interviewed felt as though the national or European-level tiers of their organisation had nothing to offer them at a strategic level. The consequence of this was that alliances between local chapters and grassroots groups rarely brought any of the advantages of 'professionalisation by association' that might have been expected. With the exception of the French road campaign these alliances did not make grassroots groups more likely to connect to European political opportunity structures or frames. Therefore the isolation of local EMO chapters impedes the chances for these groups to connect to what is a ready-made network of similar groups, co-ordinated by a national or international organisation. This isolation also makes it difficult for any 'europeanisation by proxy' to occur at a local level because the advantages of institutionalisation enjoyed by NGOs and EMOs may not trickle down to grassroots groups.

A second obstacle to the creation of a europeanised environmental movement is the dominance of national frames and political opportunity structures. This research has illustrated the enduring importance of national political opportunity structures in

determining social movement behaviour. To illustrate, the decentralisation of GMO policy in Italy created a very different set of opportunities in Tuscany than in Aquitaine in centralised France. As a result, there were more grassroots actors in France than in Italy, where the Regional Government's activities squeezed out the opportunities for less professionalised actors.

The dominance of national masterframes was also underscored in this thesis. In particular, we noted how the europeanisation of social movement frames worked along the 'goodness of fit principle' – the better the fit between the protest frame and the national masterframe the less likely that europeanisation was to occur. It should be noted that these frames are negotiated rather than pre-determined, so a social movement can manipulate their access to europeanised opportunities. In the case of the A65 in France and the *Corridoio Tirrenico* in Italy, these frames were manipulated to shape the level of governance being addressed by the campaign. Nonetheless, the national opportunities and frames were clearly dominant in the cases studied. This national specificity presents a barrier to the creation of international networks. If the manifestation of the same EU policy is being framed and implemented differently in each country, then the experiences and strategies of a movement group's campaign become less useful outside of their home territory.

Finally, questions about the EU's legitimacy raised by this thesis throw into doubt the idea that a europeanised green movement would even be desirable for social movement actors. In two of the six case studies, the local actors chose to reject any

European dimension to their campaign, although for different reasons. The Bilston protest camp had a strong ideological element to their campaign, based on a rejection of existing patterns of production and consumption and political practices. This meant that its critique extended beyond simple incidences of perceived injustice (such as the road) into larger and more systematic critiques of the political system in which they were participating. The camp was, therefore, opposed the very notion of the EU because it was seen to replicate existing faulty power structures. In Tuscany, however, *SOS Maremma* saw the introduction of any European dimension into the debate as a challenge to the local level of their campaign. It rejected any idea that the road was a European project as a way of discrediting the proposal – here the EU was seen as lending an implied legitimacy to the road. In light of these findings, it should not be assumed that local green actors will see europeanisation as a positive force that strengthens their social movement.

This thesis has shown that the greatest opportunity to develop European environmentalism and expand of the process of europeanisation lies in the creation of social movement networks. European environmentalism must be a collective endeavour. I have identified a number of obstacles to this goal, but also teased out the role of passive processes of europeanisation for social movement actors who do not seek to address European opportunities at a national or European level. Further research in this area would prove useful in deepening our understanding of how social movement networks help to shape the effects of European integration in domestic and European arenas.

8.4 Conclusion

To conclude, the recent turn in europeanisation research has breathed new life into long-standing debates about Europe. It has also spawned studies into the multitude of policies and politics that are shaped by, and seek to shape, the processes of European integration (Bomberg & Peterson, 2000: 7). It is only recently, however, that attention has been turned to the europeanisation of non-state actors. Even less attention has been dedicated to social movements at a grassroots level. This thesis has attempted to bridge that gap in understanding. This endeavour allows us to point to new areas of exploration.

In examining the processes of europeanisation at work at a local level, I have problematised the role of the state in the process. I developed a framework for identifying European or europeanised political opportunity structures and frames. Actors may connect either to opportunities and frames at the level of the EU (favoured by campaigns tightly bound by European legislation), or they may connect to opportunities at a domestic level and replicate europeanised frames between countries (favoured by smaller actors and campaigns less tied to EU legislation). Grassroots europeanisation may then be vertical, or lateral. But I also noted that ‘connecting’ to these domains is not the same as exercising influence there. Further research is required to understand the extent to which this state-centric europeanisation may be more consequential than passive europeanisation that occurs outside the state.

Secondly, social movement literature has long established that the country in which a campaign takes place is important in defining its political opportunity structures. This thesis has also shown that nationality matters for frames. Being able to connect or disconnect the campaign frame from the national masterframe will alter the possibility to connect to European or europeanised opportunities. This raises questions about the relationship between passive europeanisation and the europeanisation of frames. To what extent does passive europeanisation, through the creation of networks, facilitate the europeanisation of shared beliefs, strategies, and practices? While this thesis has provided an important initial exploration of passive europeanisation, further work is required to understand what its dynamics – especially the creation and operation of networks – mean for the diffusion of ideas or ‘soft’ europeanisation.

Finally, I have demonstrated that the degree of institutionalisation of actors is important in determining the extent of europeanisation. Yet, for a grassroots group, working alongside a more institutionalised and europeanised group does not automatically afford them access to europeanisation. Other factors are more important in determining the degree of europeanisation at a grassroots level, such as the area of policy in question and the country in which the protest is taking place. The relationship between local chapters and grassroots groups is inadequately addressed by the literature and it certainly raises important questions for students of europeanisation. While this thesis has identified core dynamics in that relationship more research is needed. In particular further empirical study of environmental

protest at a local level could tease out the effect that these alliances have on the trajectory of local movement protest.

This thesis has posed several questions, offered some answers and in turn posed some more questions of its own. Importantly, it has cast a spotlight on the effect of europeanisation on grassroots social movements. More generally, it has identified new opportunities, new frames, and fresh ways of thinking about the environmental challenges of the 21st century.

Appendix 1: Data Collection Methods

The research design of this thesis adopts a qualitative approach and this is reflected in the research methods chosen. I rely on a triangulation of methods to enhance the robustness of my findings: case studies, semi-structured interviews and documentary analysis. These methods are discussed now in more detail below.

Documentary Analysis

Documentary analysis or the ‘documentary research method’ (Mogalakwe, 2006: 221) has established itself as an important feature of social and political research. This process involves the study of documents ‘either to understand their substantive content or to illuminate deeper meanings which may be revealed by their style and coverage’ (Ritchie, 2003: 35). Ritchie goes on to note that ‘[d]ocumentary analysis is particularly useful where the history of events or experience has relevance, in studies where written communications may be central to the enquiry...and where ‘private’ as well as ‘public’ accounts are needed’ (2003: 35). In the case of social movement research this ability to capture all three of these elements is important.

I collected both primary and secondary documents for the research project detailed here, although this was weighted heavily towards the former because I was most interested in how the social movement actors portrayed the issue and themselves, rather than the way in which they were portrayed by others. I understand documents

to mean 'written text' (Mogalakwe, 2006) and so the range of sources I used was large. I took the text from social movement websites, from flyers and leaflets, from campaign dossiers, newsletters, email lists, press releases and other official communications. Accessing these documents was not problematic because many were already in the public domain, although in some instances, particularly relating to previous anti-GMO actions I relied on my interview participants providing me with copies of campaign material that they had archived for their own use. Although this represented only a small percentage of the documents that I used it does mean that they were self-selected by social movement actors. To overcome this bias as much as possible I requested to select my own materials from their archives. I also recognise the symbiotic relationship between text and the images that accompany it, particularly in the context of social movement materials and so I also recorded the images alongside the text for analysis.

In analysing each of the documents I noted down both the substantive content – what kind of protest activity was going to take place for example, who was involved? I was also interested in the more subjective meanings within the document – what kind of language were they using? Did any words or themes or images reoccur? Where I required additional information I supplemented the data with secondary sources – newspaper reports of protest events for example where the language was one again critically evaluated.

Semi-Structured Interviewing

The second method of data collection used in this thesis was semi-structured interviewing. Interviews ‘provide an opportunity for detailed investigation of people’s personal perspectives, for in-depth understanding of the personal context within which the research phenomena are located, and for very detailed subject coverage’ (Ritchie, 2003: 36). The ability of these interviews to capture personal understandings and context meant that they were particularly useful in helping to capture the way in which issues were being framed, as well as supplementing and helping to corroborate the documentary analysis.

A total of 40 interviews were conducted for this research project, taking place predominantly in 2008 and 2009 – a small number of UK interviews were conducted in 2010. I employed a snowballing technique in order to identify suitable actors to interview. This technique is one that is particularly well suited to social movement research because it ‘yields a study sample through referrals made among people who share or know of others who possess some characteristics that are of research interest’ (Biernacki & Waldorf, 1981: 141). I therefore used the websites of the various campaign groups to identify one or two individuals with whom I pre-arranged interviews. Once I met them I asked them to recommend others with whom I might meet, and my interview participants grew in numbers.

Where I had an email address for a participant I circulated two documents in advance in their native language – a Project Overview which explained the purpose of the

research and confirmed my provenance, and an Interview Outline that sketched the kinds of topics I intended to cover in the interview (See Appendices 2 and 3). In light of the sometimes sensitive nature of the campaigns (for example GM crop protest) it was particularly important to be transparent in the purpose of the research and the kinds of subjects that they would be invited to discuss. Where possible, I also sent an email to each participant after the interview to thank them for their time and inviting them to contact me with any queries about the research in the future.

The interviews were semi-structured so whilst there were a set of guideline questions from which I worked, I was able to pursue individual themes with participants as they emerged.

Each interview lasted for around one and a half hours, although the interviews of 17.11.2009 and 02.11.2009 lasted for around three hours because of the participants' travel arrangements. Each interview was conducted in the native language of the participant, and for interviews conducted in French or Italian permission was sought before we began to record the conversation in order to help with the transcription of notes at a later date. Nobody refused to be recorded, although some participants also chose to make 'off the record' observations. Notes were written during the course of the interview, and I also provided pens and paper for the participants to note down anything that they thought would be important, for example to sketch the other actors with whom their group was affiliated. These notes and recordings were then examined, in the same way as the documents for both their substantive and subjective contents.

Ethical Issues

Because of the sometimes sensitive nature of the issues being discussed – GM-crop destruction for example – all of the interviews were non-attributable. Where interviews were conducted within very small communities of actors this also helped to protect anonymity because individual identities could be quickly retrieved by a process of deduction. I believe this approach helped the participants to speak more freely. The only exception to individual anonymity was in the recruitment of individual interview participants. Where another campaigner acted as a gatekeeper I used their name with their permission to gain access to other interview participants. The secure storage of the research data was another ethical consideration. In line with the protection of individual identities, the spreadsheet containing details of the interviews conducted was password protected, as were the digital recordings of interviews. The written notes from each interview were kept locked in a filing cabinet.

Finally, the transparency of the project was an important ethical consideration. All communications were in the participants' native languages, and a summary of the project and interview guide also in their native language were distributed via email in advance where possible. All participants were provided with my contact details and a hard copy of the research project overview where requested.

Appendix 2: Project Outlines

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PROJECT OUTLINE

What does europeanization mean for the structures, beliefs and networks of the green movement?

As the members of the EU continue to be guided by the process of European integration - with the introduction of new regulations for example - the effects of this integration (called europeanization) are becoming visible. Europeanization is being manifested in various ways including the creation of institutions and shared understandings across Europe.

This raises interesting questions for the green movement: what does the process of europeanization mean for the movement? How is the movement operating in the context of European integration and is it changing? Can the movement shape europeanization? This research attempts to address these questions – the details are explained below.

Why is this important?

- This project is asking questions that no one has really asked before. There has been a lot of academic research on the europeanization of green *political parties*, but not the green *movement*, especially at a grassroots level.
- We will be able to predict how the movement is likely to develop and the impact it is likely to have by understanding more about how it is currently working.
- We will have a better understanding of europeanization and what it means for things that are not concrete institutions.

How is this project organised?

- This project is the basis of my PhD research at the University of Edinburgh 2007-2010 and funded by the UK Economic and Social Research Council.

- I am investigating green movement protest against road-building projects and GM crops in Britain (Devon and Midlothian), France (Gironde), and Italy (Tuscany).
- I will be interviewing members of the green movement who are involved in protest against these issues, as well as individuals in the local authorities to find out about their experiences.
- Interview data will be supplemented with other material: websites, newspaper articles etc. and academic texts.

What will happen to the results?

- The results of my research will be written up into a PhD thesis which will be made available in the British Library and the University of Edinburgh Library.
- I hope to publish selected parts of my research as articles in academic journals. These will be available in paper copy and online. I also hope to publish an adapted and extended version of my PhD thesis as a book.
- First and foremost I hope that this research will contribute to a better understanding of the green movement and the effects of European integration.

Further information:

If you would like to discuss this project further then please do not hesitate to contact me. You may also contact my PhD project supervisors if you would like to verify the context of this work:

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PLAN DU PROJET

Que signifie l'eupéanisation pour les structures, les croyances et les réseaux du mouvement vert?

Au fur et à mesure que les membres de l'UE continuent à être guidés par le processus d'intégration européenne – avec, par exemple, l'introduction des nouvelles réglementations – les effets de celle-ci (qu'on appelle « eupéanisation ») deviennent visibles. L'eupéanisation se manifeste de manières diverses, y compris par le biais de la création d'institutions et une compréhension commune à travers l'Europe.

Cette situation pose quelques questions intéressantes pour le mouvement vert : que signifie le processus d'eupéanisation pour le mouvement ? Comment opère le mouvement dans le contexte d'intégration européenne et comment change-t-il ? Est-ce que le mouvement a la capacité de déterminer l'eupéanisation ? Cette recherche tente de répondre à ces questions - les détails se trouvent ci-dessous.

Pourquoi est-ce important?

- Ce projet pose des questions que personne ne s'est jamais demandé. Il y a beaucoup de recherches académiques sur l'eupéanisation des *partis politiques* verts, mais pas sur le *mouvement* vert – surtout au niveau populaire.
- En comprenant comment opère le mouvement en ce moment, il serait possible de prédire son développement et son probable impact.
- On aura une meilleure compréhension de l'eupéanisation et de ce qu'elle signifie pour les mouvements qui ne sont pas des institutions concrètes.

Comment s'organise ce projet ?

- Ce projet est le fondement de ma recherche doctorale à l'Université d'Edinburgh 2007-2010 et il est financé par le Conseil des recherches économiques et sociales du Royaume-Uni (ESRC).
- J'examine les protestations du mouvement vert contre la construction des nouvelles autoroutes et contre les organismes génétiquement modifiés en France (la Gironde), en Italie (la Toscane) et en Grande-Bretagne (Devon et Midlothian).
- Je ferai des entretiens avec membres du mouvement vert qui se mobilisent contre ces questions, en plus des autorités locales pour me renseigner sur leurs expériences.
- Les données des entretiens seront complétées de matériaux supplémentaires : des sites web, des articles de journaux, et des textes académiques.

Que se passera-t-il aux résultats de la recherche ?

- Les résultats de ma recherche seront publiés dans ma thèse doctorale qui sera disponible dans la Bibliothèque Nationale de la Grande-Bretagne et dans la bibliothèque de l'Université d'Edinburgh.
- J'espère publier des extraits de ma recherche dans les journaux académiques. Ceux-ci seront disponible aux formats papier et électronique. Qui plus est, j'espère publier une version étendue libre de ma thèse.
- Surtout, j'espère que ma recherche contribuera à une meilleure compréhension du mouvement vert et des effets de l'intégration européenne.

Pour savoir plus:

Si vous souhaitez discuter de ce projet n'hésitez pas à me contacter. Sinon vous pouvez contacter mes directeurs de thèse pour vérifier le contexte du travail :

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SCHEMA DEL PROGETTO DI RICERCA

Che cosa significa l'europeanizzazione per i strutture, le credenze e le reti del movimento ambientale?

I membri dell'Unione europea continuano ad essere guidati dal processo dell'integrazione europea – con l'introduzione dei nuovi regolamenti per esempio – e gli effetti di quest'integrazione (che si chiama l'europeanizzazione) diventano visibili. L'europeanizzazione si manifesta in tanti modi diversi come la creazione di nuovi istituzioni ed una comprensione 'europea'.

Questa situazione pone alcune domande interessanti per il movimento ambientale: che cosa significa l'europeanizzazione per il movimento ambientale? Come funziona il movimento nel contesto dell'integrazione europea e in quale misura cambia?

Può il movimento influenzare l'europeanizzazione? Questo progetto di ricerca relaziona tra loro tutte queste domande – i dettagli, invece, vengono spiegati sotto.

Perché è importante questa ricerca?

- Questo progetto si pone domande che nessuno ha mai chiesto. Esiste molta ricerca sull'europeanizzazione dei *partiti politici* ambientali, ma non sul *movimento* ambientale – soprattutto al livello di gente comune.
- Capendo come funziona il movimento allo stato attuale, sarà possibile predire il suo sviluppo e l'impatto probabile del movimento.
- Porterà una comprensione migliore dell'europeanizzazione e che cosa significa per le cose che non sono le istituzioni fisse.

Com'è organizzata questa ricerca?

- Questo progetto è la base della mia ricerca di dottorato all'Università d'Edimburgo (2007-2010) e finanziato dal Consiglio sulla ricerca sociale ed economica (ESRC) del Regno Unito.
- Investigo il movimento ambientale nei campi della costruzione di autostrade e gli organismi geneticamente modificati in Italia (Toscana) nella Gran Bretagna (Midlothian and Devon), e la Francia (la Gironde).
- Interviste ai membri del movimento ambientale ed alle autorità locali per meglio capire le loro esperienze.
- I dati delle interviste saranno integrati con altri materiali: i siti web, articoli nei giornali ed i testi accademici.

Che cosa succederà ai risultati della ricerca?

- I risultati della mia ricerca diventeranno una tesi di dottorato che sarà disponibile nella Biblioteca nazionale della Gran Bretagna e nell'Università d'Edinburgo.
- Spero di pubblicare estratti selezionati nelle pubblicazioni accademiche. Saranno disponibili on-line e su carta. Mi piacerebbe anche pubblicare una versione estesa della tesi come libro.
- Soprattutto spero che questa ricerca contribuisca ad una migliore comprensione del movimento ambientale e degli effetti dell'integrazione europea.

Ulteriori informazione:

Sono lieta di discutere qualsiasi altra questione per quanto riguarda il progetto. Oppure può contattare i relatori della mia tesi dottorale per appurare il contesto della ricerca:

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Appendix 3: Interview Guides

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INTERVIEW GUIDE

Thank you very much for agreeing to an interview with me. The interview should last about 45 minutes, and I will be taking notes although all quotes can be non-attributable if you prefer.

In order to give you some time to think about the subject, please find below some of the issues on which I am interested to hear from you.

- How you came to be involved in environmental issues.
- How you became involved in xxxx issue.
- How the campaign about xxx is organised, what kind of activities it does.
- Where your campaign draws its resources from – financial, expertise, leadership.
- Is your campaign linked to any other groups?
- Are you aware of European integration changing the way you operate?

Please do not worry about giving me ‘the right’ answer – there isn’t one! I am simply interested to hear your thoughts and your experiences with these issues.

Please also remember that if you do not feel comfortable talking about something in particular then you are always able to tell me so and I will move on to discuss another topic.

I look forward to meeting with you shortly.

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QUESTIONS

Merci beaucoup d'avoir accepté mon invitation. L'entretien devrait durer 45 minutes et je prendrai des notes. Cependant, si vous le préférez, toutes les citations peuvent être non-imputables.

Afin de vous laisser le temps de réfléchir sur le sujet, veuillez trouver ci-dessous les questions sur lesquelles votre expérience personnelle m'intéresse :

- D'où vient votre implication dans les questions environnementales ?
- Comment s'est concrétisée votre implication dans ce problème ?
- Comment la campagne s'organise-t-elle, et quelles sont ses activités ?
- D'où viennent les ressources de la campagne ?
- Est-ce que la campagne est liée aux autres campagnes?
- Est-ce qu'il y a une dimension européenne à votre travail?

Je ne voudrais pas que vous vous sentiez obligé de donner la réponse « correcte » ; elle n'existe pas ! Je suis simplement intéressée votre opinion et vos expériences sur ces questions.

Je tiens à vous préciser, que, si une question vous gêne, vous n'êtes dans aucune obligation de répondre. L'entretien se poursuivra avec la question suivante.

Au plaisir de vous rencontrer.

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DOMANDE

La ringrazio per aver accettato di fare l'intervista. La durata sarà di circa 45 minuti.

Per meglio riflettere sul soggetto dell'intervista sotto troverà alcune domande che mi interessano:

- Come si è diventato coinvolto nelle questione ambientali.
- Perché si è lasciato coinvolgere in questa campagna.
- L'organizzazione della campagna e le sue attività.
- Da dove vengono le risorse per la campagna.
- La sua campagna è legata ad altre campagne ambientali?
- C'è un dimensione europea nella sua campagna?

La prego di non preoccuparsi di dare una « risposta giusta » – non esiste! Sono semplicemente interessata alle Sue opinioni ed esperienze.

Inoltre Le volevo ricordare che se non si sente a suo agio con una particolare domanda è possibile passare alla successiva senza alcun problema.

In attesa del nostro incontro, Le porgo cordiali saluti.

Appendix 4: List of Interviews

France

Interview with anti-road activist	03.11.2008
Interview with anti-GMO activist	04.11.2008
Interview with anti-road activist	04.11.2008
Interview with anti-road activist	06.11.2008
Interview with anti-road activist	07.11.2008
Interview with anti-GMO activist	10.11.2008
Interview with anti-road activist	11.11.2008
Interview with anti-GMO activist	03.11.2009
Interview with anti-GMO activist	11.11.2009
Interview with anti-road activist	13.11.2009
Interview with anti-road activist	16.11.2009
Interview with anti-road activist	16.11.2009
Interview with anti-road activist	17.11.2009
Interview with Aquitaine Council representative	19.11.2009
Interview with anti-GMO activist	22.11.2009

Italy

Interview with anti-road activist	20.10.2008
Interview with anti-road activist	20.10.2008
Interview with anti-road activist	20.10.2008
Interview with anti-GMO activist	21.10.2008
Interview with anti-road activist	21.10.2008
Interview with anti-GMO activist	23.10.2008
Interview with anti-GMO activist	23.10.2008
Interview with Tuscan Regional Government representative	24.10.2008
Telephone interview with WWF representative	27.10.2009
Interview with CIA representative	28.10.2009
Interview with anti-road activist	30.10.2009
Interview with anti-road activist	02.11.2009
Interview with anti-road activist	02.11.2009
Telephone interview with representative of SAT	02.11.2009

UK

Interview with anti-road activist	28.03.2008
Interview with anti-road activist	20.06.2008
Interview with anti-GMO activist	19.12.2008
Interview with anti-road activist	03.03.2009
Interview with anti-road activist	12.06.2009
Interview with Devon County Council representative	16.02.2010

Interview with Devon County Council representative	16.02.2010
Telephone interview with anti-GMO activist	19.02.2010
Interview with anti-GMO activist	19.02.2010
Interview with anti-road activist	20.02.2010

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- Figure 6.4: *Attac Landes/Faucheurs/Vigilance OGM 33* French Presidential
elections flyer.
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- Figure 6.5 Flyer for *Comitato Stop Autostrada*'s bike ride to stop the motorway
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